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New York

Chairman: Mr. Valencia Rodriquez . . . . (Ecuador)

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

Agenda items 53 to 66, 68 to 72 and 153 *(continued)*

General debate on all disarmament and international security items

Mr. Cárdenas (Argentina) *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I wish to convey to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the other officers of the Committee, my congratulations on your election to guide our work for the current session.

In the general debate in the General Assembly, we heard many important statements, including those of the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation, which contained very valuable contributions in the area of arms control and disarmament. From my delegation's point of view, questions associated with non-proliferation are today of priority importance in view of the persistence of a number of regional sources of tension that could pose a threat to international peace and security.

Risks in recent years of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in recent years demonstrate the growing importance of multilateral agreements in this field, and of the need for controls on the export of sensitive technologies related to such weapons systems.

The system of collective security established in the Charter should continue to be strengthened. In this respect, any measures promoting the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will help bolster that system and the maintenance of international peace and security.

Argentina's ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco on 18 January last, and its decision to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) confirm its unambiguous peace-loving tradition and clearly demonstrate my country's commitment to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Argentine Government wants the legislative process to be completed before 1995, so that Argentina can participate in next year's Treaty review Conference as a State party.

On that occasion, my country hopes to promote two primary objectives: the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty and improvements in and the strengthening of its verification system. As is well known, Argentina's commitment to non-proliferation received its initial impetus within our regional framework, through agreements with Brazil. These agreements are now being implemented in full.

The Argentine-Brazilian agency for the accounting and control of nuclear materials is in full operation, meeting the deadlines established in all the working timetables concerning inspections, technical support work, accounting for nuclear materials and coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that have been set for this year.

Furthermore, on 4 March last, the agreement on complete nuclear safeguards entered into force. This was signed by Argentina, Brazil, the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the IAEA. The full entry into force of this agreement means that all nuclear installations in the two countries are now under full international supervision.

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We support the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the monitoring of safeguards agreements. We reaffirm that the obligations contained in those agreements should be strictly observed within the deadlines set. This is our position both in the region and in the context of the international community.

An effective way to promote non-proliferation is the exchange of experience on a regional level. With this in mind, we organized a seminar, held at San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina, from 18 to 21 April, on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-proliferation. That seminar, which was organized in close cooperation with Brazil and the United States of America, was the first of its kind in the region. It enjoyed the participation of 18 countries of the Americas and four international organizations, the IAEA, the ABACC, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and opened up the possibility of holding similar meetings in the near future.

The complete prohibition of nuclear tests is one of the most important objectives on the disarmament and arms control agenda. The negotiations now under way in the Conference on Disarmament should not be allowed to lose their initial impetus. To this end, we should recall that the objective of terminating testing is universally shared, and yet requires genuine political will on the part of all negotiating States.

We support — and we believe that this will be conducive to the objective of ending nuclear testing — the unilateral moratoriums observed by most of the nuclear Powers. By contrast, Argentina rejects the nuclear tests that have been carried out, which run counter to that international trend and which diminish the impact of ongoing unilateral, regional and international efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation.

My country supports and participates in the consultations being held in the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a convention prohibiting the production of fissile material. We believe that, together with a comprehensive test-ban treaty, this would genuinely and effectively help us reach the goal of nuclear disarmament.

The Convention banning chemical weapons hardly requires comment concerning its major importance among disarmament treaties. It was the product of arduous negotiation and has the advantage of rendering a whole category of weapons of mass destruction, which have devastating humanitarian effects, internationally unlawful. For these reasons, Argentina joins the countries of the European Union in calling for this instrument to enter into force as soon as possible. From our national standpoint, my Government will strive to expedite the legislative processes involved in its ratification.

At the same time, our decision to implement strict controls on exports of chemical substances, among others covered by existing legislation, together with the commitment of a number of Latin American countries through the Mendoza Accord of 1991, bear witness to our adherence to the purposes of the Convention. Furthermore, at the domestic level we are taking the decisions necessary to set up the national authority required by the Convention.

As noted earlier, controls on the exports of substances and equipment that could be diverted for military purposes are a valuable supplement to the legal ban imposed by international treaties on complete weapons systems To strengthen these complementary efforts, there will be an international seminar in Buenos Aires on 15 and 16 November next on the non-proliferation of chemical and bacteriological weapons, organized in conjunction with the Australian Group. The purpose of the seminar will be to share experiences with the Latin American countries invited concerning the operation of the Group.

After many years of operating without an effective verification mechanism, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction is now nearing the final stages of improvement and strengthening. The process of negotiating a verification mechanism approved by the recent Special Conference of parties to the Convention indicates a favourable trend in the direction of multilateral disarmament. We trust that the ad hoc group that has been set up will be able to complete its work in a reasonable period of time, drawing on the invaluable experience of the Verex Group on verification measures and the useful precedents of the Convention on chemical weapons.

The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and all disarmament and arms-control measures indisputably require an increase in mutual trust and the strengthening of the system of cooperative security mechanisms, which give pride of place to preventive diplomacy, thus reducing the potential for conflict.

In this respect, a vital component of any cooperative security mechanism is transparency. We therefore concur in the positive assessment that most nations have of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, an assessment reflected by the Secretary-General in his annual report on the work of the Organization. This important transparency measure, whose operation should be bolstered through participation by the greatest possible number of countries, has far-reaching repercussions in areas not directly associated with it, such as verification or preventive diplomacy. We hope that it will soon be possible to broaden it to include stocks of military equipment and equipment procured from national production. Only in this way will it be possible to implement properly the commitments stemming from resolution 46/36 L of 1991.

In that context, this year Argentina submitted to the Register not only data on exports and imports, but also information on stocks of military equipment. We are convinced that greater transparency in the area of conventional weapons would help strengthen mutual trust among countries in the southern cone of America.

The international security system established by the Charter cannot function effectively without appropriate regional support, as foreseen in Chapter VIII. As a contribution to the dialogue on these issues, in March this year Buenos Aires hosted the first regional meeting of experts on security mechanisms and confidence-building measures, organized within the framework of the Organization of American States (OAS). The meeting agreed on recommendations on the enactment of specific measures to build mutual trust. This process, which is moving forward in parallel within the regional organization and in the United Nations, offers the genuine prospect of a cooperative security system in keeping with the new international situation.

Closely bound up with security and arms control issues is the problem of anti-personnel mines, which the Secretary-General has quite rightly described as an international humanitarian crisis. Every country has some connection with this problem and some responsibility for it, whether as a consumer, a producer or a victim of the laying of land-mines.

Along with other countries, Argentina has decided to act resolutely. For this reason, it has placed a five-year moratorium on the export, sale or transfer of anti-personnel mines. There can be no doubt that the proliferation of anti-personnel mines has become an extremely serious problem that needs to be tackled effectively and urgently in the appropriate multilateral forums.

We also support efforts aimed at channelling assistance for mine clearance. We also regard as worthy of attention the proposals aimed at strengthening the 1980 inhumane-weapons Convention.

We need renewed efforts to achieve transparent and cooperative international security mechanisms and to ensure that conflicts and disputes end in rational political solutions. We hope that at this session the Assembly will strengthen these trends which will be to the benefit of the whole international community.

Mr. Bystricky (Slovakia): I am pleased to have this opportunity to address the First Committee at this year's session.

I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of the Committee; I wish you much success in that highly responsible position. At the same time, I should like to assure you of the full support of the Slovak delegation.

I greatly appreciate the opportunity to address this important forum of world opinion and to present the position of Slovakia on a range of issues concerning disarmament, arms control, peace-keeping operations, global stability and international peace.

The end of the cold-war era has opened up possibilities even the greatest optimist would not have dared to think of a couple of years ago. Like other peaceful nations, Slovakia confirms its readiness to contribute to the removal of tension caused by the enormous accumulation of arms still persisting as a residue of the cold-war period.

Recent years have been characterized by significant changes in the conceptual understanding of security and stability. We consider the joint efforts of the world community to ban weapons of mass destruction to be the most important commitment of our times.

I take as an example the chemical-weapons Convention which, having introduced a ban on the development, production, possession and use of chemical weapons, has been open for signature since January 1993. As one of the first conventions of this kind, the chemical weapons Convention contains a thorough set of verification measures, including the establishment of an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The mechanisms for verifying compliance with past multilateral agreements were, for the most part, either inadequate or incomplete. Many of these multilateral arms-control agreements contained no verification provisions whatsoever. And in cases where they did, such as the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, they have never yet been exploited to the full. The inability of those earlier treaties to ensure compliance, let alone warn of impending violations, underlined the need for verifiable, rather than declamatory, multilateral disarmament accords.

Our delegation believes that the chemical-weapons Convention has become a test case for a new type of multilateral arms-control agreement. Intended by its negotiators as a remedy for the defects of earlier multilateral arms-control endeavours, it was drawn up to provide measures to verify compliance, deter non-compliance and redress a situation if necessary. In our understanding, it thus provides, among other things, for a very sophisticated and complex verification regime, and for challenge inspection mechanisms with no right of refusal in order to resolve uncertainties about compliance.

At the same time the Convention clearly spells out the balance between obligations on the verification side and rights in the field of trade, cooperation and assistance. We cannot imagine the smooth implementation of the Convention without a proper and adequate balance between rights and obligations for all member States on an equal footing. From this general point of view, Slovakia began its national implementation of the Convention after the Paris signing ceremony. The process of ratification has started already.

As a country on whose territory no chemical weapons are deployed, developed or produced, the Slovak Republic is doing its best to assist the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in carrying out the activities set up by the Paris resolution. During the visit of the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission to Slovakia last July, we offered one of our facilities as a centre for training future OPCW inspectors. At the same time we made a suggestion to provide a laboratory as part of a future network of OPCW-designated laboratories. We did so aware of the fact that the training of staff and building up the necessary infrastructure will be the key elements for the effective functioning of the OPCW.

The Slovak Republic greatly appreciates the progress made during the Special Conference of States parties to the biological-weapons Convention and declares its readiness to participate in the work of the ad hoc working group to create a system of verification for the biological-weapons Convention.

The years 1994 and 1995 are of fundamental importance for global disarmament efforts. We find ourselves on the threshold of a new era. We must not miss this chance. My country strongly supports the earliest possible conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. This would be a significant contribution to strengthening the non-proliferation regime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty; at the same time it would be an important step towards nuclear disarmament as our ultimate goal. The ban should be comprehensive and universal. It should prohibit all nuclear tests by all States in all environments, and for ever.

Concerning the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), my country wishes to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation system by promoting the universality of the Treaty and by extending it indefinitely and unconditionally. Strengthening the regime which prevents the proliferation of these kinds of weapons would be a significant step towards complete nuclear disarmament. The non-nuclear-weapon States feel especially threatened by the existence of nuclear weapons. In addition, these States are worried by the fact that the nuclear-weapon States have not yet excluded the possible use of these weapons. Legal commitments by those States would be the first and the easiest step towards the implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The world has changed in the last couple of years. However, military doctrines, in particular those on the first use of nuclear weapons, do not reflect this change. The danger of nuclear catastrophe is no longer of a bipolar character. We understand that responsibility for nuclear security has to be shared by all — nuclear and non-nuclear States alike — but it is evident that the first step should be taken by the nuclear Powers. We expect the nuclear-weapon States to provide all other States with negative security assurances in a universal, non-discriminatory, legally binding form.

The production of fissile material for weapons and other explosive devices is an inseparable part of the complex problems concerning nuclear weapons. Therefore, Slovakia welcomed the preparatory consultations on this issue at the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that experts and diplomats will be able to convene the first round of negotiations and bring them to the successful conclusion of a treaty. Here I should like to say that, from our point of view, even partial success is better than none. That is why we support the immediate commencement of the negotiations on the basis of the so-called simple mandate set out in General Assembly resolution 48/75 L.

Let me make some remarks concerning recent cases of illicit transfers of nuclear materials. In recent years the international community has been alarmed by the increasing number of recorded incidents of illicit nuclear-materials trafficking. Fortunately, information received indicates that only small quantities have been involved, and in no case did the material appear to have come from a nuclear-weapons stockpile. That does not mean that this problem is not a serious one. Because of the physical nature of such material, the uncontrolled movement of nuclear material, in conjunction with the interests of organized crime, creates favourable conditions for the production of the so-called personal weapons of mass destruction.

The Slovak Republic appreciates the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in this field. My country is prepared to promote a more systematic approach to the problem of illicit trafficking. Closer cooperation by all Member States in their efforts to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials is of vital importance. Besides the danger of such materials falling into the hands of irresponsible individuals or groups, illicit trafficking in nuclear materials is a serious threat in itself. Uncontrolled trafficking in "home-made" containers could expose large numbers of people to life-threatening doses of radiation and might eventually result in a real catastrophe. This calls for a thorough re-evaluation of the effectiveness of existing measures concerning this issue.

Another area in which there is a lot of work to be done is outer space, where the core problem is the prevention of an arms race. We are of the opinion that in order to achieve the exclusively peaceful exploration of outer space, the present legal machinery should be strengthened so that it corresponds with the latest technological progress. This mechanism should also ban sending into outer space not only conventional arms, but also laser, high-frequency or anti-satellite weapons. Existing space treaties are a positive step, but they are not sufficient. The time has come to consider the possibility of concluding a comprehensive multilateral agreement banning the deployment of weapons in outer space and creating a supranational body to supervise compliance. We support the elaboration of a politically binding document that would, as a temporary measure, take the form of a code of conduct in outer space and would call for exchanges of information concerning space activities.

The United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament and other bodies have been dealing with the issue of conventional weapons for several decades. Events of recent years show that now is the time to reap the fruits of these efforts. Significant results have been attained by regional organizations — as in the case of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) — as well as by the United Nations itself. It is in our vital interest to safeguard the integrity and inviolability of the CFE Treaty, especially in the process of harmonizing obligations concerning arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building within the CSCE, which should be completed with the full implementation of the CFE Treaty in November 1996.

With regard to transparency in armaments, Slovakia welcomed the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as a significant measure to solve the problem of excessive and destabilizing transfers of conventional weapons. At the same time, we realize that its full effectiveness will be safeguarded only by universal participation. As a strong supporter of the Register, we did not miss the chance to participate in it from the very first year. My country is in favour of further strengthening and expansing the Register. We share the view that widening the scope of the Register by including data on military holdings and procurements through national production would desirably increase openness and transparency in the field of conventional armaments.

I wish to express the readiness of the Slovak Republic to take part in an exchange of information on the organizational structure and size of armed forces. Within the framework of the CSCE, we are committed to providing, and do provide, information on medium- and long-term plans concerning the size, structure, training and armaments of our armed forces. My country takes an active part in the negotiations on disarmament, cooperation and security in Europe. By signing the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the 1992 Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty, Slovakia joined the process of transparency in armaments, arms control and disarmament.

These facts show that Slovakia is deeply interested in being perceived as a reliable member of the international community. The Slovak authorities undertook concrete steps to contribute to stability and security in our region. The Slovak Republic has been a sovereign State since 1 January 1993 and during its short existence has built up a transparent and effective control mechanism for trade in weapons, military technologies and dual-use items. In compliance with General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, Slovakia presents annual reports to the Register of Conventional Arms.

The Slovak Republic supports all disarmament activities and realizes the extraordinary importance of the Conference on Disarmament as a pivotal multilateral forum for negotiations on arms control and disarmament. It is deplorable that despite the recommendations of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, the task of expanding the membership of the Conference on Disarmament has become a persistent problem. At this point I would like to stress once again Slovakia's specific interest in full membership in the Conference on Disarmament, an interest that is even greater because we are a successor of the former Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, a member of the Conference on Disarmament. In our opinion, the Conference on Disarmament must also be able to adapt itself to its new tasks through dealing expeditiously with issues relating to membership.

Less than two years after its admission to the United Nations the Slovak Republic has become a full-fledged partner of the community of nations. We hope that this is a confirmation of the credibility of our foreign policy, which is based on respect for international law and for principles of democratic coexistence among nations. It is evident that Slovakia, as a small country in the geopolitically sensitive Central European region, must have a transparent and clearly defined orientation for its foreign policy.

Today's world is defined by dynamic changes resulting from the growing variety of international relations. There have been many important events in the last year which we deem to be guarantees for peaceful coexistence of nations, but there have also been events that cannot fill us with optimism.

We welcome as one of the positive events the recent progress in the peace process in the Middle East. Slovakia supports that process aimed at reaching a comprehensive and final peaceful settlement in that part of the world. In this regard, my country is of the opinion that the new realities should be reflected in the relevant United Nations resolutions, some of which have become outdated.

We are deeply concerned over the lasting conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We support the international community in its efforts to settle that conflict solely through negotiations within the framework of existing mechanisms of the United Nations, the CSCE and other international institutions. Slovakia welcomes any initiative that could contribute to the peaceful settlement of that conflict. We hope that the recent measures adopted by the Government of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the subsequent decision of the Security Council on the temporary suspension of some of the sanctions will serve as an impetus to greater commitment by all parties to the conflict to continue the negotiations as the only means of ending the conflict and restoring peace and stability in that region.

Let me conclude my statement by expressing a wish for great success in the work of the First Committee during the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

Mr. Biloa Tang (Cameroon) *(interpretation from French):* As the work of the First Committee gets under way, it is important to recall that the objective of general and complete disarmament is still relevant as an item on the international community's agenda. Cameroon subscribes fully to that objective and is making its contribution to activities aimed at ensuring the dawning of a world of peace and security for all.

The common destiny of mankind requires that we act together in undertaking appropriate measures to maintain international peace and security. Encouraging developments in the field of disarmament and arms control since the end of the cold war are going in the right direction, and they strengthen our conviction that visible progress can be made if States demonstrate genuine political will.

However, the end of the cold war has not eliminated the threat posed by nuclear weapons. It is therefore in the interests of all that obstacles to bilateral and multilateral negotiations be removed to make possible a solution that is just and equitable for the entire international community. This is why we encourage the nuclear Powers and support efforts to achieve quantitative and qualitative reductions in nuclear arsenals.

It is abundantly clear that securing these reductions requires, in particular, the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for armaments purposes, together with effective verification machinery, and a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We hope that pending the conclusion of these two international instruments the nuclear Powers will continue the moratorium on nuclear tests.

At a time when negotiations in preparation for the 1995 conference of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have reached a decisive stage, only genuine political will that takes into account the security aspirations of all States can promote the adoption of the principle of the indefinite extension of the Treaty. Cameroon, for its part, subscribes fully to such an extension. In addition, we welcome the accession to the NPT of three new members — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia — and we encourage countries that have not yet done so to accede to this international instrument with a view to enhancing its universality.

The entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the conclusion of the treaty on the denuclearization of Africa and the beginning of negotiations on a treaty making the South Atlantic a nuclear-weapon-free zone constitute real progress in the area of regional nuclear disarmament and of strengthening confidence between States. We encourage the countries of South Asia to expedite negotiations with a view to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and we encourage the countries of the Middle East, once peace has been restored, to do the same.

Like many other delegations, the delegation of Cameroon supports the principle of control accompanied by effective verification measures covering all weapons of mass destruction. The same holds true for anti-personnel land-mines, which, because of the great suffering that they inflict on civilian populations, especially in Africa and Asia, deserve our full attention. Cameroon endorses the Secretary-General's appeal to the Committee with regard to international regulation to limit the production, use and transfer of mines. It also endorses the proposal on the establishment of a fund to finance demining activities. In addition, it is urgent that a moratorium on the production and transfer of mines be declared by all producing countries pending the conclusion of an international agreement.

Cameroon, as one of the first signatories to the chemical-weapons Convention, has begun the procedure for its ratification. Moreover, a national authority will soon be set up to supervise the implementation of the Convention, and nationals of Cameroon have gone to The Hague for training in this area and in the area of chemical-weapons inspection. An African regional seminar on the implementation of the chemical-weapons Convention is scheduled to take place in Cameroon early next year.

The General Assembly has recognized the importance of regional disarmament for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is in this context that steps are being taken to integrate the activities of the United Nations regional centres for disarmament — which, moreover, are being called upon to play a trail-blazing role in the framework of preventive diplomacy. In this respect, it is necessary to note with regret that, owing to the lack of adequate human and financial resources, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, which has to operate in a continent ravaged by numerous conflicts, is unable to carry out its mission. It is therefore urgent and indispensable that the Centre be given the necessary means to enable it to resume its activities.

At another level, we note with satisfaction the increasing recognition of the important role regional organizations must play in the management of conflicts. Organization of African Unity machinery for the prevention, management and settlement of conflicts is operating more and more frequently in situations of tension and conflict in Africa within the framework of preventive diplomacy. The activities undertaken through that machinery deserve the encouragement and support of the United Nations.

In our subregion, the initiative of the 11 countries of the Economic Community of Central African States — Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe and Zaire — has made notable progress towards the promotion of confidence, disarmament, security and development within the framework of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. The establishment of this body was announced a few years ago by the Secretary-General.

In Yaonde, Cameroon, during the fifth ministerial meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee, these States adopted and initialled a non-aggression pact, which will be opened for signature by Heads of State during a summit to be held in Cameroon before the end of 1994 and which will enter into force by the end of the year. These States have also undertaken to participate in United Nations and the Organization of African Unity peace-keeping operations and, to that end, to establish within their respective armed forces specialized units for the maintenance of peace.

But if this pilot project is to be implemented successfully, particularly in terms of the training and preparation of these specialist units in a subregion in which there are numerous conflicts and hotbeds of tension, the 11 States members of the Committee must be able to count on the continued support of the United Nations and the international community as a whole.

We hope also that the draft resolution on this subject that we shall be submitting will, like past texts, be adopted by the Committee.

The democratization of international relations requires that the affairs of the world be managed with greater transparency. We believe, therefore, that it is desirable to involve the greatest possible number of States in taking decisions that affect all mankind. The necessary expansion of the Conference on Disarmament is a move towards this democratization. We therefore hope that the Committee will adopt a decision along the same lines.

Finally, I should like to take this opportunity to present to you and to the other officers of the Committee our delegation's warmest and most sincere congratulations, and to assure you of our full cooperation in ensuring the success of our work.

Mr. Berguño (Chile) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of Chile is pleased that the First Committee is chaired by a man who embodies the great diplomatic tradition of Ecuador. Allow me to assure you, Sir, of our enthusiastic cooperation and to express our appreciation for the direction our discussions are taking, which is in complete harmony with the endeavours of your predecessor, Ambassador von Wagner, to rationalize our procedures and our agenda. I would like also to express my thanks to the disarmament secretariat for its support.

There is much talk these days of the favorable international climate, but growing interdependence and reduced danger of nuclear war should not blind us to the fact that changes in the world situation are still superficial. The system of common security has not yet been fully institutionalized, and the United Nations has not succeeded in playing its role of initiator and coordinator of decisions. Multilateral interaction is fragile and the function of military force as a source of power remains significant. Social and economic inequalities, regional instabilities and a latent capacity for conflict remain, complicating the spread of new technologies.

The developed world has become a safer place thanks to increasingly shared values, a common perception of threats, the free market and other integrating factors. But at the world level, common interests and values are not sufficiently accepted to preserve universal peace. The creation of a superstructure with greater inequalities in terms of economic and military power could lead to an international order which might spare us from the scourge of war but which would impose subtle coercion, domination based on intervention and the modernization of weapons systems. The action of the international community in the area of non-proliferation cannot become a mere administration of the elimination of arsenals and of the waste from weapons of mass destruction. It must be a positive contribution to converting a war economy to an economy of peace, equity and development.

This is why our Minister for Foreign Affairs stated to the seventh plenary meeting of the General Assembly that

> "no new international order will be stable or lasting if it is based on the exclusion of the majority of those who comprise it." *(Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 7th meeting, p. 40)*

In the midst of truly momentous changes we have as yet no answer to the question of whether the power vacuum will be filled by qualitatively superior forms of integration and coordination at the world and regional levels, with common security as their point of reference.

As we look at the wealth and variety of issues entrusted to the First Committee, we may well ask whether arms control and disarmament will become a permanent process embracing all military activities in a grand programme of multilateral negotiations or will it continue to be partial, selective and quantitative. The more systematic treatment of disarmament and international security issues which has been proposed this year, stimulating more detailed and focused analyses of the various agenda items, with a more effective use of available time and resources is paving the way for an the integrated approach and overall view our new times require.

Against this backdrop, I should just like to sketch a few important outlines for action which would reflect the major priorities of Chile's international policy in the area of disarmament and international security.

Our country resolutely opposes further nuclear tests. We listened with great feeling to the anguished statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Marshall Islands before the plenary meeting of the General Assembly concerning the serious human and environmental consequences of such tests. The premise underlying any nuclear test, that of preparation for an explosion in time of war, impels us to demand that existing limited nuclear moratoriums be converted into the total and unconditional prohibition of such tests. Can a truly defensive military doctrine really be based on nuclear arsenals as pillars of security?

We wish to pay tribute to Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico for his skilful guidance of the negotiating committee on a convention on the total prohibition of nuclear tests. My Government has reaffirmed its readiness to cooperate in the establishment of an international seismic monitoring system for verification of a future convention through inputs from our scientists and a large network of observatories in which Chile's traditional commitment to the geophysical sciences goes hand in hand with a renewed resolve to strengthen peace and to exorcize the spectre of nuclear war.

Our commitment to the international non-proliferation regime is complete as can be seen by Chile's implementation of the provisions of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and our full membership in the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Negotiations on a wide-ranging safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna are well advanced; these include clauses more demanding than the safeguards imposed on parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). By the time Chile hosts the general conference on the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Santiago next March, we hope that Cuba's accession and that of other countries of the region will have been confirmed, making it possible to implement the of Treaty throughout the region it covers.

My friend the Permanent Representative of New Zealand has stressed the magnitude of the geographical area involved in the integration of the nuclear-weapon-free zones of the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty of Rarotonga for the South Pacific, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the treaty that will establish a denuclearized zone in Africa in the first half of 1995. Meeting in Brasilia, members of the zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic were quick to proclaim the denuclearization of that marine space. As progress is made towards future denuclearized zones in South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean, the whole of the south hemisphere will be free of nuclear weapons and committed to a system of cooperation for regional security.

Denuclearized zones are a basic component of the international non-proliferation regime, and we have welcomed the endorsement of their importance by the representative of the United States. In Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco we are lucky enough to have negative assurances required of all nuclear States. My Government has constantly advocated that similar safeguards should be given to parties to the Treaty of Rarotonga.

The future African denuclearization treaty also envisages this, and agreements with successor countries to the former Soviet Union that have renounced nuclear status contain similar clauses. The Conference on Disarmament will then be able to elaborate an instrument that will give solemn form to the commitment to refrain from nuclear aggression against States, as required by international law.

The continued existence of a universal non-proliferation treaty is an incontestable benefit. The Government of Chile, following its incorporation into the Tlatelolco system and the negotiation of the resulting safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has begun a process of evaluation and consultation with all sectors of national opinion with a view to deciding on our accession to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). I feel bound to express the concern felt by a country in the midst of this decisive process at the widely diverging opinions that have been expressed in this debate in the First Committee. In the process of the indefinite or limited extension of a treaty, one cannot ignore the internal harmony of its provisions and the delicate balance among its priority objectives: strengthening non-proliferation, advancing towards comprehensive nuclear disarmament and generating a framework of confidence for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, the proscription of fissile materials for military purposes and the universal application of safeguards are necessary ingredients for an effective non-proliferation regime. Balanced progress in all these areas will demonstrate consistency with the goals that the international community has set itself and will be an unequivocal signal from the nuclear States to those countries reluctant to undertake non-proliferation commitments.

Chile regards the Convention banning chemical weapons as the most far-reaching, complete and universal of international disarmament treaties. It cooperated actively with the work of the Preparatory Committee and hosted the first regional seminar on the implementation of the Convention, which has been followed by another in Lima, Peru, and a third that has just been announced by the representative of Cuba. The Paris Convention is a landmark in the advancement of verification and control measures and a major effort by the international community to establish a positive framework of cooperation and of scientific and technological exchange.

The time has come to make the visionary 1972 biological-weapons Convention truly effective. The decision of the Special Conference held in Geneva to establish an ad hoc negotiating group to strengthen the implementation of the Convention is a heartening sign. The Government of Chile would like to see a binding legal instrument emerge from these deliberations to be submitted to the next conference of the parties in 1996, thus achieving somewhat tardily what we called for some years ago, along with Argentina and Brazil, in the Mendoza Declaration.

With the exception of those on the chemical-weapons Convention, negotiations on export controls have never been carried out in a multilateral forum. The Disarmament Commission has had scant success in addressing the item entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields". Acceptance of export-control norms in key sectors of dual technology is spreading, but it remains true that multilateral negotiation fosters participation and gives legitimacy to control-regimes, making them more effective. For this reason, we would like to join in the appeal made by Brazil and Canada for a consensus resolution on this issue.

Over the years the General Assembly has repeatedly expressed its anxiety about the vast sums allocated to certain military budgets and about excessive and destabilizing stockpiles of weapons in certain regions and their detrimental effects upon economic and social development. We support the initiative taken by the Netherlands, in support of the political objectives of the Assembly, to enhance the effectiveness of the Register of Conventional Arms, give an impetus to the work of the Conference on Disarmament and prepare the way for a more productive meeting of the group of governmental experts in 1996. Chile has fully met its obligations under the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as well as in notifications to the Organization of American States (OAS), and it will continue to work for the universalization of this valuable instrument of transparency.

In 1988 the General Assembly endorsed the Disarmament Commission guidelines on appropriate types of confidence-building measures and the implementation of such measures on a world-wide or regional level. This process was boosted during meetings sponsored by the OAS — such as in Buenos Aires in March 1994 — which will culminate in a regional conference on confidence-building and security measures to be held in Chile in 1995. Our hemisphere is a region relatively free from conflict, with a lower level of arms expenditures and a tradition of peaceful and judicial settlement of disputes. In the Latin American subregion we have built up a commitment to the total ban on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which will be further strengthened through a regional agreement not to develop, produce, acquire or stockpile long-range missiles.

The representatives of many countries and of Germany on behalf of the European Union have here advocated a rapid increase in the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. They have referred to General Assembly resolution 48/77 B, have mentioned the completion of one stage in this process with the drawing up by the Special Coordinator of a list of 23 States, and have stated the expectations of other States if the adoption of the list in question were to free up the process and open a more dynamic phase of increase. A different viewpoint has been expressed by the representative of Malaysia in proposing that the General Assembly examine the operation of the Conference on Disarmament. These views, however, agree on the desirability of the General Assembly taking a decisive step towards facilitating the process of increasing the membership of the Conference on Disarmament, setting the rules for its revitalization. A happy conclusion to this exercise would remove a relic of the cold war and permit the Conference on Disarmament to exercise fully its role as the sole multilateral forum on disarmament, and my country attaches particular importance to this step.

The Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish):* I call next on the Observer for the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Mr. Kung (International Committee of the Red Cross): First of all, Sir, allow me cordially to congratulate you and your colleagues on your election as officers of the First Committee.

Thanks to the initiative of the Government of France, we are now in the process of discussing possible amendments to the 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) would like to express its gratitude for being able to play an active role in these discussions and for having been asked to prepare two preparatory documents for the Group of Governmental Experts, one on the subject of land-mines and the second on other issues relevant to the review of the 1980 Convention.

The challenge that is facing the Conference is that of agreeing on amendments that will transform the Convention into a dynamic instrument. This Conference has received widespread attention from the world's media and from groups that earnestly hope for meaningful measures to rid the world of the terrible suffering caused by mines and to prevent severe problems that could be caused by other weapon developments. It is therefore essential that the amendments agreed to should yield tangible results. This requires not only clear and effective rules on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of these weapons, but also the application of the Convention to all conflicts, successful implementation measures and complementary arms-control measures.

First, I should like to say a word on mines. The problems caused by mines around the world are growing worse at a dramatic rate. The figures contained in the recent report of the Secretary-General are impressive. He indicates that, for every mine being cleared, another 20 are being laid. He estimates that it would cost about $33 billion to clear the well over 100 million mines currently buried around the world. However, only 100,000 mines were cleared last year, whereas approximately 2 million were laid. Furthermore, there are enormous stocks of mines contained in various arsenals, ready to join the others already littering the globe.

These figures do not describe the human suffering that our doctors and nurses regularly see. They attest that mine wounds are the worst that they have to deal with in practice. Neither can these figures give any idea of the profound disruption that mines cause to families, society and the long-term development of the countries affected.

A disaster of this scale cannot be dealt with through half-hearted measures. First of all, vigorous measures need to be taken to clear, as quickly as possible, the mines now in the ground. Secondly, a lasting solution needs to be adopted. The ICRC is firmly of the opinion that the only really effective measure would be to ban the use and the production of anti-personnel land-mines. We are also of the opinion that there should be strict controls on the use and design of anti-vehicle mines, which in practice have led to casualties among both local civilians and humanitarian workers, including ICRC delegates who need to use the roads to reach victims.

The ICRC notes with satisfaction that several States have joined the call for a ban on anti-personnel mines and earnestly hopes that others will do so before the Review Conference itself. At present, the Group of Governmental Experts is considering a number of proposals which are less far-reaching than a total ban. Of these, we believe that, as a minimum, all anti-personnel mines should automatically and reliably render themselves harmless within a specified period. However, we believe that, although such a regulation should reduce the amount of civilian victims, it will not prevent large numbers of civilian mine victims, since these mines will continue to claim victims during their active lives.

As to blinding laser weapons, the ICRC is pleased that a large number of States have either formally or informally indicated their support for a protocol on the subject of blinding weapons. It is essential that the Review Conference seize this last opportunity to adopt this legal regulation, as a later review conference would certainly be too late. This preventive step will save the world from the horrifying prospect of large numbers of people being suddenly blinded for life by certain laser weapons that could soon be both inexpensive and easily available. For the purposes of the 1980 Convention, a protocol could be agreed on without lengthy negotiation; it could, in simple language, ban blinding as a method of warfare and outlaw the use of laser weapons for this purpose.

Proposals that deserve due consideration have been put forward on other weapons, too. As this is the first review conference to take place since the adoption of the Convention, it is a pity that there is a prevailing sense of a lack of time during the meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts. The immense problem created by land-mines has meant that States feel obliged — and rightly so — to devote most of their time to this problem. However, this ought not to exclude discussion of other important issues. The 1980 Convention can be a dynamic treaty only if it deals with problems before they become overwhelming. For this purpose, a regular review process needs to be established that is able to address and deal with issues as they arise.

It is all too well known that a majority of armed conflicts are non-international and that they are primarily responsible for the immense suffering caused by the indiscriminate use of weapons. It is therefore essential that the 1980 Convention, in order to be effective in practice, should apply equally to non-international armed conflicts. In this regard, we should like to stress the importance of extending the Convention to all non-international armed conflicts, not only to those which have reached a certain threshold.

It is generally agreed that a major weakness of the 1980 Convention, and of many other conventions for that matter, is its lack of implementation mechanisms, and that this problem must be rectified during the forthcoming Review Conference. Given the importance of the issue, it is worthwhile to consider carefully which mechanisms would in practice be the most effective for this specific Convention. Although the ICRC sympathizes with the desire to avoid a system that is costly and complex, we wish to underline the importance of measures that are genuinely cost-effective. When one considers the figures cited in the Secretary-General's report on the horrific price that the indiscriminate use of mines is in fact exacting, it is worthwhile, even from a purely financial point of view, to ensure that the most effective implementation measures are adopted. We would hope, however, that the suffering caused by violations of the law will also be an important motivating factor.

The enormous scale of the problems caused by mines has arisen largely because of the cheapness and easy availability of these weapons. The experience of the ICRC is that the majority of suffering in armed conflicts, especially non-international ones, is caused by the massive and indiscriminate use of small arms. Arms-control and disarmament law has so far concentrated largely on containing the threat caused by the existence of nuclear weapons and, for the past two decades, on biological and chemical weapons. The fact that these have been little used or not used at all attests to the success of these efforts, which clearly need to continue unabated. However, the global problems caused by the largely unregulated manufacture of and trade in conventional weapons also need to be seriously addressed. The ICRC hopes that more attention will be given to the problem of the massive trade in small arms in order to introduce some workable limitations on their manufacture and trade. Until that is done, we will unfortunately continue to witness the carnage these weapons cause on a massive scale around the world.

Weapons that are indiscriminate in their effects or cause excessively cruel suffering should be subject to prohibitions not only on their use but on their manufacture as well. In this respect, we are of the opinion that there should be much greater complementarity between international humanitarian law on the one hand, and disarmament law on the other. It is unfortunately the case that once weapons are manufactured they will inevitably get into the hands of irresponsible users, and this is particularly true of small arms.

To conclude, the ICRC hopes that the Review Conference on the 1980 Convention will do much to make the Convention a dynamic and meaningful means of limiting the suffering and destruction caused by the use of certain conventional weapons in the conflicts that are all too prevalent in today's world. It is critical that all States speedily ratify the Convention and actively take part in its review so that its impact may be universal. We also consider it of utmost importance that the Convention be subject to frequent and regular review in order to maintain its relevance and credibility in the face of developments.

Ms. Lodhi (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, please accept the sincere congratulations of the Pakistan delegation on your election. We are confident that under your skilled guidance the First Committee will reach important decisions to promote disarmament and international security. I would also like to express our appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Adolf von Wagner, for the effective manner in which he conducted the work of the Committee last year.

Mr. Stelzer (Austria), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

During the past few years the world has witnessed many dramatic changes. Obviously, the most vivid of these was the end of the cold war and the collapse of communism. The inversion of the post-Second-World-War global order has dramatically altered, in every respect, the equation by which nations deal with nations. But it has not proved to be the ultimate panacea for which we had all prayed.

While the threat of a global war and nuclear catastrophe has receded, the world remains a dangerous place. Threats to global security now emanate from a variety of sources: regional confrontations, the policies of local hegemons and the massive and unrestrained violations of human rights by certain nations. Cinders and sparks can start massive forest fires just as effectively as an incendiary bomb.

The inability of the international community adequately to address these threats — the threats caused by ambition, foreign occupation, ethnic and religious conflicts and human rights violations — derives from a perception that equates security policy with arms control, disarmament and peace-keeping. But the factors that breed the insecurity that fuels the arms race are largely ignored. Consequently, we address the symptoms without curing the disease. This is apparent from the manner in which disarmament issues are approached today: in isolation from the conditions that breed insecurity.

One area where there has been progress is that of nuclear disarmament. The obstacles to the full implementation of the START I and II Treaties have been removed. However, further momentum towards the elimination of nuclear weapons may be retarded by developments in anti-ballistic missile systems.

Nuclear weapons must no longer be the principal currency of power. The Conference on Disarmament should begin negotiations on nuclear disarmament with the goal of reducing and eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons in a specified time-frame.

At the same time, measures should be undertaken to rectify the elements of nuclear instability which have emerged in the post-cold-war era. These efforts could involve the disposal of strategic weapons which are to be eliminated under existing treaties, assurances regarding the targeting policies of nuclear-weapon States, control over nuclear materials and technology that may lead to horizontal or vertical proliferation, and restraining the destabilizing effects of emerging technologies. The United Nations should convene a series of workshops to address these issues. Proposals generated in these workshops should then be considered by a conference of Member States.

In the area of nuclear non-proliferation, we attach importance to the measures currently under active consideration: the review of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and negotiations for a convention on the prohibition of fissile- material production. But these measures are being presented as a panacea for resolving the problems of nuclear non-proliferation. That is clearly not the case. Moreover, the manner in which some States seek to institute these measures has created doubts about their ultimate efficacy.

A comprehensive test-ban treaty will be a valuable step towards both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, but such a treaty should be genuinely comprehensive and not provide loopholes for some States to conduct nuclear tests or continue the refinement of nuclear weapons.

The General Assembly has consistently emphasized the need for a halt in the production of fissionable materials and for the progressive conversion and transfer of stocks to peaceful uses. Pakistan has accepted this consensus on fissile materials for many years. The language of the resolution adopted by the Assembly last year was formulated to secure the endorsement of certain hold-outs. We do not accept that this should now be used to compromise the long-standing non-proliferation objectives of the international community.

The resolution has been used in the Conference on Disarmament to suggest a highly restrictive mandate for the negotiation of a fissile-materials convention. Such a mandate leaves open the question of uncontrolled and asymmetrical stockpiles of fissile materials. If it is to have a non-proliferation impact, the convention must seek to reduce and balance fissile material stockpiles, especially among the non-nuclear-weapon States. We hope that our deliberations here will contribute to agreement on an appropriate mandate in the Conference on Disarmament.

There is considerable focus on the review and extension process of the NPT. While Pakistan has often stated its concerns regarding the inequities of the Treaty, we none the less support its indefinite extension if all its parties agree.

The Government of Pakistan has made it clear, and I will make it clear again today, that we will sign the NPT if and when our neighbour, India, does so also. Negotiations need negotiating partners. And right now, Pakistan sits at the table alone.

The nuclear tinder box of South Asia will remain the most dangerous place on Earth until or unless the parties — and here I mean specifically Pakistan and India — agree to negotiate and resolve the issues that divide them, including the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, the nuclear capability of both countries, and the significant conventional-arms asymmetry between them. On all these issues Pakistan stands ready to negotiate just and reasonable solutions. But we cannot negotiate alone, and our Indian neighbours refuse to talk. Because of Indian intransigence, not only the region but the entire world is a much more dangerous place.

A viable way of achieving non-proliferation goals in the Middle East as well as in South Asia would be to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones. The creation of such zones would promote regional security and global non-proliferation goals, including the universal acceptance of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

In South Asia we face a far graver situation than elsewhere because of the threat of a nuclear arms race. In 1974, India detonated its nuclear device, euphemistically called the "Smiling Buddha". Pakistan, in response, acquired a certain technological capability, but we have chosen not to build or explode a nuclear device.

Over the years, Pakistan has put forward a series of proposals aimed at curbing nuclear proliferation in the region. These proposals include: the simultaneous signature by both India and Pakistan of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); the simultaneous acceptance of full-scope safeguards; mutual verification of nuclear facilities; a bilateral nuclear-test-ban treaty; and a bilateral declaration renouncing nuclear weapons. To date, these proposals have not been positively responded to. They are, like the dreams of the poet Langston Hughes, "dreams deferred". Instead of bringing hope, they have been allowed by India to "fester like weeds".

Given the increasing danger of nuclear proliferation in the region, we believe it is imperative for India and Pakistan jointly to renounce nuclear weapons. We propose that the two countries, as a first step, issue a joint declaration under which each would forgo the nuclear option and commit itself to a nuclear-free South Asia. To pressure one group of States to adhere to non-proliferation agreements without containing the nuclear threat posed by their adversaries is to invite certain failure.

South Asia also faces another threat: the threat of missile proliferation. India has embarked on an ambitious programme aimed at the development and production of short-, medium- and long-range ballistic missiles. The Agni, an intermediate-range nuclear-capable ballistic missile, is in the advanced stages of development. India has also developed the Prithvi, a short-range missile capable of carrying a 1,000-kilogramme warhead over a distance of 250 kilometres. India conducted the final user trials of the Prithvi this year. According to official Indian sources, the Prithvi will soon go into serial production. The Prithvi is a mobile missile. Once it is produced, Pakistan will have to presume that it has been deployed. All our major cities except one will be within its range. Pakistan would then be compelled to provide a matching response.

We want to avoid a missile race in South Asia. An approach that deals only with missile transfers while ignoring indigenous development would exacerbate, not arrest, missile proliferation. Pakistan has proposed the establishment of a zero-missile zone in South Asia to prohibit the production, deployment and testing of ballistic missiles.

Another threat is looming over South Asia: the threat of a conventional-arms buildup propelled by adversarial regional relationships. The global focus on nuclear proliferation often obscures the threat posed by the conventional-arms race. It is conventional weapons that are actually being used in the current explosion of conflicts around the world; it is conventional weapons that consume 90 per cent of global expenditures on armaments; it is the threat posed by the imbalance in conventional defence capabilities that impels States to seek non-conventional means to deter aggression.

South Asia offers a classic example of the threat posed by the uncontrolled conventional-arms build-up by regional Powers. Since 1986, the Indian defence budget has exceeded $9 billion annually. The Indian conventional-arms buildup is an ongoing process, as evidenced by the 20-per-cent increase in India's budget in 1993-1994. India's massive forces, the third largest in the world, are overwhelmingly and ominously deployed against Pakistan.

Conversely, since 1990, Pakistan's conventional capability has seriously eroded. Pakistan has been subjected to discriminatory embargos. The resultant asymmetry that has developed in conventional capabilities does not augur well for regional security or non-proliferation in South Asia.

In order to promote conventional-arms control in South Asia and to reduce regional threats, Pakistan has put forward a number of proposals including: mutual and balanced reduction of conventional forces; measures to prevent the possibility of a surprise military attack; and formulation of principles that would serve as a framework for a regional agreement on conventional-arms control. But again, no positive response to any of these initiatives has been forthcoming.

In South Asia, the key to agreement on both conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction is a resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Twice, India and Pakistan have gone to war over Kashmir, and Kashmir remains the major source of tensions between us. The time to negotiate a resolution of Kashmir is now, before a catastrophe happens, not after the fact. The Kashmir dispute will be resolved only when the people of Kashmir are allowed freely to determine their own destiny.

There is increasing awareness that the problems of Kashmir, conventional-arms control and nuclear proliferation in South Asia are inextricably linked and must be addressed in an integrated manner. Pakistan believes that the major issues that threaten security in South Asia should be comprehensively addressed. Pakistan and the United States had separately proposed that Russia, China and the United States, as well as India and Pakistan, should hold discussions to promote security and non-proliferation in South Asia. This was accepted by all the proposed participants except India. Pakistan also accepted the subsequent idea of wider multilateral talks on South Asian security. This idea also seems to have become a casualty of an Indian veto.

During his recent visit to China, the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. William Perry, identified South Asia as a major challenge to regional security in Asia. He said,

> "We are on the brink of a nuclear-weapons race on the subcontinent, where relations between India and Pakistan have been tense for years.... The combination of nuclear weapons and enduring tension could prove catastrophic to both countries — indeed to the entire region".

We stand only a half-decade from the start of the new millennium. Our work in this Committee may well determine whether the new era is one of hope, of peace, of economic and social development, or, in the alternative, a da-capo repetition of the symphonic bloodbaths of the twentieth century. In Pakistan, we have chosen the music of development over the dissonance of decay. We urge our neighbour to join with us in a concert for peace.

Mr. Kittikhoun (Lao People's Democratic Republic): On behalf of the delegation of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, I would like warmly to congratulate Ambassador Valencia on his election as Chairman of the First Committee at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly. I am confident that with his rich diplomatic experience and skill, he will guide our work to a successful conclusion.

I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to convey our deep appreciation to his predecessor, Ambassador von Wagner of Germany, for his able stewardship of the Committee last year.

The end of the bipolar structure has brought to humankind a new hope: that of peace, stability and cooperation. Despite the emergence of new hotbeds of crisis and instability in various parts of the world, the longstanding and tireless efforts deployed by the international community for disarmament and international security have produced encouraging and positive results that could help curb the arms race and in particular prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In this time of opportunities and challenges, it is our hope that the First Committee, at the current session of the General Assembly, will help us to move progressively towards our common goal: general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Next year will be a time of great importance for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). With the wisdom of the States parties, I hope and believe that the 1995 Conference on the review and extension of the NPT, a very important event on the disarmament agenda, will reach a successful conclusion, as expected by the international community. To achieve and guarantee an effective non-proliferation regime, it is necessary to ensure real, universal adherence to the NPT. The very wide acceptance of the Treaty illustrates the significant value of its crucial contribution to nuclear non-proliferation. In this spirit, my delegation welcomes the recent accession of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia to the NPT, and the intention of Argentina to accede to the Treaty before the 1995 Conference. Adherence by additional countries would be most welcome.

With regard to nuclear testing, serious negotiations have taken place on a comprehensive test-ban treaty within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing is fundamental in preventing the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. For that reason, we support the view that the earliest conclusion of the Treaty would have a significant impact on the decision on extending the NPT.

We also share the view that the conclusion of an effective international arrangement on credible security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT would help facilitate the extension of the Treaty. Equally important for nuclear disarmament would be a ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. It is our hope that we can achieve further progress in this field as well.

Land-mines are continuing to cause suffering and to kill civilian populations in various parts of the world. To eventually eliminate this horrible terror, the international community should make further concerted efforts to adopt a comprehensive ban on land-mines: a ban on their use, production, stockpiling and transfer.

This year again, the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to overcome the obstacles to an expansion of its membership. In our view, the composition of the Conference should correspond to the reality of our new era, an era of cooperation and dialogue between States. We all are called upon to take this into account in order that the present impasse may be resolved in the near future.

In South-East Asia, the atmosphere of cooperation and understanding among States in the region has been further consolidated. Exchanges of visits between them at the highest levels have taken place regularly, reflecting their common will to reinforce cooperation and mutual trust. No less important, a high-level consultative meeting, the Regional Forum of the Association of South-East Asian Nations, was held in Bangkok, Thailand, on 25 July 1994. That Forum has enabled the countries of South-East Asia and of the Asia-Pacific region in general to proceed to an exchange of views and consult each another on political and security issues of common interest and concern.

That first-ever meeting marked a new chapter of peace, stability and cooperation in the annals of South-East Asian countries. As a country that has suffered much from the consequences of a long war, we took part with great interest in that meeting. We view its result as positive overall and express the hope that it will help strengthen and enhance political and security cooperation between States of the region. For its part, the Lao People's Democratic Republic will do its utmost to contribute sincerely to this effort in order to turn South-East Asia into a true zone of peace, stability and cooperation.

The chairman returned to the Chair.

Mr. Fofana (Sierra Leone): Mr. Chairman, let my first words be of congratulation to you on your election to a post in which you will guide the affairs of the First Committee. The wealth of your political and professional experience and your personal qualities will undoubtedly benefit the work of the Committee in the coming months. My delegation wishes you every success. Our congratulations go also to the other officers of the Bureau on their elections. I should also like to commend your predecessor, His Excellency Ambassador Adolf von Wagner of Germany, for the excellent and able manner in which he conducted the work of this Committee during the forty-eighth session. We also wish to express appreciation to the secretariat for the efficient work they have been doing during the past few months.

We are ready to work with you, Mr. Chairman, in this Disarmament and International Security Committee, in the conviction that it will advance the effort to reduce levels of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

Five years after the end of the cold war, we must acknowledge that the reality of world disarmament has fallen far short of our dreams. This last decade of the century is one of uncertainties and contradictions. The comprehensive test-ban treaty, however, has brought new signs of hope, and there is a new impetus in international disarmament negotiations. There is now a historic opportunity to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The decision by most nuclear-weapon States to maintain moratoriums on testing nuclear weapons has made a major contribution to an improved negotiating atmosphere in the Conference on Disarmament. Sierra Leone hopes that all the nuclear Powers will play their part in bringing the negotiations to a conclusion by abstaining from conducting further tests. An agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty would have a significant impact on the achievement of nuclear disarmament, and especially on the achievement of nuclear non-proliferation objectives. Sierra Leone urges the international community to seize this opportunity and conclude the comprehensive test-ban Treaty as soon as possible.

Given the importance attached to the Conference on Disarmament, we call on the members of the United Nations Conference on Disarmament to take into account the views of countries not members of the Conference. To do so would result in greater support for the Conference's objectives and conclusions. In this regard, we wish to emphasize the support that exists for expanding the Conference: its membership should be increased in order to respond appropriately to the new challenges the world faces.

The issue of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is of particular importance to my delegation. As a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Sierra Leone remains committed to its provisions. However, there is much sympathy for the view that, for it to be universally accepted, a number of options would have to be considered.

The convening of the 1995 review and extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT provides a unique opportunity to make a sober assessment of the Treaty's implementation. There can be no doubt that the question of extending the NPT is linked to such critical issues as nuclear disarmament, the dissemination of nuclear know-how for peaceful purposes, security assurances to non-nuclear States and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Hence, the issues we face next year should not be just whether the NPT should undergo a limited or an unconditional extension. The longevity of the Treaty will ultimately depend upon these issues being resolved and upon the sincerity of the nuclear-weapon States in the fulfilment of their obligations. My delegation is confident that, as we prepare for the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons next year, we should create an atmosphere of confidence among non-nuclear-weapon States so as to encourage them to come on board.

The NPT has been the factor underlying all the efforts by the international community over the past 25 years to stem the tide of nuclear weapons. Despite the general expectation in the 1960s that the world would have numerous nuclear-weapon States by the 1980s, this has not proved to be the case. Instead, realizing the danger of nuclear arms proliferation, 160 countries, including Sierra Leone, have now acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, leaving only a handful outside the Treaty framework. The peaceful-use assurances deriving from the Treaty and from International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards have laid the foundation for very valuable international cooperation in various fields such as nuclear power generation, nuclear medicine and in the agricultural and scientific applications of nuclear energy. In addition, the NPT incorporates the only commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to total nuclear disarmament, and, even here, more needs to be done if peace is to be maintained.

Disarmament as a whole should be seen within the context of preventive diplomacy. We must recognize the fact that the end of the cold war has not removed the danger arising the massive production of weapons. On the contrary, in some cases the danger has actually increased. Sierra Leone therefore believes that conventional arms control is an issue that should be tackled vigorously. In our view, we must focus on the question of the interrelated aspects of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms. We need to discuss universal and non-discriminatory means to enhance openness and transparency in that field, especially through the use of the Register of Conventional Arms. While transparency, restraint, responsible policies and good-neighbourly behaviour are essential elements for enhancing regional and global security and peace, it is clear that, if the situation in many parts of Africa is anything to go by, it has become imperative for the international community to address seriously the issue of conventional arms transfers. We must be most vigilant in monitoring transfers of conventional arms from producer countries through third parties to consumer countries.

However, one ray of hope is that the pace of chemical and biological disarmament continues to be very encouraging. Significant progress has been made in implementing the chemical weapons Convention, and measures are being taken to strengthen the biological weapons Convention. In our view, the international community will benefit in terms of security, trade and development from the total ban on these categories of weapons of mass destruction that will be put in place by the effective operation of the two Treaties.

The Sierra Leonean Government has always supported the idea of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones around the world. Accordingly, Sierra Leone has endorsed all efforts to achieve this goal and has supported all resolutions on the matter. We believe that the importance of these zones to the future safety of our environment should not be underestimated, and it is in this connection that the issue should be considered — with a view to making their establishment universal.

My delegation supports the moratorium on the export of land-mines. We further call for a ban on the manufacture and export of land-mines, as they continue to cause tremendous misery and untold hardship to many populations throughout the world.

We are intrigued by the fact that the arms manufacturing countries persist in producing these terrible engines of destruction, especially when it has been proved that this area is not particularly profitable for them. We call upon them to review their policies regarding the production of land-mines, as, inevitably. the people who suffer most are the most vulnerable populations of developing countries: women, children and poor farmers attempting to till their lands in the aftermath of conflicts. We urge the international community to extend additional control over the manufacture and use of, and trade in land-mines, given the indiscriminate manner in which they cause injury to civilian populations.

I should like to register our satisfaction that the Centre for Disarmament Affairs has kept its location in New York and has not been moved to Geneva. For most of us, this decision was a constructive one, that will enable small delegations, such as ours, to benefit fully from the activities of the Centre. We thank the secretariat for endorsing the views of the majority of delegations.

The Sierra Leonean delegation wishes to reiterate its support for disarmament and for stringent controls over all forms of arms, be they nuclear or conventional. As a country in the throes of a rebel war and that is implementing a substantial economic reform programme as well as a political transition timetable — all with all this taking place simultaneously — we have a special interest in the dividend from arms control and peaceful coexistence. We therefore call upon this body to pursue even more vigorously its goal of limiting the proliferation of arms and making the world a safer and more forward-looking place. We also wish to endorse the views of the earlier speaker who pointed out that disarmament would be even more meaningful if it were linked to a greater emphasis on development support for poorer countries.

Mr. Gyarmati (Hungary): As the Hungarian delegation is speaking for the first time under your chairmanship, Sir, permit me to extend to you our congratulations on your election to that important post. Your election is indeed a well-deserved acknowledgement of your diplomatic skills and experience, as well as a due tribute to the role your country has been playing in the United Nations. My delegation is fully confident that you and the other members of the Bureau will guide the work of the Committee with care and competence. Please rest assured that we shall help you in that endeavour.

On a more personal note, let me express my pleasure and honour at having a chance to share some thoughts on a few topical issues that are causing particular concern in my country.

The historic changes that have occurred in the world since 1990 have suggested to some that a new world order could be created easily and that, in that new world, there would very soon be no need for arms control any more.

Of course, the era of great-Power confrontation is over. Gone also are the huge armies of the two military alliances that had faced each other for decades. But the new world order has not yet taken shape and we still have to struggle with the legacy of the past. What is even more troubling is that nobody will dare say that any light at all is visible at the end of the tunnel.

Arms control will therefore have to remain on our agenda for quite some time. The great military capabilities created in another era have not vanished. On the contrary: the deterrent effect of the possibility of a large-scale confrontation no longer works, and more than ever there are conflicts raging all over the world, including in Europe, which, unprecedentedly, had been for decades the most peaceful continent. In those conflicts, more and more people are losing their lives and the demand for peace-keeping operations is constantly growing. Consequently, it is only right and proper to say that arms control efforts should not only be maintained but must also be reinforced in earnest.

The disarmament record of the Hungarian Government is not unknown in this body. I need not therefore go into detail, but will recapitulate briefly our main concerns and priorities. High priority, we believe, should continue to be given to non-proliferation, not only of nuclear weapons but also of other technologies. Hungary unreservedly supports the unlimited and unconditional extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the adherence of all to the requirements of the missile-technology control regime, the creation and effective functioning of a new export control body to replace the outdated Coordinating Committee for Exports to Communist Areas (COCOM), efforts aimed at achieving substantial progress towards greater transparency in armament and military budgets, and the strengthening of all other similar institutions and arrangements.

In addition, there is a particular area of arms control to which, in our judgement, not enough attention has been devoted and where efforts should be resolutely reinforced. That field is conventional arms control. It is anyway an understatement these days to call "high-tech" weapons "conventional". The amount of destruction those weapons can cause can be very nearly as great as that caused by nuclear weapons. And, even more important, we must not forget that all major conflicts and wars in the past few decades have been fought with conventional weapons, and hundreds of thousands of innocent people have been killed in a "conventional" manner.

In Europe, we have managed to create and successfully implement a major conventional-arms control agreement, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The CFE Treaty has been extremely effective. The destruction obligations under that Treaty are bring about the elimination of more heavy weapons than were used during the Second World War. Although the Treaty was drafted and signed in the final months of the cold war and was originally meant to eliminate large disparities between the two military blocs, one of which no longer exists, it proved possible to adapt it to the changing circumstances, and it has become a very useful tool in the successful management of the unification of Germany, the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty and the Soviet Union, and is still helping maintain a finely drawn balance of forces in Europe.

The CFE Treaty is not only one of the few real success stories in conventional arms control, but is also an indispensable pillar of European security without which stability in the continent would be seriously challenged. This means that no changes in the Treaty can be allowed before it is fully implemented, i.e., before 1996. Alongside strict implementation, however, we will have to continue to adapt the Treaty to changing realities within the Treaty itself and take care of the concerns of some of its States parties, such as those of the Russian Federation and Ukraine relating to the so-called "flanks rules" of the Treaty.

Even so, we cannot close our eyes to the shortcomings of the CFE regime. The main shortcoming is that, based as it is — and for understandable reasons in the late 1980s — on the concept of eliminating disparities between the two military blocs, it does not constrain the armed forces of the other States in Europe. Many of those States, of course, are of no concern at all for European security and stability. It is very unfortunate, however, that one region of the continent — the most troublesome of all — was also left out of the CFE regime: I have in mind here the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

I am sure that there is no need to explain why this is a major headache for us in Hungary, for the other countries of the region, and for all participating States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). We are therefore convinced that the — very urgent — next step in the field of conventional arms control must be the preparation and implementation of a credible arms-control treaty for that region. The new treaty must cover all the forces of the countries that have emerged on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and it might also be worthwhile to integrate the other countries of the region in to its regime.

The arms-control arrangements could, of course, be based on the CFE concept, but in many cases we will have to recognize differences and also take into account the lessons of the past few years. Thus, for instance, we do think that the treaty should cover, in addition to the types covered by the CFE Treaty, artillery below 100 millimetres in calibre, surface-to-surface missiles, major naval surface warships and so on. The limits should be determined solely on a national basis, but verification of the treaty should be a common objective, in all likelihood to be carried out by an international organization. We think that the Western European Union would be especially suited to the job.

Subregional arms-control arrangements could be pursued in other parts of Europe, too, should the countries of a region deem it necessary. Hungary would certainly support any such initiative, especially in regions where the possibility of military confrontation, as a legacy of the past, cannot yet be ruled out, for example in the Baltic region.

Following the full implementation of the CFE Treaty and the establishment of subregional arms-control arrangements, the time will come to review the conventional arms control regime in Europe in general. We think that, at a certain point, when these conditions have been met, we should be able to prepare a new treaty in the field of conventional arms control covering the forces of all European States. That treaty could build on the CFE Treaty in many respects but should also differ from it. The main differences, in addition to its States parties, might lie in its geographical coverage, in an approach based on solely national obligations, in the internationalization of verification, and so on. The treaty should be developed with in the CSCE framework and become a major pillar of European security by the end of the century. It should also take into account the legitimate security requirements of all States parties, including, *inter alia,* the need for intra-alliance flexibility.

The Hungarian position on the present and future of arms control is very clear. We do not advocate arms control not for arms control's sake. Nor is it the self-interest of the distinguished battalion of arms-control diplomats that makes us so interested. It is our firm conviction that arms control is one of the most important stabilizing instruments of diplomacy, and that extensive use must be made of it in the future too.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the Permanent Observer of the Organization of African Unity.

Mr. Sy (Organization of African Unity) (*interpretation from French*): Allow me to congratulate you, Sir, and the other members of the Bureau on your election to lead our Committee. I am sure that, with your skill as a seasoned diplomat and with your experience, you will lead the work of our Committee to a successful conclusion.

Among the positive aspects of the end of the cold war are the improvement of relations between the major nuclear Powers and the emergence of a more favourable climate for resolving major international conflicts. This significant political development has had positive repercussions on negotiations in the nuclear weapons field and has already given rise to major disarmament agreements. Moreover, a military alliance conceived within the framework of the cold war has been dismantled. It is to be hoped that all the other alliances and instruments of the cold war throughout the world will follow the same path.

Even though the positive aspects of the post-cold-war period have allowed for a relaxation of tensions in certain areas of international political life, they have not, unfortunately, decisively strengthened international peace and security. The existence of well-stocked nuclear arsenals still threatens humankind with nuclear holocaust. The levels to which the great Powers and other countries in certain areas of high tension are armed and still aberrantly high. The arms trade is flourishing, thriving, and is fueling many civil wars, ethnic conflicts and tensions. The collective security system established after the Second World War shows serious flaws when it proves unable to prevent, much less stop "ethnic cleansing", genocide and other violations of human rights on a massive scale.

These threats we can all see are compounded by even more insidious but no less dangerous ones: poverty and economic stagnation, despair, the environmental degradation, pandemics and the drugs trade. These threats must be addressed globally and in a coordinated fashion, and with the same urgency. Furthermore, new instruments for cooperation must be established and the central role of the United Nations must be better highlighted.

On the issue of nuclear disarmament, we believe it crucial to emphasize the importance of continued efforts towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In this context, we note with disappointment that a comprehensive test-ban treaty has yet to be concluded, despite the urgent requests of the international community. Moreover, the non-nuclear-weapon States have not yet received legally binding guarantees against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. It goes without saying that such guarantees can not but strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and promote the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world pending general and complete disarmament.

In Africa, the States members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) have, since 1991, been engaged in the process of drafting a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. Thanks to the support of the international community, and the United Nations in particular, a group of United Nations/OAU experts has worked on the treaty and has prepared a draft that may be approved as early as February 1995. The draft treaty was transmitted last June to the OAU Council of Ministers, which requested that it be distributed to all States members of the OAU. There are also plans to hold a joint meeting between the OAU intergovernmental group and the United Nations/OAU group to put the finishing touches to the draft treaty.

The draft treaty, the importance of which is obvious, meets a very long-standing aspiration of the African peoples and States to get nuclear weapons out of Africa. The draft is of great interest to the OAU, which, now the struggle against colonialism and apartheid is over and has decided to give priority to settling African conflicts. Indeed, without a peaceful and stable environment, the aspirations of the African peoples for economic betterment, development and democracy are likely to be thwarted. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa is therefore a part of the OAU's efforts to strengthen peace and security in Africa and throughout the world by creating a climate of confidence favouring the establishment of good-neighbourly relations, the settlement of conflicts and reductions in military expenditures.

The establishment in June 1993 by the Heads of State and Government of the OAU of machinery for the prevention, management and settlement of conflicts should allow our organization to play a pivotal role in the settlement of conflicts in Africa, with particular stress on conflict prevention.

Indeed, we are convinced that as conflicts are settled the implementation of disarmament measures will be facilitated. Thus, the draft treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa deserves the international community's support particularly those provisions that apply to territories in Africa but which belong to non-African Powers and the provisions on the non-use of nuclear weapons against States in the zone.

The African atomic energy commission provided for in the draft treaty also deserves support from the international community. Indeed, one of the major objectives of the draft treaty is to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy, especially for economic development. The African atomic-energy commission, which is to work in close cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), will therefore have a key role to play here.

The idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa was first put to the General Assembly in 1961. Since then, great progress has been made towards implementing it, particularly since favourable political conditions for it have been established in Africa. What we are asking for today is that the international community should provide the necessary support for finalizing the preparatory activities and that it should give the required political backing for the establishment of an effective nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.

In conclusion, I should like to say a few words about the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament at Lomé. Because of the importance of the efforts to prevent and settle conflicts in Africa, the Centre must receive the human, material and financial resources it needs to play its proper role. The Centre would greatly benefit were it to coordinate its activities with those of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and engage in activities to complement those of the OAU's mechanism for conflict prevention, management and settlement. Here, we believe that, in terms of conflict prevention, it is important for the Centre to be able to participate in studying potential hotbeds of conflict and in helping identify possible sources for escalating violence and tension. In addition to paying greater attention to conflict prevention, the Centre ought to be able to continue informing the African public about disarmament issues by stressing the problems that are specific to the region.

Those are just a few of the OAU's concerns in the area of disarmament.

Mr. Al-Battashi (Oman) (*interpretation from Arabic*): On my own behalf and on behalf of the delegation of the Sultanate of Oman, I should like to extend to you, Mr. Chairman, our sincere congratulations on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. We are confident that your vast diplomatic experience and your skills will have a great effect on our deliberations and will ensure the successful conclusion of our work.

I should like also to extend similar congratulations to the other officers of the Committee on their election, and wish them every success.

There is no doubt that the world today is undergoing many changes that are the inevitable results of the demise of the cold war. The world is now experiencing detente in the fields of disarmament and international security. While we appreciate the achievements made in this field, we feel that they fall short of expectations. Indeed, the modest achievements made so far do not measure up to the magnitude of the terror caused by the existence of weapons of mass destruction with their horrific potential for overkill which threatens the peace and security of the whole world and is cause for great concern to all the world's peoples.

As a case in point, we refer here to the Middle East region, where the threat of such weapons is a telling example of the extremely dangerous nature of these overkill weapons. The arsenals of nuclear weapons that are the monopoly of some in the region are cause for great concern. The fact that some are dedicated to acquiring components for this most dangerous weapon not only threatens the security of the region but also poses a very real threat to the security of the world we all live in. From this rostrum, we call once again, and hope that the call is clear enough, for narrow, unilateralist policies — that are not only egotistical but also obsolete, bankrupt, anachronistic and redundant, the residue of a past of competition, monopoly and indifference — to be renounced.

In our view, the ideal way to transform the Middle East into a nuclear-weapon-free zone and to rid it of all other weapons of mass destruction — which are no less dangerous — lies, firstly, in desisting from the horrific stockpiling of those weapons with the aim of achieving dominance and imposing hegemony over one of the most important regions of the world. Secondly, there must be a total and absolute commitment to the principles of good-neighbourliness, peaceful coexistence and mutual benefits. In order to achieve this, there is an urgent need to engage forthwith in the business of confidence-building.

My country, as a developing nation, has taken it upon itself, since joining the international Organization in 1971, to adhere to these principles and policies, which have continued to prove fruitful in terms of our mutually beneficial relations with all peace-loving nations.

Among the prerequisites for ridding the Middle East of nuclear weapons is that the party concerned must place its nuclear installations under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards regime. Peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved through stockpiling weapons or by intimidating one's neighbours. It can be achieved, simply, through respect for the principles of international law in word and in deed.

The bitter reality that some have only recently come to realize is that one can change one's personal effects at will but one cannot exchange one's neighbour for another, no matter how one may try to intimidate that neighbour or try to bring him to his knees. We in the Sultanate of Oman realized that quite early, at a time when we were about to gain membership of the international community, and we continue to hold to that realization firmly and absolutely. Indeed it has become one of the constants of our relations with our neighbours.

Ever since we joined the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, we have welcomed all efforts aimed at maintaining the region's neutrality, peace and security, which form the cornerstone of its prosperity and guarantee the development of the intertwined relations of its many States and peoples. We have taken it upon ourselves to reconcile the divergent views of the parties concerned, in the belief that true cooperation amongst peace-loving nations and responsible joint action by the States of the Indian Ocean region are the best means of implementing the General Assembly's Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. My country is well aware of the residual obstacles that continue to stand in the way of the work undertaken by the Ad Hoc Committee. For our part, we are seriously trying, in cooperation with our partners, to overcome those difficulties by every possible means in order to ensure the success of the Ad Hoc Committee's work and to implement the Declaration. We shall spare no effort in that regard, as we are convinced of the importance of making the Indian Ocean region a zone of peace.

The results of the Ad Hoc Committee's work, to date, fall far short of our aspirations. This is because of certain narrow-minded policies and obstacles placed by some in the way of the Committee in order to impede its work. Our opinion in this regard is frank enough and is not open to haggling: the Indian Ocean region is no one's seisin, and in order for it to continue as it has always been — a multicultural region and an international waterway — there is a need for cooperation between all the parties with interests in it. Once again we call upon all the parties concerned to display greater flexibility in the context of the Ad Hoc Committee's work, to act responsibly and seriously and to avoid the temptation of pursuing devious policies that serve their own selfish interests. While we look forward with cautious optimism to the future work of the Ad Hoc Committee, we shall continue to voice our views with the usual clarity and frankness and shall continue to work diligently for the achievement of results that would satisfy us all.

Since it joined the United Nations, my country, a small developing State, has consistently supported every effort aimed at eliminating weapons of mass destruction. However, the persistence by some in stockpiling those weapons in an irresponsible and high-handed fashion makes us support the legitimate right of all non-nuclear States which do not possess any weapons of mass destruction to obtain guarantees covering the possibility of nuclear aggression against them. Such guarantees should be comprehensive, effective and deterrent. They should preserve the principle of balance and make any party with aggressive intentions think twice before putting such intentions into practice.

Because of its profound understanding of the significance of a clean environment for human life, my country attaches great importance to the question of the environment. The peoples of the Gulf region have suffered greatly from the environmental pollution resulting from the destructive wars in the region. Pollution is costing many lives and causing tremendous material damage in the Gulf countries, not to mention its effects on international navigation in the vital waterway of the Gulf itself. We therefore call upon all countries concerned to address this problem in the framework of disarmament and international security.

The development by some countries of their arsenals of sophisticated naval weapons has become a matter that should be taken seriously because of the threats it poses to the security of small States that do not possess effective naval defence systems. In this connection, we call upon all States that possess highly sophisticated naval defence systems to take effective measures to reduce the dangers that may result from naval confrontations or naval accidents, especially those which may involve ocean-going nuclear vessels.

With every passing day, the viability, effectiveness and significance of the United Nations is demonstrated by the important role it plays in solving international problems. We have always supported and will continue to support that role — especially since we small developing States find it of vital interest to us to maintain the Organization's momentum in the spheres of economic and social development, as well as in the area of disarmament, an area where the Organization will continue to play a major role, given the hopes Members pin on it with regard to the settlement of disputes and the achievement of international agreements that will be hugely important factors for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The decade of the 1990s has witnessed a qualitative transformation in the area of disarmament thanks to the tremendous international developments that have taken place, such as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. My country was among the signatories of that Convention, and, by signing, Oman demonstrated its support for the efforts aimed at eliminating all weapons of mass destruction. These efforts culminated in unprecedented detente and understanding in the context of the Conference on Disarmament that led to the realization that it is necessary to find serious solutions to such important pending issues as nuclear tests and the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We call for continued support for the Organization with a view to achieving the objectives set out in the Charter.

Mr. Batu (Turkey): At the outset, I should like to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, as well as the other members of the Bureau, on your election. I am confident that, under your wise and able leadership, the First Committee will be successfully guided through its challenging agenda.

We are living through a phase of rapid historical change. Five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world is still teetering between hope and despair. Although the ideological division of the world is far behind us, the international community is facing new challenges. Long-suppressed evil forces such as xenophobic and ethnic nationalism, and racism, have now come to the surface, creating new tensions, crises and conflicts that constitute new threats to international peace and security. To contain these new threats effectively, we should strengthen and expand the concept of crisis prevention. In this context, the priority focus of attention should be, more than ever, on arms control and disarmament.

Fortunately, since the end of the East-West confrontation, the prospects for arms control and disarmament as key instruments for greater security and preventive diplomacy have improved considerably. As was rightly stated by the Secretary-General before this Committee on 17 October 1994, never before has there been such an opportunity for global cooperation to this end. We strongly endorse his call to make full use of this opportunity.

We are deeply concerned by the risks posed by the worldwide proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the biological weapons Convention and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have laid the groundwork for reaching a global consensus on how to build a safer world. Within a few months, we will be meeting here again to take a step of vital importance: to confirm the validity of the NPT and to extend it. With 165 parties, the NPT is the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and reflects the international consensus against nuclear-weapon proliferation.

We have always considered the NPT a key multilateral disarmament agreement. By considerably reducing the risk of nuclear war, the NPT has made a significant contribution to international security and arms-control efforts. In principle, we support the indefinite extension of the NPT. We call upon those States that are still outside the NPT to accede to it as non-nuclear States and to conclude safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We must stand committed to our common goal of achieving universal adherence to the NPT.

It is widely recognized that the NPT suffers from several weaknesses, especially in connection with safeguards and verification. The verification regime of the Treaty needs to be further strengthened. Turkey supports the new tasks and responsibilities undertaken by the IAEA aimed at increasing its role in developing a more effective safeguards system. While encouraging this development, we also believe that the 1995 NPT review Conference should make a new attempt to reinforce the safeguards system in general and the IAEA itself. This can be done, by the declared consensus of the signatories.

Ineffective controls over the removal, transfer and role of fissile material has emerged as a serious problem of the post-cold-war era. We have reported to the IAEA a number of incidents of illicit traffic in nuclear material in our country. We strongly believe that it is high time to develop a programme to stop this traffic. The programme should aim to assist those countries in which the smuggling originates to develop national control systems. The establishment of an international control mechanism could complement the programme. In this vein, we support the establishment of a standing group of experts within the IAEA to work out the details.

Turkey welcomes the statements by France, the Russian Federation, the United States and the United Kingdom whereby they commit themselves to suspending nuclear tests. These are important steps, in conformity with the aim of international negotiations for a comprehensive test ban. Turkey supports the conclusion of a complete, universal and internationally verifiable test-ban treaty. In this context, we are following the Geneva negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty very closely.

With 157 signatories, the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons demonstrates the resolute determination of the international community to free the world from these types of weapons of mass destruction. Universal accession to the Convention should be achieved without delay. We call upon the signatories to complete the ratification process as soon as possible and hope that the Treaty will come into force before the end of the year.

We strongly support the efforts under way to strengthen the biological and toxin weapons Convention through the addition to its provisions, of a legally binding verification regime. We welcome the recent decisions of the Special Conference in Geneva to continue its work on an expert level and to prepare specific proposals for the fourth review Conference of the biological weapons Convention, in 1996.

It is our strongly held view that transparency in armaments is an important component of efforts aimed at building confidence and reducing unpredictability at the regional and global levels. In this context, we attach great importance to the work of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Security Forum. The Security Forum adopted principles governing conventional arms transfers on 25 November 1993. At the global level, we strongly support the work undertaken by the United Nations within the framework of transparency in armaments and consider it a contribution to strengthening confidence between States.

Turkey has supported all the steps taken in connection with transparency in armaments. In this respect, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is a crucial instrument. A review of its first two years of operation indicates that the system's most important weakness is the fact that not all Member States have presented their reports. Therefore, the utmost priority should be given to ensuring that all Member States report to the Register. We believe that the development of methods that would encourage Member States in this direction should be considered. In addition, the scope of the Register should be expanded to include procurement from national production. The Register could thus become an effective instrument for the biological weapons Convention.

We take the view that full compliance with existing arms control and disarmament instruments at the regional and global levels is of primary importance for future arms-control agreements. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) constitutes a cornerstone of Europe's security architecture and establishes a stable and secure balance at lower levels of conventional armed forces. Turkey stands committed to and looks forward to the full implementation of the CFE Treaty. The CSCE Summit to be convened on 5 and 6 December 1994 in Budapest should reaffirm its commitment to the full implementation of the CFE Treaty.

The growing number of ethnic conflicts has amply demonstrated the vital role of regional arms control and disarmament efforts in buttressing the global quest for enhanced stability and security. There is now a pressing need to broaden the scope of arms-control and other security-building endeavours to embrace all the regions of the world. In this context, the Middle East is of particular importance for my country.

The historic breakthrough in the peace process which promises concord and cooperation between the Palestinians and Israel and between Israel and its Arab neighbours will contribute to the search for a new security structure and measures in the Middle East. The chances for disarmament, arms-control and confidence- building measures are now better than ever. We are participating actively in the activities of the working group on arms control and regional security established as part of the Middle East peace process. We are pleased to observe the growing acceptance of the need to complement the peace process with the eventual establishment of confidence- and security-building measures. We are aware that the divergent interests and the different priorities within the regional process and the complexities of the region's political landscape make these efforts a difficult undertaking. However, we are convinced that the progressive developments in the peace process will also create the necessary conditions for increased and shared security.

The Conference on Disarmament, as the only effective multilateral negotiating body, should respond to the changing political realities of our times. Last year, the General Assembly urged the Conference to reach an early consensus on the expansion of its membership by the beginning of the Conference's 1994 session. We regret to note that this did not happen.

We are disappointed that another opportunity for enlargement was lost during the last session. The time has come for the General Assembly to intervene constructively in the issue of expanding the Conference on Disarmament. A negotiating body such as the Conference should have the necessary representative weight to meet the challenges of our times by ensuring enlarged participation in the search for new global commitments in the field of disarmament and arms control.

The O'Sullivan list is the only proposal on the table for enlarging the Conference on Disarmament. We hope that a solution to the current impasse can be found within the context of this proposal, and without further delay.

We look forward to the successful completion of our work on the rationalization of the work and modernization of the agenda of the First Committee during this session.

Indefinite extension of the NPT, a comprehensive test-ban treaty, strengthened conventions biological and toxin weapons and on chemical weapons are all within our reach. This is a historic opportunity that should not be missed. We must continue to work together with a shared vision of making the world a better and safer place.

Mr. Norberg (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, allow me first to congratulate you on your election as Chairman of this year's session of the First Committee, and also to congratulate the other members of the Bureau on their election.

In recent years, significant progress has been made in the field of disarmament. International treaties are now established for all existing categories of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear as well as chemical and biological weapons.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a key to both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Since the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT in 1990, many important and to some extent decisive developments have taken place. No less than 25 States have become parties to the Treaty since 1990, including France and China. Sweden warmly welcomes the recent accession by Georgia, Guyana, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Mauritania and notes with satisfaction the declared intentions of Algeria and Argentina to accede to the Treaty. We hope that they will be able to complete the necessary procedures before the NPT Conference next year.

Adherence to the NPT is now firmly established as a norm of international behaviour. Sweden urges all nations to become parties to the NPT, and to act forcefully to implement existing safeguards systems.

The NPT contains two overriding and complementary elements. First and foremost, a commitment by parties to non-proliferation, in which respect the Treaty has been and remains an outstanding success. Secondly, a commitment by nuclear-weapon States to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith. In this respect, progress was long and distressingly absent, but an important improvement has now occurred, with the conclusion of the START Treaties and the prospects for the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

It is obviously of the highest importance that full results be registered in the field of nuclear disarmament without any further delay. The delicate and necessary balance within the NPT would then be a reality, which should be preserved as long as the dangers of proliferation and nuclear weapons exist.

Consequently, Sweden firmly expects continued negotiations on nuclear disarmament, on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and on related questions such as a cut-off in the production of fissile materials and transparency in and control over stocks of weapon-origin nuclear materials with a view to proceeding towards the ultimate objective of a total abolition of nuclear weapons and weapon-grade nuclear material.

The objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are, as I have said, complementary, not antagonistic, and should not be used by any side as tactical bargaining chips in disarmament negotiations. The NPT needs to be extended indefinitely to help ensure that nuclear weapons are for ever discredited, and discarded from the arsenals of every State.

The regular five-year review conferences provided for under the NPT will provide important opportunities for ensuring that all parties fulfil their obligations under the Treaty and for taking the necessary action if they have not done so.

Since 1991, we have witnessed the conclusion of the first-ever agreement leading to the effective disarmament of nuclear weapons. The major reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals agreed upon under START I and II are a watershed in the post-war history of disarmament and arms control.

START I has now been ratified by all States concerned, but will not enter into force until all parties to the Treaty have acceded to the NPT. START II remains to be ratified. It is imperative that all States concerned take the necessary measures to implement these important agreements without delay.

The dismantling of nuclear weapons must be safe and the fissile material from them must be controlled. It is essential to protect this material and to ensure that it is not used for new weapons. In this task, the International Atomic Energy Agency could have an important role to play. It is also vital for prompt and effective international measures to be taken to prevent illicit trade in nuclear weapon-related materials.

Reductions in existing nuclear arsenals must be supplemented by a cut-off, that is, a complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Sweden sincerely hopes that negotiations in this field will start early next year in the Conference on Disarmament.

It is also more than high time agreement was reached on negative security assurances. States which have forsworn the nuclear option by adhering to the NPT or other legally binding international agreements — and effectively abide by them — have a legitimate right to enjoy such assurances.

The optimal solution would be a multilateral treaty whereby the nuclear-weapon States would unambiguously and without reservation commit themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

More than three decades ago, the world community for the first time called for the complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests. The main rationale behind this demand was the prevention of vertical as well as horizontal nuclear proliferation. This rationale remains as valid and pertinent today. On several occasions, Sweden has presented proposals for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We are gratified that all States, including the nuclear-weapon States, are now prepared to negotiate such a treaty. It is essential for the ongoing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament to be concluded in the very near future.

Sweden appreciates the fact that four nuclear-weapon States are observing a moratorium on nuclear testing pending the outcome of the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, but we are dismayed that China has carried out two nuclear tests since the negotiations started in January 1994, the most recent during the early days of this session of the General Assembly. Sweden urges China to refrain from further testing and to declare a moratorium too.

Sweden welcomes the recent decision to establish an ad hoc group with the objective of proposing measures for strengthening the biological and toxin weapons convention. This is today the only major disarmament treaty without a verification system. We are convinced that the need for a verification regime will become increasingly obvious, particularly in view of recent developments in biotechnology and genetic engineering. Sweden will continue to contribute to the international efforts to establish a verification regime, which we hope will be achieved in the near future.

As the first industrialized country to ratify the chemical weapons Convention, Sweden urges all States to take the necessary steps for ratification so that the Convention can enter into force without delay. Sweden also calls on all signatory States to contribute constructively to an early agreement on the issues that remain to be settled in relation to the new organization that is to verify compliance with the Convention.

Horrifying pictures in the international media of children, women and men maimed and mutilated by land-mines have brought to the world's attention the urgent need to strengthen international regulations on the use of anti-personnel land-mines. Years after hostilities have ceased, these deadly seeds of war remain in the ground, causing indiscriminate suffering to civilian populations. Each day, children and other civilians are killed or injured by these mines.

Sweden is firmly convinced that an international, total ban on anti-personnel land-mines is the only real solution to the humanitarian problem caused by the use of these mines. Consequently, we have proposed just such a ban on all anti-personnel land-mines. In our opinion, not only the use but also the development, manufacture, stockpiling and transfer of all anti-personnel land-mines must be prohibited. This issue is, in our view, among the most important topics at the Review Conference of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, to be held next year.

We are encouraged by the support already expressed for a total ban on anti-personnel land-mines and feel confident that, once the full implications of the inhuman effects of these mines on civilian populations are fully realized, the world community will agree on the need for a complete prohibition.

Not only anti-personnel land-mines but also other conventional weapons should be discussed at the forthcoming Review Conference. Laser beams directed at the eyes can cause permanent blindness. Hence, Sweden has proposed a ban on the anti-personnel use of laser beams as a method of warfare, to be included in a new protocol to the Convention. We feel it is important to stress that our proposal specifically concerns anti-personnel use and does not in any way relate to other applications of laser technology.

Naval mines are another category of weapons that must be dealt with at the forthcoming Review Conference. Like land-mines, naval mines do not distinguish between military and civilian objects. The perils for civilian shipping are obvious. Sweden has proposed that a protocol on naval mines be established under the Convention.

The preparations for the Review Conference of the 1980 Convention, planned for September/October 1995, are well under way. This treaty is sometimes called the Convention on excessively inhumane weapons, which very clearly describes its purpose. We urge all States to accede to the Convention in order to contribute to the further development of international humanitarian law in these important areas. The outcome of the Review Conference depends to a large extent on the widest possible representation, and we appeal to all States parties to participate in the preparatory work and in the Conference itself.

In the field of conventional weapons, openness and transparency in armaments is an important way of enhancing confidence between nations. At the global level, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms fulfils a unique function.

More than 80 countries reported their 1993 transfers to the Register. This number is, in itself, perhaps not all that encouraging. On the other hand, the reports submitted by these countries represent most international transfers of weapons covered by the Register. However, in order to achieve a global Register with universal participation, all States should submit reports. By so doing, they would contribute effectively to international confidence-building and thus to international security.

The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva is the only multilateral body with a mandate for negotiations on disarmament. The composition of the Conference does not, however, correspond to the present political map. Today, there are more countries with observer status at the Conference than there are members. In Sweden's view, the Conference should be open to all States that have applied for membership.

Finally, in recent years, important progress — inconceivable only a few years ago — has been made in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation. We must use the present momentum to strengthen and further develop these achievements. We should also be well advised to further intensify our efforts to abolish all weapons of mass destruction and to work for international peace and security.

Mr. Diall (Mali) *(interpretation from French)*: Allow me at the outset to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Malian delegation, most wholeheartedly on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. I am sure that, thanks to your capabilities as an outstanding diplomat, our deliberations will without question lead to very positive results. Our delegation, for its part, would like to assure you of its fullest cooperation.

Our congratulations go also to the other members of the Bureau and to Mr. Adolf Ritter von Wagner of Germany on the outstanding way he directed the work of our Committee during the forty-eighth session.

Last Monday, when Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali addressed our Committee, he referred to the matter of arms proliferation in certain countries. In that connection, he pointed out that he had dispatched, at the request of the President of our Republic, a mission of inquiry to Mali to consider ways and means of gathering in the weapons sown broadcast throughout our country. According to the Secretary-General, that initiative has proved that efforts for arms regulation and disarmament can be effectively integrated into the broader framework of preventive diplomacy and the restoration of peace.

As the Secretary-General stressed, it was on the initiative of the President of the Republic of Mali, His Excellency Mr. Alpha Omar Konaré, that the United Nations Advisory Mission on illicit small arms in the Saharo-Sahelian subregion went to Mali between 14 and 21 August this year. During its stay, the high-level United Nations Mission met with a number of our country's leading figures as well as with officials from the civil administration, the gendarmerie, the customs bureau, the police and the armed forces. It met not only with representatives of the diplomatic community in Mali but also with key individuals and decision makers from non-governmental organizations.

For the best part of its time, the Mission operated in close liaison with the national commission of experts set up by our Government. On the basis of the terms of reference handed down by the United Nations, the national commission of experts has produced a memorandum on the situation concerning small-arms proliferation in Mali. My delegation takes this opportunity to express again to the Secretary-General the sincere gratitude of the people and the Government of Mali for the attention he has given Mali's request and for having sent the Advisory Mission. Our authorities wish to see this activity continue so that tangible results are achieved.

The phenomenon of small-arms proliferation has now spread throughout our national territory and is indiscriminately affecting all strata of society. In the absence of precise statistics, the scope of the proliferation can be measured by the resurgence in armed crime. Several studies of the phenomenon have been carried out since 1990 and, specifically, there have been seminars with participants from various strata of society, but we have been unable to come up with any convincing results because of the lack of suitable tools to combat the problem.

The phenomenon actually shows itself in a variety of different guises: insecurity resulting from land-management conflicts between farmers, and cattlemen and others; poaching; the trend towards widespread self-defence; and large-scale cross-border or urban banditry. Small-arms proliferation has now reached proportions that are alarming both in terms of collective security and in terms of the very stability of the State.

In opening the work of the Advisory Mission, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mali emphasized the alarming phenomenon of the unbridled and illegal proliferation of small arms both in Mali and the rest of the Saharo-Sahelian subregion. He stressed that no one can gainsay that getting the upper hand over this phenomenon would be a way to prevent conflicts and combat crime and banditry. The Minister also recalled that, so far, the international community had had its attention drawn to the proliferation of the so-called weapons of mass destruction alone, downplaying the destructive impact of small arms, although they, because of their size and the ease with which they can circulate, get past all controls and are as a result accessible to every sector of society.

The phenomenon of arms proliferation, which has spread far beyond Mali's borders to turn into a subregional or even a regional problem, needs action to be taken towards concerted, coordinated and dynamic international cooperation. The need for this kind of concerted action was stressed at the meeting of the Ministers of the Interior of the Gambia, Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone at Banjul in May 1994. Similar meetings were held later in the year, in June in Algiers and in August in Bamako, Mali. These gatherings made possible the adoption of major recommendations concerning, *inter alia*, a ban on imports of weapons of war and ammunition; a ban on the unrestricted sale of weapons within each of the States concerned; the establishment and promotion of dynamic cooperation between the technical services responsible for security, defence and customs in order to identify channels for arms and ammunition trafficking networks with a view to shutting them down in the States concerned; and the harmonization of the States' domestic laws on arms and ammunition.

The proliferation of arms is not only a great danger to the security and internal stability of many States but is also a seed-bed for the conflicts convulsing the world. Mali's Head of State made his proposal to the Secretary-General out of the desire to contribute to the maintenance of peace. Mali's Minister of Foreign Affairs had the same thing in mind when the addressed the General Assembly on 6 October 1994 and drew the attention of the international community to the seriousness of the problem, saying:

> "Is it not also time to collectively address one of the factors underlying the development of armed conflicts in some regions of the world? I am thinking of the massive uncontrolled circulation of small arms in third world countries in general, and of Africa in particular. We are all aware that very few of these countries manufacture arms. So where do they come from? How are they channelled? What can we do about them?" (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 20th meeting, p. 25)*

At a time when our Organization is entering a decisive phase in its history, with the upcoming celebration of its fiftieth anniversary in 1995, the issue of arms control and disarmament is still one of mankind's major concerns. Our world will not be really free and cannot live free of the fear of destruction until we have rid ourselves of this threat for good. The delegation of Mali exhorts all countries to strive towards this ideal.

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Mali for his kind words addressed to me and to the other members of the Bureau.

Mr. Eltinay (Sudan): My delegation joins the previous speakers in congratulating you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of this Committee and in expressing our confidence that you will lead our work to success. Through you we send our congratulations to the members of the Bureau on their election and to your predecessor, Ambassador von Wagner, for the tremendous efforts he exerted in the rationalization of the work of the First Committee.

In the post-cold-war era, it seems that the world is confronted with unceasing challenges in its endeavours to consolidate international peace and security. Some attribute these challenges to the spreading regional and internal disputes but fail to address in depth the root causes, while others refer to the tendency to stockpile weapons of mass destruction as their major source.

The plain fact remains that the major source of the unending international tension is lack of confidence. Confidence was immolated in favour of the short-term interests of the warmongers who dragged the world into the dilemma of the cold war and kept it there for more than four decades during which all kinds of weapons of mass destruction were stockpiled, posing a constant threat to mankind. Tremendous human and material resources that were badly needed for development were put to use in the race to acquire excessive quantities to weapons of mass destruction, and it is disheartening that there are still some who toil to maintain a world of confrontation under various pretexts, such as "conflict of civilizations".

Fifty years after the establishment of the United Nations, it is high time for the international community to consider reviving the ideals enshrined in the Organization's Charter and to demonstrate a sense of consistency in their efforts to realize them.

Sudan, which is fully committed to these principles, maintains that regional peace and security and international peace and security are indivisible, and that the major component of both is confidence-building. Chapter VIII of the Charter provides the basis for confidence-building and deals with the question of arrangements for the settlement of disputes at the regional level. Hence, the adherence of States to international law and to the principles of peaceful coexistence, good-neighbourliness, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-interference in the internal affairs of States is indispensable to international relations.

In keeping with its adherence to these principles, the Sudan has given the utmost priority to the issue of regional confidence-building through ministerial committees established jointly with neighbouring countries and other countries of the region. The most recent resulted in the agreement concluded with Eritrea in August 1994. The ongoing peace process aimed at securing a peaceful negotiated settlement of the conflict in southern Sudan — a process that was initiated by the Sudan — is indisputable evidence of the genuineness of Sudan's endeavours towards the maintenance of regional peace and security.

The representative of Kenya described to the peace process in the Sudan as "evasive". That description is not precise. A greater degree of accuracy is necessary if there is to be consonance between such remarks and the declaration made by the President of Kenya as head of the Committee of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). In view of the intransigence of outlaws, who are encouraged by the military and political backing of a State member of the IGADD Committee, the Government of the Sudan proposed the assignment of personal envoys to accelerate the peace process through shuttle diplomacy. However, the reference to peace in the Sudan was received by my delegation as an indication of good intent and motives with regard to the betterment of Sudan.

My Government reiterate its commitment to a peaceful settlement within a united Sudan, in conformity with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity enshrined in the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, with full recognition of the right of all citizens to express their cultural values. Further, we maintain that discussion of the issue of self-determination is a precedent that may endanger the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all African countries, without exception, as ethnic diversity is a characteristic common to all States in Africa. Moreover, the right to self-determination is one to be exercised by people under colonial or foreign domination, and is not applicable to tribes or ethnic groups in an independent State.

African conflicts inherited from the colonial "divide and rule" era are attributable to disparities in development, and they should be settled through action to deal with their root causes, which are to be found in the realm of development. My delegation, while emphasizing the indivisibility of development and peace, regrets that certain developed countries persist in suspending development assistance to countries suffering internal conflict, thus aggravating the situation in such areas. We call upon these developed countries to reconsider their positions with a view to accelerating the peace process in the areas afflicted by conflict.

My delegation welcomes the signing, in Yaoundé in September 1994, of the non-aggression pact involving the countries of the central African region. We believe that this step will result in the creation of an atmosphere conducive to further economic and social cooperation in the region.

My delegation also welcomes the progress that has been achieved in the formulation of a draft treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa and hopes that the Group of Governmental Experts will be given the assistance it requires to finalize the draft, including a definition of the area of implementation.

We also hope that specific steps will be taken to secure implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, with active participation by the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

Despite the General Assembly's resolutions on declaring the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the realization of this goal continues to be obstructed by lack of political will. The courageous step taken by South Africa in renouncing its nuclear armaments needs to be emulated by Israel, which must heed the international community's call that it accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

My delegation acknowledges the potential of the International Court of Justice as an important contributing factor in the maintenance of regional and international peace and security. We express the hope that the international community will make use of this potential for the peaceful settlement of disputes between States and for defusing tensions arising from inter-State conflicts.

As we approach the 1995 Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, we are disappointed that this important Treaty — and we are all duty-bound to strengthen it, as well as its regime for the total elimination of nuclear weapons — has become something to be haggled over. The attempts of the nuclear-weapon Powers to maintain the discriminatory nature of the NPT and their opposition to the calls for the universality of the Treaty to be affirmed are having an adverse effect on the process of building international confidence and securing complete disarmament. The non-nuclear States look forward to receiving from the nuclear Powers negative and positive assurances with regard to the non-use of nuclear weapons, as well as the nuclear Powers' commitment to the implementation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and to granting access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

A similar situation still confronts those involved in the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which is essential to the extension of the NPT. In this regard, we regret the lack of progress and the failure to achieve consensus on the question of expanding the Conference on Disarmament to reflect a universal and collective approach to disarmament through broader representation.

We urge that, in acknowledgement of the objective role that they continue to play in the field of disarmament, the non-governmental organizations be granted observer status at the Conference on Disarmament to enable them to make an effective contribution to international public awareness with regard to the vital issue of disarmament.

There is a common perception that the issue of disarmament is not confined to certain types of weapons, but includes all categories. Yet, one outcome of the selectivity approach adopted by some is that conventional weapons tend to be singled out when it comes to applying the requirement of transparency in respect of armaments. The United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons will not be effective unless it is expanded.

As regards the Register itself, we note its obvious lack of accuracy and the absence of complete information in reports. Illicit transfers of conventional weapons, including sophisticated types, continue to destabilize States where outlaws receive huge supplies of arms that encourage the escalation of conflicts and obstruct efforts towards peace.

Unfortunately, while we appreciate the role played by non-governmental organizations in the humanitarian field, some States and NGOs are involved in illicit arms trafficking and such information is not included in States reports to the Register; this must prompt new, creative methods of curbing this seed-bed of threats to international peace and security. My delegation fully supports the call for a code of conduct to be formulated that would put an end to these activities at the regional and international levels.

Africa, as the major victim of inter- and intra-State conflicts, needs prompt action to put an end to the conflicts that continue to drain its precious resources, not to mention, ending the loss of life they cause. Concerted efforts must be made and resources pooled to ensure that lasting peace prevails and to promote development in the interests of the progress and welfare of all peoples of the continent.

The Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish)*: The Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Mr. Kenyon, has asked to speak. With the approval of the members, I now call on him.

Mr. Kenyon (Executive Secretary, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)): I am grateful to you for providing me once again with an opportunity to address this committee, and I thank the members of the committee for their courtesy in hearing me so late in the evening.

Two years ago, the General Assembly, acting upon the recommendation of the First Committee, adopted resolution 47/39 by consensus. This resolution commended the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, called upon all States to sign and ratify it and, in fact, paved the way for the signature ceremony in Paris, in January 1993, that launched the preparatory phase in the implementation of the Convention. It gives me great pleasure to have the opportunity to address the Committee today and to report on the progress being made in order to help bring into force this unprecedented multilateral Convention, which has created a global norm against an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. It is for this purpose that the Preparatory Commission of the future organization at The Hague is working, without exaggeration, around the clock.

Ever since the Convention was opened for signature at Paris on 13 January 1993, there has been a continued and growing realization that the Convention will help to promote global and regional stability by eliminating existing stocks of chemical weapons, and related production facilities, within a specific time-frame, inhibiting all States from acquiring chemical weapons, making the activities of States parties transparent through declarations and monitoring procedures, and by providing a forum for promoting international cooperation and resolving problems. This realization is reflected in the fact that the number of States signatories to the Convention today stands at 158, and 16 States have already ratified the Convention. Intended by its creators to remedy the defects of earlier multilateral endeavours, the Convention has indeed become a test case for a new type of multilateral disarmament agreement, with non-discriminatory measures to verify compliance, deter non-compliance, and if necessary, enforce compliance. A regime ruling out chemical weapons is thus beginning to emerge throughout the world, with very few exceptions.

The Commission regularly addresses the issue of universality of membership of the Convention, and I have personally been in touch with representatives of a number of non-signatory States in this regard. At its eighth session last month, the Commission again decided to encourage States that are not yet signatories to sign and ratify the Convention as soon as possible. The Commission requested me to communicate this decision to appropriate representatives of all such States and to include this decision in my statement to the Committee.

Last year, before this Committee, I had the opportunity to describe the initial progress in The Hague and the tasks to be performed by the Preparatory Commission in anticipation of the Convention's entry into force. The first task was to complete work on a number of detailed, technical procedures deliberately left over from the Geneva negotiations, such as the development of operational requirements and of the procedures for the conduct of inspections. The second was to build a new institution with a strong and cost-effective verification capability. The third was to help ensure effective national implementation by States parties. While the three tasks are not organically linked, there is necessarily a certain degree of interdependence between progress in The Hague and progress in national preparations by individual member States.

As far as the first two tasks are concerned, progress in The Hague has been steady without being spectacular. Eight sessions of the Commission have been held so far, and the Commission has achieved substantial progress in several areas, including, first, the inspection workload. Estimates of the approximate number of facilities which would fall under the declaration or inspection provisions of the Convention have been made. The annual inspection workload at entry into force is estimated at about 400 inspections. For the first year after the Convention has entered into force, 384 inspections are currently planned.

Second a general training scheme for candidate inspectors has been developed. National training offers have been evaluated, and certification of courses is under way. Applications from candidate trainee inspectors are being reviewed, and preparations are being made for the final selection process, which will occur seven months prior to the Convention's entry into force.

Third the equipment required for the conduct of inspections has been identified. Operational requirements for the major items of equipment have been agreed, technical specifications are under final consideration and the procurement of equipment has been authorized by the Commission.

Fourth, declaration forms for the chemical industry have, for the most part, been developed, and are contained in a draft declarations handbook. Inspection report formats have been largely developed for chemical weapons storage facilities, Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 facilities and challenge inspections. Formats for other facilities are under development.

Fifth, a draft under consideration at present of model facility agreements and guidelines and procedures for verification activities at chemical weapons storage facilities, when completed in the near future, is expected to serve as the basis for the development of other model facility agreements. The development of guidelines and procedures for chemical industry facilities is almost completed.

Sixth, most parts of a basic document entitled the OPCW Policy on Confidentiality are either complete or under active consideration. A classification system for the OPCW has been agreed.

Seventh, in respect of technical support, specifications for the OPCW laboratory have been developed, and the location of the laboratory together with the list of laboratory equipment and its procurement have been approved by the Commission. An OPCW health and safety policy has been adopted, and detailed regulations are under development.

Eighth, consideration is well under way of an OPCW media policy that will include procedures for the conduct of media relations during inspections and for finalizing visa-related practices in Member States to ensure the smooth entry of inspectors.

Ninth, in terms of institution building, the core staff of the Secretariat have been recruited and staff requirements for the build-up phase prior to the entry into force of the Convention have been identified.

A few weeks ago, the Commission agreed a total budget of about $30 million for 1995 — the budget is, of course, set in Dutch guilders. Approximately $15 million will be utilized for the continuing work of the Commission, with the secretariat remaining at roughly its current authorized strength of about 120 staff. At the present time, 106 staff members, representing about 45 nationalities, are working in the Secretariat.

Once 65 ratifications have been deposited, the additional budget funds will cover the activities planned in the six months immediately prior to the entry into force of the Convention, including the training of inspectors. The staff strength upon the entry into force of the Convention will be 370, and preliminary estimates for the OPCW suggest that its staff strength will level off in the region of 450 about six months after the entry into force of the Convention. Approximately half this number will be inspectors. The preliminary budget estimate from the OPCW itself is between $75 million and $80 million for the first 12 months, which is much lower than some earlier projections.

There are, however, several unresolved issues, some of them dating back to the negotiations on the Convention. The most important ones concern detailed procedures for challenge inspections; conversion of chemical-weapon production facilities; procedures to be applied to old and abandoned chemical weapons; and the issue of how and when the present export-control regimes should be reviewed in the light of the Convention's provisions on economic and technological development.

Several other tasks require urgent attention in the near future. These include developing a personnel policy for the OPCW in order to attract highly qualified experts; elaborating an information management system that meets the needs of verification while taking care of confidentiality concerns; finalizing the accommodation requirements for the future organization; and preparing for the transition between the Preparatory Commission and the organization itself.

Another category of issues, which hinge primarily on Member States themselves, include early identification of facilities that are likely to be declared and inspected upon the entry into force in order to define the magnitude of the inspection effort, and ensuring as wide a geographical distribution as possible in the future inspectorate by security applications by candidate trainee inspectors from all regions of the world.

With all this remaining to be done and considerable uncertainty remaining as to how much time we have left before the deposit of the sixty-fifth ratification, the Commission has recognized the need to try to improve the efficiency of its work and has started a review.

In addition to these tasks, which are being undertaken at The Hague, national preparations in Member States themselves are of considerable importance. While the legal process of ratification as such may be simple in many instances, the very nature of the Convention requires detailed preparations. In brief, these include prioritizing and assigning implementation tasks; preparing for declarations, including establishing data-collection systems; making contacts with the industry; preparing draft legislation; planning for the national authority; training escorts in receiving and guiding inspectors; reviewing and streamlining visa regulations; and sensitizing immigration and customs officials.

The Commission has adopted a number of basic assumptions that are important for the smooth entry into force of the Convention and its effective implementation. These include the assumption that the United States of America and the Russian Federation — the two largest possessors of chemical weapons — as well as the States possessing the large majority of declarable civil-industrial facilities will deposit their instruments of ratification prior to the entry into force of the Convention. The process will also be helped if the bilateral agreement of June 1990 between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the destruction and non-production of chemical weapons is in force and in the process of implementation, so that verification measures to be undertaken by the OPCW can be complementary to those carried out under that agreement.

It is clear that an earlier assumption of the Commission — that the Convention could enter into force on the earliest possible date, January 1995 — can no longer be met. However, there are no indications of any dilution in the basic commitment of member States towards an early entry into force of the Convention. It gives me great pleasure to report that the pace of ratifications has recently increased significantly. Seven ratifications have been deposited over the last 3 months, as compared to a total of nine over the previous 18 months after the Convention was opened for signature.

The Commission has also reiterated the commitment of member States to the early entry into force of the Convention and has called on member States to take appropriate measures to uphold and maintain the political momentum necessary to achieve this goal. Greater predictability in the timing of the entry into force of the Convention will be of the utmost importance in implementing plans for the OPCW, which require a certain lead time. However, it has to be acknowledged that, while most member States are working towards an early ratification of the Convention, such factors as the pressure of other parliamentary business, including elections in some cases, could contribute a greater or lesser degree of uncertainty to their estimated ratification timetables.

The secretariat is willing to offer all possible help to assist member States in their preparations and is also interested in forging links with newly established or designated national authorities in member States. A number of non-governmental organizations and research institutes have worked with the secretariat on the process of national implementation. In addition, seminars on national implementation are being held in The Hague and in various regions of the world, and direct contacts are being made with the industry world wide. Meetings of industry representatives are held occasionally in The Hague, and an industry outreach group has been set up to take care of particular concerns of the industry as to how it would be affected by the Convention. Earlier this year, the Netherlands hosted a course for national-authority personnel from developing countries. A similar course is planned for next year.

In conclusion, let me recall what I stated a year ago before this Committee: implementation of this Convention will require a high degree of perseverance and ingenuity. Sustained public and governmental support will be needed for its early entry into force and for its universality. The enhancement of security for all and the elimination of the threat of chemical weapons forever are the great benefits that the Convention offers. The road ahead is not easy. I am confident, however, that the Committee will continue to render its most valuable support.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the Director of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Davinić.

Mr. Davinić (Director of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs): The Committee will recall that on Monday, 17 October 1994, the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, requested a clarification from the Secretariat regarding the background paper (A/INF/49/3) on "Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery in all its aspects", which was prepared pursuant to resolution 48/75 C.

He specifically raised two questions: firstly, why the said paper had not been forwarded to the Conference on Disarmament as stipulated in the above resolution, which referred to it as "a representative intergovernmental group of experts", and, secondly, why the paper had not been circulated by 1 May 1994, as requested by the resolution, but rather on 20 May.

In response to the first question, I should like to recall that, while it is true that, in his statement on the resolution last year, the representative of Mexico referred to the Conference on Disarmament as the "representative intergovernmental group of experts" (*A/C.1/49/PV.3, p.6)*, other Member States — basically those that voted against or abstained in the voting on the said resolution — contended that it was not. In order not to prejudge the interpretation of whether the intergovernmental group is the Conference on Disarmament or not, the Secretariat distributed the paper to all Member States so that those that felt that the Conference on Disarmament was the appropriate body to deal with it would be in a position to follow up the issue in that body.

As regards the delay in distribution — three weeks after the deadline — this was mainly attributable to efforts on the part of the secretariat to clarify how indeed this paper should best be distributed in order to fulfil its intended purpose. I very much regret if this created any inconvenience for any Member State.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): We have heard the last speaker for this afternoon's meeting. The Committee has thus concluded its general debate on all disarmament and international security agenda items. In this connection, I should like to inform the Committee that 100 Member States and four observer delegations participated in the general debate.

Before I call on those representatives who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply, I wish to remind delegations that we shall follow the normal procedure for statements made in right of reply.

I now call on those representatives who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. Chandra (India): I am constrained to speak in order to set the record straight, as the Pakistani Ambassador to Washington has made a number of misrepresentations about the situation in southern Asia and pertaining to my country.

References to Jammu and Kashmir have no relevance to this Committee. Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India. Despite this fact, Pakistan has got into the habit of raising the matter in every forum, including all other Committees of the General Assembly. Our views on this matter are well known and I will therefore not take up the Committee's time by reiterating them.

It is ironic that the Ambassador of Pakistan — a country which, by the published admissions of its own generals and leaders, started all three wars against India and possesses the atom bomb — should make out that there is a threat to peace from India. There is no threat to peace and security other than that caused by Pakistani involvement with terrorist activity directed against India.

Notwithstanding such provocation, India has acted with its customary restraint and responsibility. Contrary to Pakistani assertions, Indian defence spending — which has always been far lower than that of Pakistan, whether as a proportion of the gross national product or as a percentage of central government expenditure — has shown a steady downward trend in the past few years, coming down from some 3.9 per cent of gross domestic product in 1987 to about 2.4 per cent in 1993. In contrast, Pakistan's defence expenditure has been in the region of 7 per cent of gross domestic product over this period. There are, besides, a number of bilaterally negotiated mechanisms and confidence-building measures in position that maintain the peace.

It is well known that, in 1974, India conducted an underground, peaceful nuclear explosion, and has refrained from moving weaponwards. India's nuclear programme is entirely peaceful. Similarly, uninformed comments have been made regarding Agni and Prithvi. The former is a technology demonstrator; the latter has not been deployed and is in any case not intended to carry nuclear warheads. In contrast, Pakistan has already deployed missile systems Hut I and II, which bring within range much of western India, including New Delhi. It has since gone on a spree to acquire additional missiles.

The confidence-building measures proposed by Pakistan are an obvious bid to cover up its discomfiture and embarrassment at the fact that its clandestine nuclear-weapon programme stands exposed by its own admission. The measures have, moreover, been so devised that India cannot possibly accept them as they do not take into account our vastly greater defence responsibilities and, in the nuclear field, because they run counter to our principled position on the need to take into account the global reach of nuclear weapons and not do anything that would sanctify unequal treaties and the division of the world into haves and have nots.

Again, contrary to Pakistan's assertions, we have, in accordance with the Simla Agreement, made repeated offers to Pakistan, orally and in writing, for a bilateral dialogue towards an across-the-board normalization of relations. This offer has been backed up by a series of detailed and far-reaching proposals contained in six non-papers, including a number of disarmament-related confidence-building measures that build upon existing arrangements and are designed further to enhance confidence between the two countries. It is notable that these proposals include, *inter alia*, measures for maintaining peace and tranquillity along the line of control, the creation of a zone of disengagement in Siachin, the extension of the existing agreement on the non-attack of nuclear installations and facilities to include population centres and economic targets, an agreement on no first use or threat of use of nuclear capability against each other, and so on.

Pakistan has so far chosen to spurn the offer of talks and the proposals made by us, which gives the lie to its contention that there is a threat to international peace and security from India, for, if there were indeed a real threat, it would be unnatural to fail to engage in a bilateral dialogue and explore the proposals made to avert that threat. Pakistan has sought to raise the bogey of a threat to international peace and security merely as a ploy to internationalize the Kashmir issue. Any such move would set back the normalization process now under way there by encouraging Pakistani-supported terrorists and would exacerbate further India-Pakistan relations by giving a fillip to Pakistan's territorial ambitions.

Bilateralism, not third-party involvement, offers the best method for resolving differences between India and Pakistan. The latter approach was tested and found wanting in the two decades following India's gaining independence. It failed to prevent three wars between the two countries and to undo the injustice done to India by Pakistani aggression in Kashmir. Meaningful and lasting solutions to problems between neighbours are best found within the bilateral framework.

The late father of the present Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was then President of Pakistan, solemnly committed himself in the Simla Agreement to just such a course of bilateralism. We are surprised that the present Government of Pakistan has been trying to resile from this solemn agreement.

In her statement made earlier today, the Ambassador of Pakistan to Washington belaboured the point that Pakistan wants bilateral contacts to take place only in a multilateral framework. We have made it clear to Pakistan, and I should like to reiterate this now, that this is not acceptable. We remain, however, open to across-the-board bilateral discussions for a resolution of our problems: as our Foreign Secretary stated recently, "at any time or at any place in India or in Pakistan".

Mr. Akram (Pakistan): I should like to respond as briefly as possible to my colleague from India and the points that he has made. First, on the question of the bilateralism that India espouses, Pakistan is also committed to a bilateral process with India. This is not only within the Simla context; even before the Simla Agreement, India and Pakistan engaged in numerous rounds of bilateral talks, specifically to seek a solution to the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.

Today also, Pakistan is prepared to open bilateral talks with India, provided such talks are meaningful and substantive. We have held seven rounds of talks at Foreign-Secretary level over the past four years. At each round, whenever we raised the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir India shut the door in our face. It is for this reason that we have asked the international community to draw the attention of the Government of India and of the world to the fact that Jammu and Kashmir is one of the longest-standing disputes on the agenda of the United Nations and that it is a disputed territory whose final status is to be determined by an impartial plebiscite to be conducted in accordance with the wishes of the people. That is the text of Security Council resolutions, and we believe that India and Pakistan, and the United Nations, are all committed to the implementation of those resolutions.

If India is prepared to discuss the implementation of the resolutions, if India is prepared to discuss a final settlement for Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of those resolutions, Pakistan would be very happy to enter into talks; but in India's position there is a contradiction: it says that it is ready to discuss Kashmir, but at the same time it says that Kashmir is an integral part of India. The two positions are difficult to reconcile.

We believe that the assistance of the international community is required at this time to help India and Pakistan overcome their differences, because, as the Secretary-General said when he visited South Asia last month:

> "We fear the escalation of hostilities between Pakistan and India could lead to an accident which would have disastrous repercussions."

This sentiment is also reflected in the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization.

We believe that the international community — the United Nations — must play a part in avoiding the possibility of a threat to peace in South Asia. It is not sufficient for India to say that it subscribes to bilateralism, because bilateralism, for India, means the imposition of its hegemony over its smaller neighbours. No sovereign State represented in this Hall accepts that bilateralism should be utilized as a doctrine to prevent the fulfilment of the obligations of Member States under the Charter to implement the resolutions of the Security Council.

The representative of India also spoke about the nuclear issue. It was India that introduced the threat of nuclear proliferation to South Asia in 1974 by detonating a nuclear bomb. India can call it peaceful, but everybody knows that what India exploded in 1974 was a nuclear bomb. That capability of India's is there; it has been demonstrated. It is that capability that causes the primary threat of proliferation in South Asia.

Similarly, with regard to the development of missiles, it was India that took the lead and initiated the process of the development of the missiles that threaten Pakistani cities today. Indian missile deployment will lead to a most dangerous situation, and we hope that India will take heed of our statement and will accept the concept of a zero-missile zone in South Asia.

Finally, I wish to state that the world community cannot ignore the fact that, in South Asia today, there is a major threat to peace and security. In the month of August, Indian forces violated the cease-fire line in Kashmir 142 times. That is a figure accepted by the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. If 142 violations of the cease-fire between two armies numbering almost 2 million soldiers is not a threat to peace and security in the world, we ask what is such a threat and whence does it arise? It is against that threat we ask the world community to take action.

Mr. Chandra (India): At this very late hour I shall be extremely brief. I wish to say that Pakistan appears to have many complaints and problems — nuclear issues, disarmament issues, cease-fire violations, and so on — and in our view, and I think everyone will agree, the shortest distance between two points is a straight line. Since that line between New Delhi and Islamabad is indeed the shortest one, I would request Pakistan to take up our repeated offers of direct bilateral talks for an across-the-board dialogue — since they have so many complaints — and for complete normalization of all relations.

None of the detours via New York and Geneva has proved useful, nor will they prove useful. I should like to end with a question: why cannot Pakistan adhere to its pledged word on the Simla Agreement and engage in these discussions to resolve all the problems that they have *vis-à-vis* India?

Mr. Akram (Pakistan): Let me respond to my colleague from India as briefly as possible. First, as regards adherence to Simla: was the Indian invasion of the Siachin glacier adherence to Simla? Indian forces still occupy Siachin, in direct violation of the provisions of the Simla Agreement. Pakistan has attempted, as I have said, on numerous occasions to resolve these problems bilaterally with India. It is still prepared to do so if India is prepared to undertake a serious and meaningful dialogue with Pakistan, if India is prepared for peace with Pakistan.

But, today, 600,000 Indian troops are in Kashmir killing, maiming and brutalizing the Kashmiri people. How can India expect to talk peace with Pakistan when it is making war on the Kashmiri people? We ask India in response: will you take your army out of Kashmir? Will you seek a peaceful settlement of Kashmir? If the answer is "yes", you will find us at the table tomorrow.

The meeting rose at 7.20 p.m.

United Nations A/C.1/49/PV.11

General Assembly

Forty-ninth session

Official Records

First Committee

11th Meeting
Friday, 28 October 1994, 10 a.m.
New York

Chairman: Mr. Valencia Rodriguez . . . . (Ecuador)

The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

Observance of Disarmament Week

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): In marking Disarmament Week, which began on 25 October 1994 at today's meeting, the Committee will be continuing the tradition established by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament.

It is a pleasure and an honour for me warmly to welcome to the First Committee His Excellency Mr. Amara Essy, President of the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session. On behalf of all members of the Committee, and on my own behalf, I congratulate Ambassador Essy on his election to the presidency and salute his well-known diplomatic skill and the effectiveness with which he is carrying out his high responsibilities.

It gives me special pleasure to welcome Mr. Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, to this special meeting of the First Committee.

As Chairman of the Committee, I wish to begin with a short statement on this special occasion.

The General Assembly proclaimed the week beginning with the date of the founding of the United Nations as a week dedicated to promulgating the objectives of disarmament. The Assembly's proclamation of Disarmament Week should constitute an unremitting appeal to the consciences of all human beings, both leaders and led, to ponder the consequences of the arms race for humankind and to press the urgent need to marshall the energy and resources needed to help achieve the lofty objective of disarmament that the United Nations is striving to attain.

We must recognize that there has been significant progress in recent times, largely as a result of the major political, social and economic changes that have taken place in the world. But a great deal still remains to be done before the idea of disarmament becomes a reality. Hence, on the occasion of Disarmament Week, we must reiterate the call for continued efforts towards that end.

The greatest concern, on which we must all redouble our efforts, is nuclear disarmament. Even though the thunderheads lowering over the world have dissipated for now, the elimination of the threat of nuclear holocaust still remains a central priority both for nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

In this context, the extension of the NPT and the 1995 Conference are significant, because the actions taken in that respect will largely determine the world's ability to usher in an era of greater international stability and security. The same goes for the efforts towards the complete and verifiable ban on nuclear tests. The work in these areas being accomplished by the Conference on Disarmament should be highlighted and pushed forward, and the Conference itself must be expanded to reflect the current world situation.

The same energy and resolve must be used in our efforts to put an end to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Conventions banning biological and

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chemical weapons are appropriate mechanisms whose application and implementation will promote greater confidence and security.

Similarly, ending the proliferation in conventional weapons must continue to be a subject of particular interest to us all. It is important to remember that the major armed conflicts causing so many deaths and such desolation and suffering in many parts of the world right now are using those self-same conventional weapons — hence the need to adopt urgent measures to avoid this kind of tragedy. We must ensure greater openness and transparency over conventional weapons and put an end to the spread of and illicit traffick in such weapons.

Emphasis quite rightly has been placed on the fact that the purpose of Disarmament Week should be to focus international attention and mobilize the conscience of all peoples, large and small, in order to form a single, common front on the side of general and complete disarmament. At the same time, the activities of the multilateral organizations, both regional and global, responsible for disarmament-related work must also be bolstered. Both regionally and globally, governmental and non-governmental bodies have an essential role to play here.

I urgently appeal to one and all to act as faithful guardians and watchdogs over how the resolutions of the General Assembly are implemented, because those resolutions must become the creed of the struggle for disarmament so that the dividends from disarmament can be used to alleviate the suffering caused by economic and social backwardness, acute poverty, disease and ignorance.

The media must play a fundamental role in this campaign. I am firmly convinced that they will respond, with all due diligence and commitment, to this urgent appeal from humankind.

I now have the pleasure of calling on the President of the General Assembly, His Excellency Mr. Amara Essy, to address the First Committee.

Mr. Essy (President of the General Assembly) (*interpretation from French*): I should like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the kind words and congratulations you addressed to me. I am most grateful for them. Allow me also to take this opportunity to express to you and to all the delegations on the First Committee my most sincere hope that this session will be constructive and fruitful.

Every year, the President of the General Assembly joins the Committee to celebrate Disarmament Week. I am following in the footsteps of my predecessors because I am fully aware of the high priority that the General Assembly traditionally attaches to disarmament issues. In fact, in the final analysis, the future of our planet depends on disarmament.

Over the past year, we have witnessed a radical change in the global political climate. For decades, negotiations had been conducted within the framework of what could be termed the cold-war syndrome. The international community had become used to this conflict-based relationship and had managed to move forward despite the inherent tensions of the time. That is how it proved possible to take major steps forward along the path towards our ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament by means of a solid system of global multilateral agreements and major regional and bilateral accords.

We are no longer writhing in the throes of the cold war. Today, we are far less afraid that we will be wiped out at the touch of a button. The world we live in, however, is still a very dangerous one because, even if the international security environment really has changed, and even if new prospects for disarmament are opening up, we are at one and the same time witnessing the appearance of highly complex challenges that the international community must address as of now. Efforts to

> "promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources"

are as relevant today as they were 49 years ago, when the Charter was drafted.

We all know that the sharp divides that typified the cold war have given way to a great diversity of problems and to an increasingly complex and unstable system of international political relations. Ethnic conflicts and militant nationalism are posing new threats to international peace. A whole slew of forces that had formerly been held in check have been unleashed, touching off hotbeds of violence and aggression throughout the world. Hundreds of thousands of human beings have perished now that weapons of every kind — from state-of-the-art conventional arms to the humble machete — have been taken up to settle conflicts.

We must put a stop to this state of affairs. First Committee members have a dual mission. Firstly, it is up to them to consolidate effectively the progress made during the cold war. Secondly, they must find the means to meet the new challenges posed by the formulation of new disarmament policies and the development of innovative methods and common approaches aimed at bolstering stability and mutual trust at the lowest possible level of armaments.

In April 1995, the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will meet to review the Treaty and to consider renewing it. For all its flaws, the NPT has, over the past 25 years, made a decisive contribution to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Committee now has an opportunity to explore the possibility of a common approach that would enable us to buttress one of the pillars of international security. I do urge members to try to ensure that a climate of understanding prevails during the coming months, in particular during their deliberations.

This was so in the case of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly last year that called upon all States to support the multilateral negotiations towards a complete test-ban treaty; this year, in the Conference on Disarmament, the resolution gave rise to a concerted effort to draft a universal, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty.

There is no doubt that the scale of the progress achieved proves the seriousness with which the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament are being taken. Whatever path we choose, there is always a first step to be taken, and my view is that the international community has already taken that step and is moving forward in the right direction.

The other important initiative involves banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. As the Secretary-General noted in his report on the work of the Organization and in the statement he made to the Committee last week, a treaty to that effect will be an important element in the world's efforts to promote disarmament.

If we remain this resolute in our desire and will to put an end to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ban them, then we must by the same token not neglect other weapons of mass destruction. I therefore welcome the fact that the Preparatory Committee of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is right now taking steps to ensure the implementation of the chemical weapons Convention. This Convention — an international Treaty that bans an entire category of weapons of mass destruction — spent an arduous 10 years in the negotiation. Its entry into force next year is the more eagerly awaited therefore.

Concerning another equally dangerous weapons category, we look forward with equal eagerness to the finalization and evaluation of a verification system for the Convention on biological and toxin weapons. Success in those efforts would undoubtedly boost the effectiveness of the new regime.

We all know full well that the proliferation of conventional weapons and the particularly destabilizing impact conventional-weapon transfers can have on regional and subregional security are cause for ever-increasing concern. We have seen all too clearly what happens when nothing is done to curb unmonitored transfers of conventional weapons. There can be no doubt that the potential destructive power of these weapons is having serious repercussions on international peace and security.

The Register of Conventional Arms, which promotes openness and transparency, is one of the ways in which Member States can promote confidence in each other's military behaviour, thereby reducing the risk of dangerous misunderstandings.

Alongside these measures at the global level, we should be promoting regional arrangements such as the regime now in place for Latin America and the Caribbean, where the process of strengthening the nuclear-weapon-free zone established under the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been continuing to make rapid progress this year, and likewise in Africa, where a draft treaty to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone is now having the finishing touches put to it.

These are measures which make up part of a whole. The Commission has 22 items on its agenda, but for lack of time I have touched on only a very few. Still, I should like to emphasize the importance and scope of each of those items because they are all part of the disarmament effort at the international level and because they all deserve all our attention. At the dawn of this new era, the diplomacy of disarmament must be specific and realistic, and must take into account the new way the international cards have been dealt.

Once again, I hope that the work of the Committee during the forty-ninth session will be fruitful.

The Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish):* I thank the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Amara Essy, for his very important statement, and also Mr. Marrack Goulding, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, for participating in this special meeting of the Committee on Disarmament and International Security devoted to the observance of disarmament week.

Organization of work

The Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish):* As representatives will recall, at its third informal meeting on Wednesday, 26 October, the Committee, at the request of several delegations, decided to extend the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions on all of the agenda items concerning disarmament until Monday, 31 October at 6 p.m. so as to enable delegations to conclude their consultations currently in progress on various texts.

Representatives will also recall that at that informal meeting I said that a decision on the extension of the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions would need to be taken at a formal meeting of the Committee. Accordingly, may I propose that the Committee decide to extend the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions concerning agenda items on disarmament from Thursday, 27 October, to Monday, 31 October at 6 p.m.? If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee accepts my proposal.

It was so decided.

The Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish)*: On the same subject, I should like to ask all delegations kindly to submit their draft resolutions to the Secretariat, particularly those with financial implications, so that they can be processed as quickly as possible. The sooner the draft resolutions are submitted, obviously the sooner the work of the Committee can be completed. It will also help members complete their consultations on the texts and comment on them when the Committee considers them.

The meeting rose at 10.40 a.m.

United Nations
A/C.1/49/PV.12

General Assembly

Forty-ninth session

Official Records

First Committee

12th Meeting

Thursday, 3 November 1994, 3 p.m.
New York

Chairman: Mr. Valencia Rodriguez . . . . (Ecuador)

The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

Agenda items 53-66, 68-72 and 153 (continued)

Consideration of draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and international agenda items

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of the United States who will begin the introduction of draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.19.

Mr. Ledogar (United States of America): It is my pleasure to introduce United States Senator Patrick Leahy from the State of Vermont, who will formally introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.19, entitled "Moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines".

Senator Leahy sponsored legislation in the United States Senate which mandated the United States moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines. He was also instrumental in the formulation of last year's resolution 48/75 K, which was adopted by consensus. That resolution called upon all States to agree to an export moratorium. Currently, 18 States have declared moratoriums.

This year's draft resolution, A/C.1/49/L.19, calls upon the international community to make a public commitment to the eventual elimination of anti-personnel land-mines. We believe that all Governments recognize the importance of addressing the staggering humanitarian and economic problems caused by the indiscriminate and illegal use of land-mines. We ask all Governments to join us in this effort.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask you now to call on Mr. Leahy.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I welcome the Honourable Mr. Patrick Leahy and call on him to continue introducing the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/49/L.19.

Mr. Leahy (United States of America): I am here today to introduce, on behalf of the United States Government, a draft resolution entitled "Moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines", which is contained in document A/C.1/49/L.19. It calls on all States that have not yet done so to declare a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines. It requests the Secretary-General to prepare a report on progress towards implementing such moratoriums. It encourages further international efforts to seek solutions to the problems caused by anti-personnel land-mines, with a view to the eventual elimination of these weapons. Finally, it urges States which have not done so to adhere to the inhumane weapons Convention and its Protocols, which govern the use of anti-personnel land-mines and related devices.

Almost exactly one year ago, I stood in this room and introduced a similar draft resolution — the first of its kind — which called on all States to implement moratoriums on the export of anti-personnel land-mines. That resolution was inspired by legislation that I had sponsored in the United States Senate to impose a moratorium on United States exports of anti-personnel land-mines — legislation that was passed by 100 votes to none.

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The resolution of last year was a first response to a deadly plague that has infested more than 60 countries. It is estimated that, today, at least 85 million unexploded land-mines are strewn around the world. In some countries, such as Afghanistan and Cambodia, there is one land-mine for every two people, and there are tens of thousands of amputees — people who have lost arms or legs — and individuals who have lost their sight as a result of these devices. Often no larger than a can of shoe polish, and costing only $3, they lie silently waiting for their unsuspecting victims. Usually the victim is a civilian — often a young child. If people are lucky enough to survive the blast, they face lives without legs or arms, or in blindness.

But the victim is also the United Nations peace-keeper sent to Somalia or Rwanda or Bosnia. It could be a Pakistani, an American, an Italian or a Russian. Many victims are returning refugees or other displaced people. It makes no difference, because land-mines do not choose their victims. No matter how technologically sophisticated they may be, they will kill or mutilate whoever steps on them — soldier, civilian, visitor, innocent bystander or whomsoever.

Land-mines are an economic development issue, a human rights issue and an environmental issue. Every week, hundreds of people are killed or maimed by these cruel, indiscriminate weapons. The economic consequences of land-mines are devastating for poor, developing nations, where they are so widely used today. It will cost the international community tens of billions of dollars just to clear the mines that are already in place.

Land-mines were first conceived of as defensive weapons, but even in the civil war in the United States of America more than a century ago they were placed in houses, around water wells and on roadways. Today, land-mines are often used offensively as weapons of terror — sown, like seed, by the thousand around populated areas — and little or no attempt is made to record their location.

In the 12 months since I introduced that first draft resolution on a moratorium on the export of land-mines, more than a dozen countries have stopped exporting all anti-personnel mines. Italy — one of the world's largest exporters — has declared a moratorium on exports and has pledged to take the necessary steps to block the production of these weapons. The Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, is among the world leaders who have called for a comprehensive ban.

I am especially pleased that, in his address to the General Assembly on 26 September, President Bill Clinton endorsed the goal of the eventual elimination of anti-personnel land-mines. The draft resolution that I am introducing today, in addition to calling on countries that have not yet declared their own export moratoriums to do so, would put all countries on record in support of the eventual elimination of these weapons. The United States Administration believes that States can move most effectively towards that goal as viable and humane alternatives are developed.

This is a major step forward. It should end the debate about the need for the goal of the eventual elimination of anti-personnel land-mines. Some have called this goal too far-reaching. To them I say, "Think of the victims. Look at the global human tragedy land-mines have already caused. Think of the immense financial expense to clear the mines. Consider the danger they pose to your own soldiers or the danger they pose to those States that send people in on humanitarian missions."

The goal of the eventual elimination of anti-personnel land-mines should be unanimously supported. We must then develop an effective approach to achieving it as soon as is humanly possible. As a first step, the United States President has proposed that States conclude an agreement to reduce the number and availability of anti-personnel land-mines.

Every 15 minutes of every day, of every week, of every month, of every year that we delay, another person falls victim to a land-mine. In the past 12 months alone, approximately 2 million more land-mines have been laid. But during the same period, in every country represented here, the number of people demanding an end to this senseless slaughter has continued to grow.

Next September, the United Nations will convene a Conference to review the 1980 inhumane weapons Convention, with the special aim of strengthening its Protocol on land-mines. My Government has taken steps towards ratification of that Convention. It also strongly supports efforts to expand demining programmes. In addition, this year in the United States Senate, I sponsored and saw the passing of legislation that provided an additional $10 million for the development of more effective technology to locate and destroy mines.

The United States appreciates the support of the 57 States that have joined it in sponsoring this draft resolution. We urge others to join us, and we hope that they will promptly implement their own moratoriums if they have not yet done so. By stopping the proliferation of these weapons we shall have taken one of the most effective steps towards the goal of the eventual elimination of anti-personnel land-mines and of ending the great human tragedy that they cause.

The Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish):* With the agreement of the Committee, I shall now call Mr. Johan Molander, Deputy Under-Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of Sweden, to address the Committee in his capacity as Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts to prepare the Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

Mr. Molander (Group of Governmental Experts to prepare the Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects): First of all, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you — and through you the Committee — for giving me this opportunity to report briefly on the state of negotiations in the Group of Governmental Experts to prepare the Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which I have the honour to chair.

I am also particularly pleased to be addressing the Committee immediately following the introduction by Senator Leahy of the United States of draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.19, on an export moratorium on anti-personnel land-mines. To meet the challenge of land-mines, all efforts must be made and those efforts must be mutually supportive.

To date, the Group of Experts has held three meetings of two weeks, in February, May and August 1994. A fourth meeting will be held between 9 and 20 January 1995, and it has been decided to hold the Review Conference itself between 25 September and 13 October 1995.

As indicated by the mandate given to the Group, its work — and thus my comments — will concentrate on Protocol II, on land-mines. The state of negotiations is reflected in the progress report — and, in particular, in the Chairman's rolling text annexed to it — contained in document CCW/CONF.1/GE/21 from the Group of Governmental Experts.

It is not my intention to take up the Committee's time by repeating orally what is contained in the report, but rather to discuss candidly some of the hurdles we are facing.

The devastating and indiscriminate effects of anti-personnel land-mines fighting wars long after the wars have ceased, long after the battles have moved somewhere else, are known to all of us. These are aftermath wars fought by an anonymous enemy against the peasant ploughing his field, the woman collecting wood to prepare the evening meal, the child fetching water from the well or playing outside his village. These residual wars must be brought to an end; and yet, it has been calculated that two million land-mines will be laid in 1994 while only 100,000 will be cleared. Humanity is losing the battle against land-mines by a factor of 20 to 1!

There is no one single solution to the problem. As highlighted by the Secretary-General himself in his report to the Assembly on the work of the Organization and in his contribution to the September/October 1994 issue of "*Foreign Affairs*", the land-mine catastrophe must be dealt with in several ways. Many initiatives have been taken in the General Assembly, such as the draft resolution on an export moratorium introduced just now and resolutions on mine clearance. Some such measures must be taken in the short term to combat this plague. Others, such as the Review Conference on the inhumane weapons Convention must have an impact over the long term.

It would seem futile to discuss possible amendments to Protocol II, on land-mines, if it is not stated from the outset that its major flaw is not that it is imperfect — which it is — but that it is not being applied.

To date, only 42 States have ratified the Convention and the Protocols. Many countries in the regions most devastatingly affected by land-mines are not bound by it, and, furthermore, it is not applicable to non-international conflicts.

The process of ratification and accession must be accelerated. Canada recently deposited its instrument of ratification. I am informed that several other countries, such as Brazil, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and others, are in the process of ratification. These are welcome additions. On behalf of the States parties, I implore those States that have not yet done so speedily to consider acceding to the Convention. There is still time to do so and to participate not only as observer but as States parties in the Review Conference of 1995.

The revision of Protocol II, on land-mines, with which the Group of Governmental Experts has been entrusted, is a complex and formidable task. In essence, the inhumane weapons Convention is part of humanitarian law, specifically the laws of war. At the same time, in the course of our work, a number of elements have been introduced that, more often than not, have been taken from disarmament law. I refer in particular to proposals regarding such issues as transfers, assistance, technological cooperation and verification. Experts on humanitarian law and experts on arms control do not always speak the same language. It would therefore, in my view, be useful if delegations were to include people with expertise in both fields to a greater extent.

There is no use in further debating whether the inhumane weapons Convention is a humanitarian law treaty or a disarmament treaty. In fact, the Group has set out on a path combining both elements. Delegations should be equipped to respond to that situation in order to be able to present to the Review Conference a limited and well-developed set of options.

The problems we face in the preparatory work can be grouped into five main subject areas. Two of them, the scope of application and the material restrictions and prohibitions, derive from the current text of the Convention. The remaining three — transfers, assistance/technological cooperation and verification — are subject areas hitherto not dealt with in the land-mine Protocol or the Convention.

I shall briefly address these five areas. First, with regard to the scope of application, an important, if not an overwhelming, part of the global land-mine catastrophe is attributable to the use of land-mines in non-international conflicts. This fact, as well as an international tendency to extend humanitarian law to internal conflicts — most recently illustrated by steps taken by countries such as Brazil and Colombia to ratify Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions — have encouraged a number of States to propose extending the scope of the land-mine Protocol to internal conflicts.

Other States, in particular those which have not yet ratified Additional Protocol II, maintain objections of principle. These are often of a fundamental character, involving issues of sovereignty, non-interference, and so on, based on long-established policies or historical experiences. The Group has dedicated considerable time to this issue, trying to extend the scope of application while at the same time dealing with the specific concerns that have been raised.

The issue is an important one. I hope it will be duly considered in capitals and in consultations between States. I feel that in the preparatory work, the texts on the issue could still be refined, but that a final compromise may be struck only at the Review Conference itself.

The second subject area, restrictions and prohibitions, presents us with a wide-ranging array of proposals, from rather modest improvements to a complete ban on anti-personnel land-mines. On these issues, I refer delegations to the aforementioned progress report and its annexed rolling text. Let me state here only that I feel that the Group of Governmental Experts is well equipped to negotiate this part of the Protocol, despite the wide divergence between the various proposals now to hand. I am therefore confident that the Group will be able to present to the Review Conference almost square-bracket-free texts for articles 2 to 6 of the Protocol, and I hope that they will contain substantial further restrictions.

Let me now turn to the subject areas that are new to the Convention and, indeed, to humanitarian law, if we exclude the existing but somewhat dormant provision for an International Fact-Finding Commission under Article 90 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.

Proposals have been made for a ban on exports of weapons covered by the Protocol either to conflict areas or, more generally, to States not bound by the Protocol's provisions. There are also proposals for assistance and technology transfers, not only in the area of mine-clearance but also in respect of technology that might be required if new technical specifications for the detectability, self-destruction or self-neutralization of land-mines are agreed. Finally, three new articles on verification and compliance have been painstakingly worked out.

I would be greatly remiss if I did not clearly state that there exists to date no consensus in the Group on the final inclusion of any of these new subject areas in the Convention or the Protocol. The relevant texts will require considerable additional discussion and drafting in the Group of Governmental Experts.

I would urge Governments to study the texts at high levels in their legal, foreign affairs and defence establishments, in a constructive and result-oriented way, between now and the next meeting of the Group in January, and between then and the Review Conference in the autumn of 1995. Each advance we may agree upon will in the end benefit the innocent civilian and, indeed, our overall efforts towards development. It must be borne in mind that a country infested with mines is unable to develop and prosper since mine clearance, at a cost of $600 to $1,000 per unit, is a *sine qua non* for starting rehabilitation and development programmes. Humanitarian considerations aside, we simply cannot afford the continued waging of land-mine wars.

I should like to mention that three proposals for additional protocols — regarding small-calibre weapons, blinding weapons, and naval mines — have been introduced, by Switzerland and Sweden. There has been little time to consider them in substance. Time must now be allotted to deal with them seriously before the Review Conference starts.

Good progress has been made in the Group of Governmental Experts. The atmosphere has been business-like, friendly and constructive. I am indebted to the delegations and to the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Kheradi, and his colleagues in the secretariat for the promising working spirit. Still, the task remains complex. It is my feeling that the Review Conference will need three full weeks, from 25 September to 13 October 1995, and that delegations should prepare for substantive negotiations on several of the outstanding issues.

The Review Conference must — and here I quote the Secretary-General —

> "rise to the humanitarian challenge, developing and endorsing a set of provisions which would effectively eliminate the threat of land-mines". *(A/49/275, para. 29)*

Mr. Ok (Cambodia): Mr. Chairman, because this is the first time I have taken the floor, allow me first of all to convey, on behalf of the Cambodian delegation, my congratulations on your election as Chairman of the First Committee. My congratulations go also to the other members of the Bureau.

My delegation received with great satisfaction the report of the Secretary-General contained in document A/49/357, entitled "Assistance in mine clearance". It draws to the attention of those countries that sell, produce or transfer land-mines the suffering that land-mines can cause people and their adverse effects on society and morale, as well as their financial cost to the international community. Cambodia hopes that this report will promote the understanding and cooperation of member States in the fields of planning, research and financial assistance to countries that are infested with land-mines.

Land-mines are present in 64 countries around the world. Cambodia is one of those countries. It is estimated that there are at least 8 million to 10 million land-mines scattered like seed over most of the arable land in my country, especially along the border with Thailand. They are cruel weapons, used by resistance and regular soldiers alike. They do not differentiate between soldiers and civilians. They kill or maim the enemy, the person who planted them or, in most cases, innocent civilians: agricultural workers.

In Cambodia, land-mines have already killed and maimed several thousand people. There are about 40 thousand amputees now, and 200 to 230 more victims are claimed each month. One out of every 236 Cambodians is an amputee: a rate more than 100 times higher than in Europe or the United States. In addition to endangering human lives, land-mines disrupt the transportation networks and destroy agricultural production. They pollute the environment, hold back development and reconstruction activities, and interfere with the provision of relief assistance and the rehabilitation of refugees and other displaced persons.

In recognizing the scourge of land-mines, His Majesty King Norodom Sihanouk has on several occasions made his position very clear by severely condemning their use. His Majesty called upon the countries of the world to ban the production of land-mines and to destroy all those that are still in stockpiles. Our King is very grateful to those countries that have declared moratoriums on the export, transfer and sale of land-mines and related devices. His Majesty has also called upon the Cambodian parliament to pass legislation banning these deadly devices for ever.

The Royal Government of Cambodia is deeply grateful to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and to the foreign Governments and non-governmental organizations that have assisted the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) in its de-mining effort. Without this valuable contribution, CMAC would not accomplish its mission of increasing public mine-awareness and carrying out mine-marking and mine clearance. My Government is very pleased with the results of the efforts by UNDP and the international community, in close cooperation with

CMAC, on the mine-clearance training programme in Cambodia. The mine-clearance training unit has trained some 2,332 Cambodians as de-miners and 99 as supervisors. To date, there are some 1,900 trained de-miners active in Cambodia, and an area of 9 million square metres has been de-mined.

Secondly, the Khmer Rouge group has given a negative reply to the international community's appeal concerning mine clearance and are continuing to plant new land-mines. On Wednesday, 12 October 1994, the Khmer Rouge, in an open broadcast said that their fighters had planted 100 new land-mines between 1 and 3 October along Route 10, which runs southwards from the city of Battambang to the Thai border.

De-mining alone is not the solution to the global land-mine problem. My delegation strongly believes that the best and most effective way to protect innocent civilians, especially women and children, from the danger of land-mines is to ban the production, use and transfer of all types of land-mines completely and eventually to eliminate them all. In this context, my Government fully supports the statement delivered by United States President Clinton last 26 September, in which he called on all nations to join the United States in reducing the number and availability of anti-personnel land-mines as a first step towards the eventual elimination of these weapons. My delegation appreciates the initiative taken by the United States in preparing draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.19 on a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines, which has just been introduced by United States Senator Patrick Leahy. We are pleased to endorse it, and join in sponsoring it.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of Mexico to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.9/Rev.1.

Mrs. Carvalho (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I have the honour to introduce to the First Committee, on behalf of its sponsors, draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.9/Rev.1, entitled "Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water". I should add that the reissue was for technical reasons only.

The final and complete suspension of nuclear tests has been the international community's constant concern. Given its enormous importance for nuclear disarmament, this item has been on the General Assembly's agenda for year after year. The efforts towards achieving that objective in various forums have been many. The initiative taken by six countries to turn the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty has undoubtedly helped stress the importance, indeed the necessity of concluding such a treaty. It has also contributed a viable alternative for ending all technological improvements to nuclear weapons.

The agreement in the Conference on Disarmament to begin multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive, universal and readily verifiable test-ban treaty that would contribute effectively to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all their aspects and would therefore promote the disarmament process and thus international peace and security has been a first step in the right direction. However, we must redouble our efforts and intensify the negotiations in order to conclude the treaty as soon as possible.

The Amendment Conference and the Conference on Disarmament will have to continue their work supporting and complementing each other. This is why draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.9/Rev.1 takes note of the intention of the President of the Amendment Conference:

> ...
>
> "to convene, after appropriate consultations and in the light of the work carried out by the Conference on Disarmament, another special meeting of the States parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, as envisaged in resolution 48/69, to review developments and assess the situation regarding a comprehensive test ban and to examine the feasibility of resuming the work of the Amendment Conference". (*A/C.1/49/L.9/Rev.1, para. 2*)

We thank the President of the Conference, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Mr. Ali Alatas, for his excellent leadership.

The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.9/Rev.1 are persuaded of the importance of leaving the way open for the Amendment Conference, and in so doing affording ourselves an opportunity to affirm our political will to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty quickly and effectively. We therefore expect to receive the broadest support from the members of this Committee.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of Germany to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.27.

Mr. Hoffmann (Germany): On behalf of the European Union, the four applicant States and the other sponsors, I wish to introduce the draft resolution entitled "Code of Conduct for the international transfers of conventional weapons", contained in document A/C.1/49/L.27. I also wish to express our gratitude to Romania, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria, who have supported this initiative from the outset and have joined in sponsoring the draft resolution. This is a short, procedural draft resolution that calls on the First Committee and the General Assembly to agree that a code of conduct should be elaborated in the most appropriate forum.

The European Union believes that the transformation of the international security situation following the end of the cold war has enabled substantial progress to be made in the field of arms control and disarmament. In the field of weapons of mass destruction, the progress achieved is well known and many delegations have referred to it in their contributions to the general debate.

In the field of conventional weapons, there have also been substantial achievements in some regions of the world — in particular Europe — but it is recognized that this is an area in which more work needs to be done. Indeed, there is growing recognition of the need to exert greater restraint in transfers of conventional weapons. The establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms shows that there has been widespread acceptance of the importance of greater transparency in arms transfers. The European Union therefore believes that the elaboration of a universal, politically binding code of conduct would represent an important step forward in the area of conventional arms control.

The objective of our proposal would be to agree on a set of principles and guidelines to promote responsibility and restraint in international conventional arms transfers. The format and detailed content of such a code would be determined in the course of the discussions. However, the experience of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, where it proved possible to agree on a set of principles governing conventional arms transfers, should give us some encouragement in elaborating a code of conduct of a more universal character.

We have not suggested a specific forum in which the elaboration of such a code would take place as we feel that it would be better to consider this issue when we have heard the views of delegations here in the First Committee. The obvious possibilities are the Commission and the Conference on Disarmament.

The European Union hopes that it will be possible to reach agreement by consensus on this draft resolution. We remain at the disposal of any delegation wishing to receive further clarification of our initiative.

Mr. Neagu (Romania): It is a pleasure for me to share in and support for the introduction by the representative of Germany, Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann, on behalf of the European Union, of the draft resolution on the "Code of Conduct for the international transfers of conventional weapons", document A/C.1/49/L.27, which my delegation is also sponsoring.

May I take this opportunity to thank the German delegation for its endeavours, in its national capacity and also as current Chairman of the European Union, to help merge the two initial drafts prepared by the delegations of Ireland and Romania, which were in fact going in the same direction. I am particularly grateful to the delegation of Ireland for its understanding and generous cooperation during the whole process of elaborating this text, which started in Geneva and continued here at this session with the active participation of all the sponsors.

The idea of establishing guidelines for international transfers of conventional arms was presented by the President of Romania at the Conference on Disarmament as long ago as June 1993. In his speech at the Conference, President Ion Iliescu stated:

> "Conventional arms are obviously more frequently used in the hot points of our planet and they often represent a main destabilizing factor. Moreover the balance of forces established in time or by international agreements in various sensitive regions and zones can be undermined through preferential conventional arms transfer policies. In the future the overall aspects regarding transparency in armaments could be regulated in an international treaty of universal vocation which would set standards and procedures as well as appropriate implementation mechanisms. In order to break the ground for such a comprehensive and complex world, a first stage could be aimed at agreed guidelines to serve as an international code of conduct." *(CD/PV.653, p. 4)*

In May this year, upon the instructions of my Government, I had the honour to introduce, in the Conference's Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments, Romania's views on the need to establish agreed guidelines to serve as a code of conduct for the international transfers of conventional arms and a working paper containing specific proposals in this regard.

In the draft resolution, the view is rightly taken that an enhanced level of openness and transparency with regard to international transfers of armaments would contribute greatly to confidence-building and security between States, ease tensions, strengthen regional and international peace and security, could serve as a useful tool in facilitating non-proliferation efforts in general and could contribute to restraint in the military production and the transfer of arms.

It is the belief of my delegation that, alongside the Register of Conventional Arms, other far-reaching international confidence-building measures such as the proposed code of conduct are needed to promote restraint and transparency in the transfer of conventional arms. In this respect, it might be useful to establish an appropriate framework for consultation and action in order to ensure that countries can never again acquire arsenals that go far beyond the needs of self-defence. Romania shares the view that arms-producing States have a responsibility to ensure that their weapons exports do not contribute to instability or conflicts in other countries or regions, and that there is also a need for importing countries to exercise responsibility and restraint in their procurement policies.

A code of conduct — open to all States — should consist of a set of guidelines, primarily a list of politically binding principles and criteria on which the arms exporting and importing policies of subscribing States should be based. The code of conduct would apply to transfers of the seven categories of conventional weapons and equipment on which States are requested to supply data to the Register of Conventional Arms: battle tanks; armoured combat vehicles; large-calibre artillery systems; combat aircraft; attack helicopters; warships; and missiles or missile systems. The addition of further categories taking into account significant technical developments could be considered under the provisions of General Assembly resolution 46/36 L.

In the view of my delegation the code of conduct would constitute a new means of promoting openness and the more detailed publication of — and internal debate on — information relating to conventional arms. At the same time, it would provide a framework for dialogue between and within States and promote the establishment or further elaboration by States of legal instruments and administrative machinery for internally regulating, and effectively monitoring their arms-procurement processes.

Such a code of conduct would allow for attention to be focused more on illicit arms transfers by highlighting known and legitimate transfers. This year, the Conference's Ad Hoc Committee thoroughly considered the Romanian working paper on a code of conduct which, as noted in the report of the Conference to the General Assembly (A/49/27, p. 145, paras. 31 and 32), was aimed at furthering the debate on how to deal with excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional arms, increasing openness and transparency in the field and establishing universal and non-discriminatory principles and criteria, to be followed by subscribing States in considering arms transfers, as a voluntary confidence-building measure.

My delegation was very pleased to note that many States, both members and non-members of the Conference on Disarmament, welcomed the proposal and considered it an important contribution to strengthening confidence and understanding between States. As was normal, various comments, proposals and assessments were made during the debate. A number of delegations were of the opinion that the parameters used in the proposals, such as human rights and "excessive" and "destabilizing" accumulations of arms, were ambiguous or irrelevant. Of course, these and other questions must be addressed if we are to clarify the issues further and thereby promote the objective of increased transparency.

The draft resolution leaves open opportunities for further discussion by stating that the Assembly:

> "Considers that a Code of Conduct for international arms transfers [should] be elaborated in the most appropriate forum". *(A/C.1/49/L.27, para. 2)*

The way in which the text is worded also leaves an opportunity for consensus, and I hope that the draft resolution will be adopted without a vote.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call upon the representative of Germany, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.1/Rev.1.

Mr. Hoffmann (Germany): It is my privilege to introduce, on behalf of 28 sponsors, the draft resolution on objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures (A/C.1/49/L.1/Rev.l). The draft resolution merges agenda items 53, on reduction of military budgets, and 64 (f), on the implementation of the guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters. This unification of two agenda items has been made possible by cooperation between a number of delegations, in particular the delegations of Romania and the United Kingdom. It appeared appropriate to combine the two agenda items because they both pertain to the issue of increasing transparency in military matters at the global level.

In 1992, the Disarmament Commission adopted guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters. This eventually became the first important result from the reform of the Disarmament Commission. The guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters contain, *inter alia*, principles for providing information on military matters, mechanisms in this regard at the global level and, last but not least, recommendations for future activities. The contents of the guidelines and recommendations are still of significance today as a framework for activities in this field. Therefore, paragraph 1 of the proposed resolution recommends the guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters to all Member States for implementation.

One of the recommendations of the 1992 guidelines — dealing with the United Nations standardized system of reporting military expenditures — still requires appropriate action. The system in operation since 1981 is an exemplary and useful means of increasing transparency in military matters. Unfortunately, participation in it is far from universal. For a number of years, only some 13 Member States have provided the relevant information; in 1992, therefore, the recommendations for objective information on military matters suggested improving the reporting system to achieve greater participation. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.1/Rev.1 takes up this recommendation in its paragraph 4, which requests the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on how to strengthen and broaden participation in the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures. His report on this subject, to be submitted to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session, could prepare the ground for improvement to the existing reporting system.

The sponsors of the draft resolution are convinced that it is a matter of general concern that we should strive for greater transparency in military matters because greater transparency contributes to strengthening international peace and security. The sponsors therefore hope to achieve general support for the draft resolution and will work for its adoption without a vote, as has been the case with draft resolutions on these issues in previous years.

Mr. Neagu (Romania): I should like to add just a few words about draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.1/Rev.1 on objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures, which has just been so ably introduced by the representative of Germany, Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann.

I would call this draft resolution a vivid expression of the rationalization of the work of the First Committee in action. Three years ago, Romania and Germany took the initiative of merging the two draft resolutions traditionally prepared by them under the agenda item on military expenditures and military budgets. Now, as a further step in the direction of rationalizing decision-making in the First Committee — as Ambassador Hoffmann has emphasized, with the contribution of the delegation of the United Kingdom — two agenda items, 53 and 64 (f), have been merged in an effort to improve the focus of the debate and of its outcome with respect to transparency in military matters.

Increased transparency in the military field leads to increased confidence and thus to the creation of the necessary environment for the reduction of military activities, armaments, troops and budgets, the *sine qua non* for peace and stability.

The United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures, which has been in place for more than a decade, has proved to be instrumental in this regard. The system was used by the States members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as a basis for formulating a Europe-specific system for reporting national military expenditures. The end of the cold war and of ideological confrontation has created conditions favouring sustained participation in the United Nations reporting system. Moreover, the reporting system itself might be improved, in order to secure more active participation.

Particularly important to that end is the draft resolution's call to Member States to send to the Secretary-General their views on how to strengthen and broaden participation in the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures. These reports and statements of views, along with the guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters, will make it possible to conduct a conclusive discussion in this Committee next year under a single item, as recommended in the final paragraph of the draft resolution. It is the earnest hope of my delegation that the draft resolution will be adopted by consensus.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call next on the representative of Mexico, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.10.

Mr. González Bustos (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): It gives my delegation special pleasure to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.10, on agenda item 71, entitled "Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)". Among the 22 sponsors of the draft resolution, Argentina, Brazil and Chile can be counted for the first time as States parties to the Treaty.

The full accession to the Treaty of those States, the recent signature by Saint Kitts and Nevis, the stated intention of Guyana to sign soon, and the announcement by the Government of Cuba that it has decided to join the Treaty regime in the near future give us hope that perhaps we shall soon witness the conclusion of the pioneering process that will establish Latin America and the Caribbean as the first densely populated region in the world to be completely free of nuclear weapons. The fact that the Treaty is in full force for 28 of the 33 sovereign States in the region is a testament to how soon we can hope to complete the cycle of efforts and decisions by various countries in the region that share Mexico's goal of regional military denuclearization, a goal that is now very close to being achieved.

The preamble of the draft resolution notes the most recent events relating to the Treaty, including the ratification by Argentina, Brazil and Chile, the signature by Saint Kitts and Nevis and imminent signature by the Cuban Government and the fact that the amended Treaty is already fully in force for five States in the region, including Mexico.

In the operative part of the draft resolution, the General Assembly would welcome the concrete steps taken by several countries of the region during the past year for the consolidation of the regime of military denuclearization established by the Treaty, would note with satisfaction the full adherence of Argentina, Brazil and Chile to the Treaty, and would urge the countries of the region that have not yet done so to deposit their instruments of ratification of the amendments to the Treaty approved by the General Conference of the Agency on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in 1990, 1991 and 1992.

Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.10 reflects the will and the determination of the Latin America and the Caribbean region to foster international peace and cooperation by eliminating the nuclear threat. Today more than ever before, banning nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean is a key objective which the international community, and the First Committee in particular, should support most vigorously. We hope that, like similar texts in previous years, this draft resolution will be adopted without a vote.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): With the permission of the Committee, I shall call next on the Secretary-General of the Agency on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Mr. Román-Morey (Secretary-General of the Agency on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean) (*interpretation from Spanish*): It is nearly 28 years since the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was opened for signature by the States of the region as a legal instrument whereby a large and densely populated region declared to the world, and especially to the nuclear Powers, its desire to live in peace and spare its peoples the waste of their limited resources on nuclear weapons, preferring to spend them on the battle for their own welfare and progress.

This marked a most important step forward in the then-new sphere of nuclear non-proliferation. It also secured the region's right to development by making it clear that no provision of the Treaty of Tlatelolco would undermine its right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The cold war and a bipolar world informed the drafting of the Treaty. Its points of reference were a devastating world war that for the first time demonstrated the horror of what nuclear energy could do if used for warlike purposes, and the early work on the peaceful uses of that energy. The constant threat of nuclear confrontation between the super-Powers made it a matter of urgency to present the world with a legal instrument — innovative for its time, but whose spirit has none the less not dated — which would show the world that, for the signatories, what they understood by "national interest" existed in a menage à trois with the interests of the international community as a whole and the other national interests within regions that, while not having their fingers on the button, would be involved willy-nilly in the war. With the Treaty of Tlatelolco, our States cast their moral veto against the emergence of new military confrontations that would be as disastrous for mankind.

The time was short, the path was long, and the circumstances were very difficult. The world in which the first steps were taken was a changing one, and the Treaty itself had to lock step with it. Here is where we see the appearance of what we might call the Latin American spirit. International law has not escaped the influence of the fertile Latin American intellect. Some of the general principles of international law that serve us today as foundations for the peaceful coexistence of peoples are of Latin American parentage.

In the non-proliferation arena, once again Latin America took the lead internationally. Obviously, there are solid reasons for this, based on the region's spirit of peace, its desire for progress and its deep social, economic and political roots.

As I was saying, in the midst of the cold war, our region understood that the only chance of a truly catastrophic situation arising for Latin America would come from worldwide conflict. The state of complete interdependence in which we live, and above all the reach of the destructive power of the atom, makes it clear that we are not immune to our surroundings. Therefore, in the face of reality, we recreated the international rules of the game.

Latin America and the Caribbean is like that: introspective and given to self-reflection, but then, from within, it looks out towards the world at large by looking within for seeds it can call its own but which may have universal relevance. We are not reinventing the wheel; all of this flows from a logical and political way of looking at things. Latin America not only recognizes but says out loud what we all know. Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the initiation of an important hierarchy that must be used as a cornerstone for dealing with the issue of non-proliferation. That hierarchy is the inescapable supremacy of nuclear weapons over conventional.

In the conviction that for Latin America and the Caribbean there are other more urgent priorities than the issue of denuclearization — such as extreme poverty, health, education and economic development — and with our long and extraordinary history of peaceful coexistence, we gave the region and the world the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In the conviction also that we are agreed that by speaking with one voice we can alert the world to the dangers posed by the huge arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, the Treaty of Tlatelolco that governs us on the regional level acts as a platform for us to speak in unison to the world on that most important issue, non-proliferation.

The authors of the Treaty created an international instrument rich in concepts: over the three decades it has been in force, it has always served as an example that should always be borne in mind by the international community, particularly in this vitally important time of change. Among the elements that make this Treaty unique are its indefinite period of application (article 31); the permanent option of making changes to it and thus adapting it to the times (article 30); the explicit ban on any reservations to it (article 28); the complete protection of its area of application that it affords by means of negative assurances by involving nuclear and other Powers from outside the continent (Additional protocols I and II); its express definition of what constitutes a nuclear weapon (article 5); the undertaking by the parties to use the nuclear material and facilities under their jurisdiction for exclusively peaceful purposes (article 1); and, finally and most importantly, its confirmation of the principle of international law that militarily denuclearized zones are not an end in themselves but rather a means for achieving general and complete disarmament (fourth preambular paragraph).

The Treaty of Tlatelolco, in full agreement with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, recognizes and spells out a general principle of international law, makes it incontestable and applicable, makes rules for it and adjusts it to the evolving circumstances of the world by allowing it to be updated and changed, by ensuring that it is observed in a major populated area, and by serving also as a touchstone for its letter and spirit to be emulated by other, equally densely populated regions of the world.

Latin America and the Caribbean are thus very pleased at the efforts being made by the peoples and Governments of other densely populated regions of the world to continue establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. We take this opportunity to applaud the decision taken by the parties to the Treaty of Rarotonga, and now we have great hopes for the enormous efforts by the peoples of Africa towards achieving an international treaty similar in spirit to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Within this general framework, and given the changing times I mentioned earlier, from 1990 on the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been undergoing updating in order to make it truly universal with respect to its area of application. To achieve this, the parties are adopting a set of amendments making it easier for third countries in the region to become full members.

Thus, on 3 July 1990, the decision was taken to add to the Treaty's legal title the words "and the Caribbean", so including the English-speaking States of the Caribbean in its area of application, and on 10 May 1990, the area of application was updated by amending former article 25 using wording similar to that of article 8 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, so that all independent States in the region could accede to the military denuclearization regime. This important change allows Caribbean States such as Belize and Guyana to be brought under the Treaty.

On 26 August 1992, at its seventh special session, the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) adopted amendments to articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20 of the Treaty in respect of the Treaty's system of verification and control. The amendments basically strengthen the verification system by recognizing that the only organization able to carry out special inspections on the basis of accusations by the parties is the International Atomic Energy Agency, but they also maintain the principle that OPANAL's organs will continue to be entrusted with supervising the application of the Treaty's system of controls. We must emphasize the fact that, even though the amendments now adopted do alter the verification system, none of them alters the fundamental principles or essence of the Treaty itself.

The amendments to which I have referred enabled States in the region with significant degrees of nuclear development to become full members. Argentina and Chile did so on 18 January 1994, and Brazil on 30 May. Furthermore, the majority of member States have subscribed to the amendments and are in the process of ratifying them under their own internal legislation. The Government of Mexico, as depositary, interprets the situation to mean that the amendments are in force for those States that have signed and ratified them and have also made the waiver declaration referred to in paragraph 2 of the Treaty's article 29.

At this point, the Treaty's status is as follows: of the 33 States members of the regional group, only two have not signed the Treaty. Cuba has officially declared its intention to accede to the Treaty and to become a full member of the Tlatelolco system soon. Guyana, for its part, has expressed its political will to join the regional system when the technical and legal conditions needed for it to do so are met.

Of the 31 States that have signed, only three have not yet fully completed the ratification process — Belize, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Santa Lucia. Thus, 28 States in the region are full members of the Tlatelolco system. Moreover, through their signing and ratifying Additional Protocols I and II, the Treaty of Tlatelolco is now fully respected in all its objectives and explicit provisions by China, France, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

The system of peace and security established and promoted by the Treaty of Tlatelolco makes the role of Latin America and the Caribbean in the multilateral disarmament agenda increasingly important. Thus, the region reiterates that the very important question of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, at both the regional and global levels, must be taken up in a comprehensive, integral, balanced and non-discriminatory manner. This must be done in such a way that nothing impedes access to the full development of advanced dual-use technologies for exclusively peaceful purposes.

Even though the OPANAL's primary and major task is the consolidation of the denuclearized zone, it has never lost from view the fact that its vocation is to gain access to nuclear technology for exclusively peaceful purposes and establish cooperation programmes towards this end, so avoiding a widening of the gap between the developed and the developing countries.

Throughout its years in operation, OPANAL has demonstrated its interest in attending the meetings of the Programme of Regional Cooperative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean (ARCAL) as an observer, and last month in Vienna, at their most recent meeting, the membership agreed that OPANAL should attend in that capacity.

Making the area of application of the Treaty of Tlatelolco universal and consolidating the Treaty at the regional level entails OPANAL's expanding its activities, and this will necessarily involve a decision by the member States to modernize OPANAL's general secretariat — of course, this will be a short term project. We believe that the links between OPANAL and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will complement this work of universalization and consolidation within the express mandate given by article 1 of the Treaty, whereby the nuclear material and facilities placed within the Treaty's scope are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. As long as OPANAL has existed, and even before the Treaty was established, our region obtained invaluable assistance from IAEA. We expect to go on receiving that assistance, not so that we can duplicate our efforts, but so that we can join forces to the benefit and for the development of our peoples.

A major decision presently occupying us is how to develop, under the Treaty's guidelines, international non-proliferation instruments that must, firstly, satisfy the contracting parties and also and not least meet the constant and paramount interests of the international community as a whole: this is necessarily a political decision and must therefore have all the necessary elements for any commitment that is achieved to be respected and also for ensuring that it is respected.

A global non-proliferation regime should therefore include the following elements: a firm political will on the part of the States parties to reach agreement, and unshakeable political resolve that that agreement will be respected; the necessary good will from the parties, based on transparency in their nuclear activities and on confidence that they will generate and exchange data on them; recognition of the principle, as set out in the Treaty, of the shared responsibility of parties with and parties without nuclear weapons not only to avoid proliferation but also to achieve a total ban on these weapons of mass destruction while allowing transfers of cutting-edge nuclear technology for exclusively peaceful purposes; the irrevocable acceptance that the systems must continue to be strengthened whereby the competent international bodies verify, control and inspect nuclear facilities in implementation of norms recognized by the international community; an awareness on the part of the international community that non-proliferation is only an important means towards achieving the total destruction of nuclear weapons, as a start and with general and complete disarmament to follow.

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean is an example that must be taken into account in the noble quest for universal peace to which we are all committed. Much has been done, but there is still much to be done. The twenty-first century will in its turn continue to bear witness to the unshakeable will of the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean to achieve peace and development.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.

United Nations A/C.1/49/PV.13

General Assembly

Official Records

First Committee

13th Meeting
Friday, 4 November 1994, 10.15 a.m.
New York

Chairman: Mr. Valencia Rodriguez . . . . (Ecuador)

The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

Agenda items 53-66, 68-72 and 153 *(continued)*

Consideration of draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish):* I call on the Secretary of the Committee to make an announcement.

Mr. Kheradi (Secretary of the Committee): I should like to inform the Committee that the following countries have joined the list of sponsors of the following draft resolutions: A/C.1/49/L.1/Rev.1: Bulgaria; L.9/Rev.1: Malaysia; L.12: Bolivia, China and Guinea; L.19: Guinea, Kenya and Malaysia; L.21: Bulgaria; and L.22: Malaysia.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of the Netherlands, who will introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/49/L.18.

Mr. Ramaker (Netherlands): During our informal discussions earlier this week, I spoke in order to provide the Committee with some general thoughts relating to the concept of confidence-building measures and transparency in armaments. In speaking today, I return to these issues by focusing on transparency in armaments and, more particularly, of the Register of Conventional Arms.

This subject has been on the agenda of the General Assembly for a number of years. After the Register of Conventional Arms was established pursuant to resolution 46/36 L, it enjoyed consensus in the succeeding years, as is reflected in resolutions 47/52 L and 48/75 E. The Register is now a widely accepted confidence-building measure aimed at promoting openness, trust and greater stability among nations by providing the international community with official data on the international transfers of seven categories of conventional arms. The first report of the Secretary-General (A/48/344), with the replies of Member States on their imports and exports of the conventional weapons concerned, appeared on 11 October 1993, listing 80 returns to the Register. Since that report appeared, 10 more Member States have filed data for the Register, so that in total 90 States have provided answers for the year 1992.

On 1 September 1994, the report contained in document A/49/352 appeared, listing 81 returns of Member States to the Register for the year 1993. On the basis of the experience of last year, the total number of returns for 1993 can be expected eventually to reach more or less the same level as that of 1992.

This year, a group of governmental experts was convened to assist the Secretary-General in preparing a report on the continuing operation of the Register and on its further development. The group met three times under the chairmanship of my predecessor, Ambassador Wagenmakers, and unanimously approved a report, although one delegation reserved its position on it. This report, contained in document A/49/316, appeared on 22 September 1994. In his foreword to the report, the Secretary-General welcomed the Register, pointing out its relevance for confidence-building with the following words:

This record contains the original texts of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, Room C-178. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.

> "As part of a larger international effort to promote openness and transparency in military matters, the Register contributes to confidence-building and security among States". (*A/49/316, foreword*)

The assessment of the first two years of the Register's operation is positive. The level of participation is encouraging. Although the number of replies is a little less than half the membership of the United Nations, the returns for 1992 and 1993 covered the bulk of the international arms trade in the seven weapon categories concerned. Nevertheless, participation in the Register could and should be improved, as was also observed by the Secretary-General in his foreword to the 1994 report of the group of governmental experts.

Wider participation, especially in certain regions and subregions, is of paramount importance for the further consolidation of the Register. It is important also that Member States that have neither imported nor exported weapons should also inform the Secretary-General of that fact, because those so-called "nil" reports show that no arms have been transferred, which in itself should promote confidence. It indicates moreover that the Member State concerned is willing to participate in this confidence-building exercise.

As far as expansion of the scope of the Register is concerned, the 1994 group of governmental experts reaffirmed the goal of early expansion of the Register by the inclusion of data on military holdings and procurement through national production, but could not reach agreement on including such data on the same basis as that applying to transfers. A growing number of States agree that the Register would become more complete and useful if it covered military holdings and procurement from national production. This means that not only the continuing operation but also the possible further development of the Register will have to remain subject to review.

I have the honour today to introduce the draft resolution entitled "Transparency in armaments", document A/C.1/49/L.18, on behalf of the following sponsors: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belarus, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

Thus, I am happy to say that over one third of the United Nations membership has put its weight behind the present draft resolution.

Allow me to explain briefly the main features and purpose of draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.18. The draft resolution is in essence a procedural one aimed at maintaining the momentum of the Register of Conventional Arms and encouraging wider participation in it. It reaffirms the determination of the international community to ensure the effective operation of the Register and, as was the case in the two preceding years, calls upon Member States to provide the requested data by 30 April each year. Draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.18 furthermore takes note of the report of the 1994 group of governmental experts and requests the Secretary-General to make provision for future review of the operation of the Register and its further development by convening another group of governmental experts in 1996. The Conference on Disarmament is encouraged to continue its work on the issue of transparency in armaments.

The Netherlands delegation is aware of the fact that some delegations in this room do not consider further work on this subject necessary or opportune because discussions this year in the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments of the Conference on Disarmament did not, in their view, produce tangible results. May I submit that this is precisely why work in Geneva should in fact continue: both the Register and the work in the Conference on Disarmament are a mere two years old, and experience has shown that multilateral disarmament efforts need time to mature.

With the present draft resolution, the sponsors are aiming to maintain the consensus similar draft resolutions have acquired in years past. I am encouraged by the broad support, expressed during both the general debate and our informal, structured discussions, for the concept of transparency in armaments as embodied in the Register of Conventional Arms. Draft resolution L.18 should, in my view, be acceptable to all delegations, and in the days to come my delegation will seek to confirm that this is indeed the case.

Mr. Boytha (Hungary): On this occasion, I should like to address the issue of transparency in armaments in the context of two relevant draft resolutions, both of which Hungary is sponsoring. One of the drafts, in document A/C.1/49/L.18, concerns the operation and further development of the Register of Conventional Arms and also the continuation of the work on transparency in armaments being carried out within the Conference on Disarmament framework. The other, A/C.1/49/L.27, is devoted to the establishment of a code of conduct for the international transfers of conventional weapons.

It has become a commonplace that the process of post-cold-war transition to a new world order has confronted the international community with new types of major armed conflicts around the world. Such largely intra-State wars have engaged not only States, but also the United Nations and other competent international organizations in searching for solutions to this new problem and in conducting peace-keeping operations at an increasing number of locations.

The enormous difficulties of restoring peace and putting an end to fighting, aggression, shelling, armed atrocities, ethnic cleansing and destruction have become obvious in recent years. The idea of preventive diplomacy and of developing security and confidence-building measures has emerged and it has become indispensable to consider the lessons of the armed conflicts now being waged in order to prevent their further proliferation.

Because the wars in question have been fought in most cases not simply with rifles but with battle tanks, armoured vehicles, mortars and cannons, the idea of preventing armed conflicts also implies developing transparency in these categories of weaponry as a confidence-building factor likely to foster restraint in military production and the transfer of arms. The drive for transparency resulted in the Register of Conventional Arms, a child of the efforts towards arms control; the Register came into effect as recently as 1992, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, adopted in 1991, which requested the Conference on Disarmament, under the heading "Transparency in armaments", to address the question of the interrelated aspects of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms, including military holdings and procurement through national production. The General Assembly also requested the Conference to elaborate universal and non-discriminatory practical means to increase openness and transparency in this field, and also in respect of the transfer of high technology with military applications and weapons of mass destruction. This request was renewed in 1992 and again in 1993.

Accordingly, the Conference on Disarmament has been dealing with the question of transparency in armaments since 1992, and in 1993 and 1994 it established a special Ad Hoc Committee to this end. I had the honour to serve as Chairman of that Committee this year. Of course, it was not to be expected that the manifold and complex task set out by the General Assembly would be accomplished by the Conference on Disarmament in such a short time. But neither was it to be presumed that after only three years would there no longer be any need for transparency in armaments. Three years — indeed, actually only two — of operation of both the Register and the Conference on Disarmament are but a very short initial phase when compared to the enormous challenges raised by the unsettled armed conflicts still raging in very many places and forever erupting in new ones too. Our options are far from exhausted though, and we must continue our work to enhance confidence and ease tensions. The assessment of the first two years of the Register's operation and the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its work in the field of transparency in armaments (A/49/27, section III, subsection H) justify the continuation of the efforts involved.

In his report on the Register (A/49/352) the Secretary-General also revealed some shortcomings in its operations and made specific proposals to promote its universality. His points should be further developed by the experts in New York. Moreover, the findings and suggestions of the Secretary-General offer fresh ammunition for the work of the Conference on Disarmament on transparency in armaments.

During the past three years, an increasing number of States have submitted background information for the Register on their military holdings and also on their procurements from national production. This suggests the possibility of making provision for proper, specific rubrics for this purpose. To do so, however, would require interpretations that were generally accepted by the nations involved. It can be seen from the relevant passage in the 1994 report of the Conference on Disarmament that an agreement did seem to crystallize in the Conference concerning the need to develop pertinent definitions, and it seems worthwhile for there to be further elaboration of the divergent views on this subject. Such continued discussion might also contribute to clarifying questions relating, *inter alia*, to the classification of licensed or collaborative production.

The Secretary-General goes on to point out mismatches and discrepancies in submissions to the Register, possibly resulting from conflicting interpretations as to whether or not — and, if it did, when - a particular transfer occurred. He deemed it appropriate for such discrepancies to be sorted out through bilateral discussions and for the outcomes to be reported to him. These are all questions that could well be handled under a code of conduct for international transfers of conventional arms. The need for such a code has also been raised in the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments of the Conference on Disarmament. Discussions have already started on whether such a code is feasible. The code's possible content should be further examined, even if most participants find it premature to be drafting it so soon.

The 1994 report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly shows that there has been progress in the work towards increasing transparency in armaments in other respects also. I refer, as an example, to the issue of weapons of mass destruction and the transfer of high technology with military applications, where opposing views were set out in more depth than they had been at previous sessions. Delegations that opposed the inclusion of weapons of mass destruction in the Register of Conventional Arms did not, however, rule out further consideration of transparency measures for such weapons on the basis of specific and substantial proposals. In compliance with the General Assembly's call upon all Member States to cooperate at regional and subregional levels with a view to enhancing increased openness and transparency in armaments, this aspect too was discussed in the Conference on Disarmament, and it deserves to have continued work done on it.

Moreover, in the light of the work of the Conference on Disarmament, there still seems to be room for discussing ways and means of viewing the organizations, structures and sizes of armed forces. Approaches to this subject differed greatly, but the relevant passages of the report reflect the fact that, in one way or another, pretty much all participants found information on military personnel to be relevant to the matter in hand.

We should not be discouraged by the mere fact that during the first three years of the Register and of the work in the Conference on Disarmament on issues related to transparency in armaments it has been impossible to reach the goals in question. It was clearly stated in the report of the Conference on Disarmament, adopted by consensus, that several new aspects had been raised with respect to transparency in the field of armaments and that a considerable number of the topics referred to in previous reports had led to further developments in the positions of States and groups of States and also to the clarification and further development of previously presented ideas. Although agreement on those topics had not been reached, some progress in our understanding of the issues was recognized.

The harsh realities of the savage armed conflicts now going on in various parts of the globe oblige us also to continue our work in the field of confidence-building and increasing openness in arms transfers. I wish to stress in this context that, for the time being, the only item referring to questions of conventional arms on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament is that on transparency in armaments. I wish to recall that the topic of conventional weapons figures on the list of subjects suggested by the General Assembly in 1979, and that it should not be neglected today either.

In conclusion, let me express the hope that the draft resolutions concerning the Register, the continuation of the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the field of transparency in armaments and other, specific proposals aimed at furthering the relevant efforts, will be adopted without a vote.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call next on the representative of Brazil, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.29.

Mr. Jaguaribe (Brazil): I am speaking on behalf of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.29. I wish to introduce that draft resolution, which relates to agenda item 55, and is entitled "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields". The draft resolution is sponsored by a number of States from several regions.

As is well know, Canada and Brazil, together with other delegations, have in recent years joined efforts in this undertaking with a view to arriving at universally acceptable norms and guidelines in this area. The relevance of this issue can be seen in its continuing recurrence in all multilateral efforts relating to disarmament and non-proliferation. That is understandable inasmuch as science and technology have a direct bearing on social and economic development as well as on international security and disarmament. The basic assumption guiding our efforts has always been that scientific and technological achievements should be used for the benefit of all mankind to promote the sustainable economic and social development of all States and to safeguard international security, and that international cooperation in the use of science and technology, through the transfer and exchange of technological know-how for peaceful purposes, should be promoted.

We are convinced that, given the global nature of the issues involved, this question can be adequately and fully addressed only in the context of a broad, multilateral understanding. In this regard, the basic purpose of this year's draft resolution is to keep the General Assembly seized of the issue whilst reaffirming the need for a mutually reinforcing relationship between developmental and security needs.

The draft resolution relies on simple and clear concepts. The sponsors are hopeful that it can command consensus support.

The Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish):* I call on the representative of Canada, who will continue the introduction of draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.29.

Mr. Westdal (Canada): Canada is once again pleased to be able to introduce, in conjunction with our colleagues from Brazil, a draft resolution (A/C.1/49/L.29) on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields.

As members know, this issue has been the subject of debate in the Disarmament Commission over the past several years. During that time, much progress has been made in clarifying positions, identifying common understandings and bridging differences. Unfortunately, in the end, the Disarmament Commission's rules of procedure intervened and the item had to be dropped before consensus on all aspects of the issue had been achieved.

The purpose of this draft resolution is to ensure that debate on these issues continues. Although consensus has not yet been achieved on texts dealing with particular aspects of those issues, there is surely consensus on the fact that they are of vital importance. They arise time and again in relation to non-proliferation measures — and, further, they involve profound questions about our common maturity, about our foresight, and about our restraint in containing and channelling our scientific and technological prowess in the service of enduring international security. For these reasons, Canada would like to see the Disarmament Commission take this question up again as an agenda item.

The draft resolution we have submitted to the Committee for its consideration affirms broad principles that we believe can command consensus. The essential elements of the draft resolution are as follows: science and technology *per se* are deemed to be neutral, and their application for peaceful purposes should be promoted; the international transfer of high-technology products, services and expertise for peaceful purposes is essential for the economic and social welfare of all nations; to the extent possible, and bearing in mind the legitimate security needs of States, every effort should be made to devote scientific and technological developments to economic and social advancement; the application of science and technology should be promoted in disarmament procedures and techniques; the international transfer of high technology is facilitated by States' commitments to global non-proliferation norms; and multilateral dialogue is required to promote international cooperation in the transfer of high technology and to strengthen confidence and security among States.

Disagreement on this issue arises most often in relation to the transfer of technology. We must address this question bearing in mind that the right of access to technology is not unlimited. Access to dual-use technology entails concurrent responsibility to ensure that it is not diverted to non-civilian uses. This is most easily facilitated through States' adherence to global, verifiable non-proliferation norms.

Finally, this is not essentially a North-South issue. In the real world, many nations, including Canada and Brazil, are both technology exporters and technology importers. All States have, on the one hand, a commercial and developmental interest in ensuring the greatest possible flows of technology and, on the other hand, a security interest in seeing that this technology is devoted solely to peaceful purposes. We encourage all delegations to consider this draft resolution in that light.

Mr. Starr (Australia): Australia would like to endorse the introductions by Brazil and Canada of draft resolution L.29, on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields. The draft resolution represents an important and, in our view, essential follow-up to the efforts on this agenda item in the Disarmament Commission.

Australia's sponsorship of the draft resolution reflects our commitment to the dual objectives of promoting the application of science and technology for peaceful purposes while furthering our shared non-proliferation goals through the implementation of national measures that seek to ensure that transfers of science and technology are not misused and do not undermine international peace and security.

The Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish):* I now call on the representative of New Zealand, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.22.

Mr. Keating (New Zealand): It is with great pleasure that I introduce today a draft resolution (A/C.1/49/L.22) promoting the conclusion of negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. New Zealand has worked once again in partnership with Mexico and Australia on this text, and I thank them for their valuable support.

The draft resolution also has the support of the following countries, which have joined as sponsors: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Samoa, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela.

For well over two decades, including during a period when an atmospheric nuclear-testing programme was being conducted in our region, New Zealand has vigorously opposed nuclear testing. We have, in cooperation with others, been bringing this issue before the First Committee for many years. At the last session of the General Assembly, the entire international community supported, for the first time, the commencement of multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty, when it adopted resolution 48/70. That decision was an important demonstration of the existence of the political will that is essential for the successful launch of negotiations.

This year's draft text builds on last year's ground-breaking resolution. It also contains some new elements to take account of new circumstances. The Conference is in the middle of live negotiations, and there are high expectations that it will produce the text of an effective treaty without delay.

The sponsors of the draft resolution are committed to the earliest possible conclusion of negotiations. We believe that this goal is widely shared by United Nations Members. In the many consultations we have held on this draft resolution over the past several weeks, however, it has become clear to us that, while many favour reference to a firm time-frame for the negotiations, others cannot accept a deadline. We have therefore sought to convey in the draft resolution the high priority the international community attaches to the negotiations and a sufficient sense of a commitment to their conclusion. We have striven to find a balance that will attract the broadest possible backing for the message that the General Assembly wishes to send to the participants in the negotiations. We believe that the text before the Committee represents a fair balance, and that it should command the same support as last year's text.

Specifically, the resolution welcomes the preparation of a rolling text in the Conference's Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, and the positive and substantial contributions made by States participating in the negotiations. Secondly, it encourages participants to make substantial progress in the period of inter-sessional work agreed to by the Conference. Thirdly, it urges rapid progress towards the conclusion of the negotiations by urging all States participating in the Conference, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to negotiate intensively, as a high priority task, and to conclude an effective treaty.

Given the priority attached to this treaty, it is self-evident that the General Assembly should stand ready to adopt the text as soon as it is completed by the Conference on Disarmament. The draft resolution carries over from last year the message that the exercise of the utmost restraint in respect of nuclear testing would be consistent with the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It also shows appreciation for the suspension of testing by a number of nuclear-weapon States.

New Zealand has a strong wish to see the current negotiations concluded so that the international community can receive the long-awaited disarmament and non-proliferation benefits of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. We therefore urge all members of the Committee to support this year's draft resolution when the time comes for its adoption.

Mr. Marín-Bosch (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The representative of New Zealand has just introduced to the First Committee draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.22 on an item of particular importance to the international community in the area of nuclear disarmament: a comprehensive test-ban treaty. My delegation thanks Ambassador Colin Keating and endorses his statement.

Since 1992, together with New Zealand and Australia, Mexico has prepared the first drafts of texts that we submitted to the group of countries that have sponsored one of the two draft resolutions that had been coming before this Committee for many years. A few years ago, we managed to reach agreement on a single text. Today, it is difficult to distinguish between those who used to support one draft and those who used to support the other. We are all now of the same view, though there are some nuances remaining in the individual positions of the sponsors. What is important is that the First Committee should express as clearly as possible its support for the conclusion of the ongoing negotiations.

Of course, my delegation would have preferred language that better reflects the wishes of the overwhelming majority of States represented here. That language would have set a deadline for the conclusion of the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We know that, in this connection, the nuclear-weapon States do not have one single position Some, like us, wish to step up the pace and conclude the treaty as soon as possible. Others have a different approach. This explains the language in paragraphs 4 and 5. It should be mentioned, however, that if the Conference on Disarmament concludes its work before the next session of the General Assembly, the text of a comprehensive test-ban treaty could be considered immediately by the Assembly. This explains the very modest suggestion in paragraph 7, namely, that the General Assembly:

> "*Declares* its readiness to resume consideration of this item, as necessary, before its fiftieth session in order to endorse a text of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty".

We are persuaded that the text of draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.22 reflects an acceptable balance between the aspirations of the broad majority of countries and the position held by others regarding the pace of the work on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. We therefore feel confident that the draft resolution will be adopted without a vote.

Mr. Starr (Australia): I am pleased to be able to join today with New Zealand and Mexico in introducing draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.22, which is designed to underpin and support the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty being conducted in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva.

For many years, Australia has given high priority in its national arms control and disarmament agenda to the initiation of negotiations towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Over the past year, we have laboured to take full advantage of the negotiating mandate agreed for the negotiations and of the historic opportunity provided by their commencement in 1994.

We now wish to promote and advance the negotiations towards the earliest possible agreement on a text. We believe that a clear expression of the broad indeed universal support in the international community for the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is of great importance. It would provide an unequivocal underpinning for the multilateral achievement of our common goal through an orderly but expeditious negotiating process.

Of course, in seeking to express the broadest possible support for any important goal of the international community, it is necessary to draw together a range of opinions on how to reach the target. Though there is a shared and common purpose amongst States on the negotiations, it is apparent that expression of that collective purpose in a single formulation can probably never be entirely comfortable for all participants in the resulting consensus.

We firmly believe that an achievement-oriented international community must operate on the basis of such understanding, compromise and determination if interests we have in common are to be advanced.

I should like once again to endorse the draft resolution, and commend its balanced and progressive language to delegations. We trust that its adoption by consensus will provide the firmest possible foundation for the initiation at Geneva of the new phase of negotiations, which my delegation hopes will be able to resolve outstanding issues and finalize the treaty without delay.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

United Nations A/C.1/49/PV.14

General Assembly

Official Records

First Committee

14th Meeting

Monday, 7 November 1994, 3 p.m.
New York

Chairman: Mr. Valencia Rodriguez . . . . (Ecuador)

The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

Agenda items 53-66, 68-72 and 153 (*continued*)

Consideration of draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Sri Lanka, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.37, entitled "Implementation of the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace".

Mr. Kalpagé (Sri Lanka), Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean: I have the honour to present the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, document A/49/29. The report was adopted by consensus in the Ad Hoc Committee. As members of the First Committee will recall, the Ad Hoc Committee was established in 1972 to realize the goals set out in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), adopted in December 1971.

The objectives of the Ad Hoc Committee during the 1970s reflected the prevailing international climate in general and the situation in the Indian Ocean region in particular. Since then the Committee's work has evolved considerably: it has mirrored shifting realities in the region as well as in the international political environment beyond it, including the tensions that had been engendered by the cold war and the rivalry that characterized the relationship between the great Powers.

In the last few years, following the end of the cold war, the rivalry between the great Powers has been replaced by a new and welcome phase of confidence, trust and cooperation. This has helped to create favourable opportunities to renew comprehensive global and regional efforts towards attaining the goals of peace, security and stability in the Indian Ocean region.

This favourable climate has been further enhanced by significant developments of a positive nature in the Indian Ocean region, including the establishment of a democratic, non-racial Government in South Africa and continuing encouraging developments in the Middle East.

Similarly, the entry into force in November 1994 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea will also help enhance prospects for mutually accommodative measures of cooperation, including the exercise of the freedom of the high seas, in accordance with the Convention.

The trend towards dialogue rather than confrontation that has manifested itself in these and other developments has also been clearly felt in the Ad Hoc Committee as it responds to emerging realities. All this has helped to give a fresh impetus to the pursuit of global and regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean region.

A new approach to the Ad Hoc Committee's work has been clearly evident in its deliberations over the last few years. An atmosphere free of rancour has prevailed, enabling a frank exchange of views. On the basis of the conclusions and recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee's 1993 meetings, further consideration was given to new, alternative approaches to its work during its session this year.

This record contains the original texts of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Section, Room C-178. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.

The Ad Hoc Committee considered that measures of cooperation should be encouraged not only in respect of military but also of non-military aspects of security, keeping in view the various perceptions with regard to the region. It was also felt that confidence-building measures at various regional levels, building incrementally on cooperation among various regional and other partners, made an important contribution to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. There was general recognition of the need to pursue both global and regional efforts in a complementary way, bearing in mind that the States of the region themselves could provide their own, specific, constructive contribution to strengthening peace, security, stability and cooperation in the Indian Ocean region. The Ad Hoc Committee also recognized the value of ongoing naval cooperation in the Indian Ocean, and encouraged consultations thereon between the countries concerned.

During this year's session, other innovative approaches were also proposed by individual member States. These are listed in the annex to the report, and were noted by the Committee after preliminary discussion.

It will be recalled that in 1989, three of the five permanent members of the Security Council that had been members of the Ad Hoc Committee withdrew from it. Others, including major maritime users, ceased to be active participants while none the less remaining members. It was therefore refreshing and encouraging to note, in 1993 and 1994, renewed interest and participation in the Ad Hoc Committee's work on the part of some of those States.

In these circumstances, the Ad Hoc Committee reiterates its conviction that the participation of all the permanent members of the Security Council, as well as that of major maritime users, in its work is important and that it would greatly facilitate the development of a mutually beneficial dialogue in the Indian Ocean region. Accordingly, the Ad Hoc Committee has requested its Chairman to apprise the Governments of the permanent members of the Security Council concerned, and the major maritime users, of the progress of work, and to consult with them in order to encourage their renewed participation and cooperation in it.

Based on the conclusions and recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee, members of the Non-Aligned Movement have presented a draft resolution under this agenda item, contained in document A/C.1/49/L.37, submitted by Indonesia, the current Chairman of the Movement. I believe that the draft has been discussed also with some countries outside the Non-Aligned Movement. The draft has been carefully prepared to give articulation to the fresh approaches evident in the Ad Hoc Committee, and I am therefore pleased to commend it to the Committee for adoption without a vote.

Finally, on behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee, I should like to express our deep appreciation to Mr. Sohrab Kheradi, Senior Adviser to the Ad Hoc Committee, and to Mr. Timur Alasaniya, Secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee, for the excellent advice and support they gave.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of Egypt who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.16, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

Mr. Elaraby (Egypt) (*interpretation from Arabic*): It gives me pleasure to present today the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/49/L.16, on the "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East". This resolution has, over the past 20 years, traditionally been submitted at successive sessions of the General Assembly.

With the passage of time, this initiative has acquired broad support on both the international and the regional levels. It has without a doubt become a cornerstone of the efforts towards disarmament and arms control in the Middle East. It laid a basis for the principles of disarmament, and has contributed to the global trend towards curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The unprecedented developments that the Middle East region has witnessed since the peace process began in Madrid, and the outcome of the process, recent agreements between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel and between Jordan and Israel, bear witness to the fact that the Middle East has entered a new phase in relations between the States of the region. Now that all the parties have clearly demonstrated their readiness to take practical and specific steps to eliminate all causes of tension and conflict, and now that they have resolved to establish normal relations based on the principles of international law set out in the Charter, it is now legitimate to hope that the implementation of an initiative for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone will be possible and that the initiative would strengthen the principle that there must be a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

The positive atmosphere prevailing in the Middle East requires all of us — countries of the Middle East and all other members of the international community — to work together to strengthen the peace process and its foundations so that more may be achieved, particularly with regard to disarmament, which will enable us to face challenges without clinging to obsolete theories.

All the countries of the Middle East have the right to their national security. It is inconceivable that any would compromise on anything that is fundamental to meeting that legitimate concern. We are confident that realizing that basic principle is indispensable for promoting success in the peace process and widening its framework. But we should reiterate in that regard the necessity to respect the principle of equality — the total equality of the States of the region — in particular with regard to their level of security. Any security imbalances would undoubtedly lead to a lack of trust and confidence and would undermine the credibility of the new situation.

No party should call for an arrangement that would mean its enjoying a special or exceptional status. Such calls would only undermine peace and throw the Middle East once again into the vicious circle of an arms race in a desperate attempt to deal with security imbalances.

The initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone, presented in the draft resolution, would guarantee balanced security in the Middle East. It would lay the foundation for the rights and obligations of the States of the region and would make a great contribution to strengthening the non-proliferation regime, which has become more important to the international community, as it promises a brighter future.

Communication channels and mechanisms, whether bilateral or multilateral, have become available to all Middle East States, and those States should use them to tackle all the basic security and stability issues in the region and to achieve the necessary, practical solutions to these issues. Foremost among them is the need to face up to the dangers of nuclear proliferation — in particular, through providing the necessary framework to implement the initiative as soon as possible.

There is no doubt that serious, timely handling of all the security factors in the region is the true way to guarantee tangible progress acceptable to all parties. Disregarding any factor in this very complex equation, or giving more weight to one factor over another, would be interpreted as an attempt to impose preconditions on the negotiating process, thus undermining the peace process.

I should not fail to mention in this regard the April 1990 initiative by President Mubarak on the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. That initiative was taken up in a Security Council resolution, and it is also mentioned in the present draft resolution. It has gained wide support.

There is an organic link between the two initiatives. They both have the same objective — the establishment of security and confidence — and they deal with the dangers of the proliferation of all three types of excessively dangerous weapons, in a manner commensurate with the danger posed by those weapons.

Implementing the initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would be considered a major step giving momentum to the peace and reconciliation efforts in a new atmosphere of trust and confidence. It would also be in line with the global demand to enhance the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and implement its seventh article.

The draft resolution contains the usual basic elements that should be taken into account in order to eliminate the dangers of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. First, every country of the region should accede to the NPT. Secondly, all nuclear facilities in the Middle East should be subjected to the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Thirdly, all countries of the Middle East should cease to produce or possess such weapons or have them on their territories. Respect for these basic principles by all the countries of the Middle East and every country outside the region would be the main guarantee of the region's protection against the scourge of the arms race and would truly contribute to the globalization of the NPT.

In preparing the draft resolution we have paid great attention to preserving a balance, which has guaranteed consensus over the years. We have conducted in-depth consultations with many delegations in an atmosphere of cooperation. We have also demonstrated our willingness to include in the draft resolution all positive elements and ideas that would contribute to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a way that would guarantee consensus in the General Assembly, while reiterating the importance all members of the international community attach to this positive initiative.

The Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I have received requests from a number of delegations to extend the deadline — 6 p.m. today — for draft resolutions on international security agenda items 68 and 70. Although it had been indicated that the deadline could not be extended, in view of those requests I wish to state, following consultations with a number of officers of the Committee, that it will be possible to extend the deadline until 6 p.m. on Wednesday, 9 November, if the Committee agrees. This is on the understanding that every effort will be made to arrive at draft resolutions that will really assist in bolstering understanding and cooperation between nations, and not widen differences, because this understanding and consolidation are a sound basis for strengthening peace and security in all regions.

If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee agrees to the suggested extension.

It was so decided.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker is the representative of Mexico, who will introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/49/L.25 concerning a step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat.

Mr. Marín Bosch (Mexico) *(interpretation from Spanish):* Nuclear weapons made their fateful appearance on the international scene in the year that the United Nations was born. Although the United Nations Charter contains no reference to such weapons, they have been one of the major items on the United Nations agenda throughout its almost half-century of existence.

It should be recalled that in its first resolution, resolution 1 (I), the General Assembly considered this question. However, it was not possible at that time to halt the progressive development of nuclear arsenals, a process that has continued for five decades. Two thousand nuclear tests have been carried out, and nuclear weapons have continued to be improved and stockpiled. By the end of the 1980s there was already talk of the existence of more than 50,000 nuclear warheads. Meanwhile, the General Assembly went on adopting dozens of resolutions on a wide range of questions relating to such weapons of mass destruction and the dangers that they entail for all humanity.

More than three decades ago the General Assembly set itself the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In 1978, in the Final Document of its first special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly agreed, among other things, that

> "effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. To this end, it is imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race until the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been achieved". *(resolution S-10/2, para. 20)*

Today we have the honour to introduce to the First Committee the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/49/L.25 on the subject of the step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat. The draft is co-sponsored by the delegations of Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Mexico.

The sponsors wish to place on record their appreciation for the contribution made by Parliamentarians for Global Action in developing the proposal and in the preparation of the draft resolution. We are particularly grateful for the efforts of Mr. Olafur Ragnar Grimsson, Chairman of the International Council, and Mr. Aaron Tovish, Deputy Secretary-General of the organization.

This is an extremely modest proposal on an issue of capital importance. The draft resolution is merely an attempt to offer the international community a mechanism that would allow all of us, but especially the nuclear-weapon States, to set out in an orderly and rational manner on the road to the gradual reduction of the nuclear threat.

The preamble to the draft resolution contains 12 paragraphs outlining the reasons why we think the proposal is timely. It begins and ends with a reference to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It also identifies alternately some of the measures already taken in this post-cold-war era and the obstacles yet to be overcome with regard to nuclear weapons and the corresponding military doctrines. In short, it points out that the world is changing, and proposes a way to change it even more.

The preamble also stresses in its ninth paragraph the desire to

> "further current efforts regarding multilateral negotiations and agreements"

in the nuclear disarmament field. It identifies the Geneva Conference on Disarmament as the ideal forum for multilateral negotiations. Lastly, it expresses the conviction that agreement on a five-to-ten-year agenda on nuclear arms control would provide a needed, overall sense of direction to global disarmament efforts.

In order to facilitate this work, and by way of example, operative paragraph 1 identifies three general headings or areas, under each of which are listed the problems to be solved and the principal challenges to be met, as well as the steps required in order to do so.

Area A identifies steps to counter three specific activities: first, the acquisition and processing of special fissionable material for nuclear-weapon purposes; secondly, the manufacture and testing of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles; and, thirdly, the assembly and deployment of nuclear-weapon systems.

Then there is a list of means to achieve this: first, prohibiting the test explosion of nuclear weapons; secondly, cutting off the production of special fissile materials for weapons purposes; thirdly, ending production of nuclear warheads; fourthly, ending the production and testing of intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles for nuclear-weapon purposes; fifthly, effective legally binding measures to deter the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and, sixthly, other related measures.

Area B refers to the steps to actuate, *inter alia*, first, the withdrawal from deployment and disassembly of nuclear-weapon systems; secondly, the secure storage and dismantlement of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles; and, thirdly, the elimination of special fissionable materials for nuclear-weapon purposes.

Here again, means to achieve this are indicated: first, standing down nuclear-weapon systems from high-alert status; secondly, separating nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; thirdly, placing nuclear warheads in secure storage; fourthly, converting delivery vehicles, where appropriate, to peaceful uses; fifthly, removing special nuclear materials from warheads; sixthly, converting special nuclear materials to non-weapon purposes; and, seventhly, other related measures.

Area C covers steps to prepare, under international auspices, first, an inventory of the nuclear arsenals, including all special fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles, as well as all facilities devoted to the processing, manufacture, assembly and deployment of those items; secondly, a reorientation of those facilities necessary to the task of implementing measures relating to area B; and, lastly, the closure or conversion to peaceful purposes of all other such facilities in furtherance of measures relating to area A.

Consequently, in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution the Assembly asks Member States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States,

> "to consider steps which they might take unilaterally, bilaterally, or in cooperation with other States to promote progress in the identified areas, and fully to inform the international community of any steps taken in this regard".

In operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.25 it is recommended that in 1995 the Conference on Disarmament do two things. First, it should develop, on the basis of the three general areas mentioned in operative paragraph 1,

> "a comprehensive set of practical, verifiable measures for possible negotiation in their next five- and ten-year periods".

Secondly, it should determine, on the basis of that set of measures and with due regard to the measures taken pursuant to operative paragraph 2,

> "a year-by-year sequence and combination of negotiations on specific measures to be commenced during the next five- and ten-year periods".

Finally, draft resolution A/49/C.1/L.25 requests the Conference on Disarmament to include in its 1995 report to the General Assembly a section on efforts undertaken in accordance with the foregoing.

The sponsors are well aware that the Conference on Disarmament is considering several important disarmament items, especially the one concerning a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. But we are convinced that what is proposed in draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.25 does not exceed the working capacity of the Conference on Disarmament. Furthermore, we consider that we are contributing to the good functioning of that sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum by offering a path that, as indicated in the preambular part of the draft resolution, will lead to a step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and will thus lead us towards the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons from national arsenals.

In this respect, it should be stressed that no one is trying to impose on anyone a preconceived nuclear-disarmament programme. This is, rather, an invitation to examine jointly one of the priority agenda items of both the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of Japan, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.33, "Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons".

Mr. Tanaka (Japan): I wish to introduce the draft resolution entitled "Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons", contained in document A/C.1/49/L.33.

Japan, which sincerely desires that tragedies involving the use of nuclear weapons should never be repeated, has been emphasizing the need for the realistic and steady promotion of nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate objective of eliminating nuclear weapons. Such remarkable developments as the agreement on nuclear arms reductions between the United States and the Russian Federation, progress in comprehensive test-ban treaty negotiations and last year's adoption by the General Assembly of the resolution on the negotiation of the prohibition of the production of fissile material for explosive purposes have contributed to the favourable trend towards nuclear disarmament now prevailing. Next year an important decision will be made on the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is now adhered to by as many as 165 countries, including all nuclear-weapon States, and which has indeed played a major role in nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

Under these circumstances, Japan considers it very important that the nuclear-weapon States continue to promote nuclear disarmament, underpinned by the strengthening of the NPT regime. In order to reflect these views in a document expressing the determination of the international community, Japan decided to submit this draft resolution. We are ready to engage in consultations on it, and we hope that it will be supported by all States.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of Nigeria, who will introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/49/L.28, entitled "1995 Review and Extension Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

Mr. Ayewah (Nigeria): I have the honour to introduce, on behalf of Indonesia, Mexico, Namibia, Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the draft resolution entitled "1995 Review and Extension Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", contained in document A/C.1/49/L.28.

The task of consolidating the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) goes beyond the purview of a forum limited to the States parties to the Treaty. The Treaty has an important role to play in the international disarmament agenda and in the maintenance of international peace and security. It was in recognition of this fact that the General Assembly commended the Treaty to Member States in resolution 2373 (XXII), adopted on 12 June 1968. We believe that no effort should be spared in consolidating the NPT or in encouraging the widest possible adherence to it. Our quest is for universal adherence. Fortunately, the Treaty is coming up for consideration at a time when the cold war has become history, and the way can now be paved for further progress in nuclear disarmament, as was envisaged during the negotiations on the Treaty a quarter of a century ago.

However, we fear that, if care is not taken, the various opposing interpretations of the extension provision in article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty advanced recently could derail the process of extending the Treaty in 1995. We are convinced that the international community, as represented in the General Assembly, must forestall this confusion in order to prevent interminable legal arguments during the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

The draft resolution therefore calls for action that will make clear the thinking of States parties well ahead of the Conference and help them focus on the most acceptable approach to the extension of the Treaty. We hope, too, that the draft resolution will generate discussion of the various options and actions to be taken, as well as debate on substantive steps towards fulfilment of the provisions of the preamble and the various articles of the Treaty — especially article VI, which concerns nuclear disarmament.

A number of actions are possible under paragraph 2 of article X of the non-proliferation Treaty. States parties need to put forward their ideas and legal interpretations of the article in order that a flexible approach may be adopted when the decision on extending the Treaty is taken.

In its operative paragraphs, the draft resolution calls upon States parties to give appropriate consideration to the import of the Treaty in its entirety and, on that basis, to give special attention to the extension provision. Thereafter, it invites States parties to provide their legal interpretations of article X, paragraph 2, and their views on the different options and myriad actions that are possible in extending and consolidating the Treaty.

In accordance with resolution 47/52 A of 9 December 1992, which requested the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance for the 1995 Conference and its Preparatory Committee, and in view of the important role of the NPT in international disarmament efforts, this draft resolution requests the Secretary-General to compile the legal interpretations and views submitted by States parties in the form of a background document for the 1995 Conference. This document is to be made available well before the holding of that Conference.

We believe that this action will greatly facilitate consideration of the issues — at the fourth session of the Preparatory Committee, if possible, and certainly at the Review and Extension Conference. We hope that all States parties — nuclear and non-nuclear, industrial and developing — will take advantage of this draft resolution to present their views.

The Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish):* The next speaker is the representative of Cameroon, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.20, which is entitled "Regional confidence-building measures".

Mr. Bilao Tang (Cameroon) *(interpretation from French):* I should like first to express my delegation's condolences to the Egyptian Government and people, who have our complete sympathy.

Debates in the General Assembly and in this Committee have given us an opportunity to recall and deplore the many crises and hotbeds of tension that absorb the meagre basic resources of this Organization, to the detriment of development activities; to emphasize that the African continent is among the hardest hit by crises and hotbeds of tension; and finally to hail the leading role of preventive diplomacy, which must be encouraged and supported by the entire international community. Regional disarmament and the promotion of confidence-building measures have been highlighted in this regard.

While, some countries in central Africa are experiencing relative peace, without being totally free from threats of destabilization, Rwanda, Burundi and, until recently, Angola have reminded us that central Africa is definitely in the zone of turbulence, conflict and tension, which is shaking the African continent.

It is in this context that we have the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, set up on 28 May 1992 by the Secretary-General under resolution 46/37 B of 6 December 1991. This was an initiative taken by 11 States of central Africa to promote confidence-building measures, disarmament and development in the subregion, which should be a zone of peace and security for all Member States.

As is clear from the Secretary-General's report (A/49/546), the 11 States of the Committee have made considerable progress in implementing confidence-building measures in the subregion. The Non-Aggression Pact between States members, concluded in Libreville, Gabon, in 1993, was initialled during the fifth ministerial meeting of the Committee, which was held in Yaoundé in September 1994. This Pact will be submitted for signature by the Heads of State during the summit to take place in Cameroon next December, and it will enter into force before the end of the year.

Furthermore, the States of central Africa have undertaken to participate henceforth in peace-keeping operations within the framework of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, and, to that end, to set up within their respective armed forces specialist peace-keeping units. All these units will constitute reserve forces, at the disposal of the United Nations Secretary-General for immediate deployment for peace-keeping and humanitarian-assistance operations.

In submitting this draft resolution on regional confidence-building measures on behalf of the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa — Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, and Zaire — I recall that the Committee's activities come within the sphere of preventive diplomacy and therefore deserve the encouragement of our Organization and the international community.

It goes without saying that investment in peace is much less costly than investment in peace-keeping or in the restoration or consolidation of peace. Consequently the 11 States members of the Standing Advisory Committee would like the United Nations, as well as interested bodies and States, to help them to promote confidence-building measures in the subregion — in particular, through various types of support, including assistance with the training and preparation of specialist peace-keeping units within their respective armed forces.

We hope, therefore, that this draft resolution, whose subject is one of the Committee's major concerns, will be adopted by consensus, as it would not involve additional finance.

The Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish)*: The next speaker is the representative of Brazil, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.39, entitled "The South Atlantic region as a nuclear-weapon-free zone".

Mr. Valle (Brazil): I have the honour to introduce the draft resolution entitled "The South Atlantic region as a nuclear-weapon-free zone" (A/C.1/49/L.39), under agenda items 71 and 72. The draft resolution is sponsored by the Member States of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic and by a number of other delegations.

One of the most important objectives to be pursued within the framework of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation is the denuclearization of the South Atlantic. We are determined to ensure the achievement of the ultimate goal of eliminating the risk and threat of nuclear weapons from the South Atlantic region once and for all.

In this respect, a number of initiatives have been advanced, beginning with the 1964 Declaration of the Organization of African Unity and the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, initiatives designed to promote the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

In Africa, considerable progress has been made in drafting a treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. In Latin America and the Caribbean, important steps have been taken to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco fully into force for all countries of the region. In this connection, at the third meeting of the States of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic, held in Brasilia last September, delegations unanimously adopted a Declaration on the denuclearization of the South Atlantic.

In order to build on the successful cooperation between nations in the South Atlantic, the members of the Zone, with the support of a number of delegations, commend to the First Committee the draft resolution before us in the sincere hope that it can be adopted by consensus.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker is the representative of Mexico, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.8, "United Nations Disarmament Information Programme."

Mr. Abarca (Mexico)(*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to introduce for the consideration of the First Committee draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.8 on agenda item 63 (d), "United Nations Disarmament Information Programme."

Since 1982 Mexico has been introducing the proposal on the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme, formerly known as the World Disarmament Campaign. Financial contributions to the Programme have not thus far met the target set 13 years ago. In 1994 only 22 countries were net contributors. This number is disheartening if we take into account the fact that the United Nations community is now comprised of 184 countries.

My delegation finds it disturbing that, although the request of a number of countries to change the title of the Programme was agreed to, two years after that change was made there has still been no substantial increase in the level of contributions. We recognize that the number of contributor countries has risen from 13 in 1993 to 22 in 1994, but the total funds received fell from $745,000 to $654,000, a decrease of more than 12 per cent. The geographical breakdown of contributors also indicates that much still remains to be done.

This is particularly serious at a time when the Programme has been recognized as the only global instrument by which objective data can be made available to all regions of the world. It should be noted that the objective of this initiative remains valid; it continues to be:

> "the widest possible dissemination of information and unimpeded access for all sectors of the public to a broad range of information and opinions on questions of arms limitation and disarmament and on the dangers relating to all aspects of the arms race and war, in particular nuclear war". *(resolution 37/100 H, third preambular paragraph)*

Another matter to be considered is the proposal to consider the item on a biennial basis as a way to help lighten the workload of the First Committee. If adopted, that proposal would mean that the annual Pledging Conference would remain the sole instrument for fostering increased financial contributions. None the less, we hope that the number of contributors will continue to rise.

It is on behalf of the delegations of Bolivia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Venezuela and Mexico, that I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.8, entitled "United Nations Disarmament

Information Programme", for consideration by the First Committee.

In its preambular paragraphs the draft resolution refers to the report (A/49/371) of the Secretary-General of 9 September 1994 on the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme and the to the Final Act of the Twelfth United Nations Pledging Conference for the Programme, held on 28 October 1994.

In the operative paragraphs the Secretary-General is commended for his efforts to make effective use of the resources available. The draft resolution notes with appreciation the contributions made by information centres and regional centres for disarmament. Paragraph 4 recommends that the Programme should further focus its efforts to inform, educate and generate public understanding of the importance of and support for multilateral action in the disarmament area, and that it work more closely with various organs of the public and non-governmental sectors in facilitating exchange of information on ideas. To this end, the draft resolution recommends the organization of meetings to facilitate exchanges of views and information on disarmament issues.

In addition, all Member States are invited to contribute to the Voluntary Trust Fund for the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme.

Lastly, the draft resolution commends the Secretary-General for supporting the efforts of universities, other academic institutions and non-governmental organizations active in the educational field in widening the world-wide availability of disarmament education, and requests him to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session a report covering both the implementation of the activities of the Programme and the activities contemplated for the following two years.

The sponsors of draft resolution L.8 trust that the First Committee will adopt it without a vote.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call upon the representative of India, who will introduce draft resolutions A/C.1/49/L.31, "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons", and L.32, "Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security."

Mr. Chandra (India): I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.31, "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons", and L.32, "Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security."

In introducing the draft resolution on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, let me begin by saying that the international political-military scene has been marked by many positive developments in the past few years, such as the end of the cold war; the START II agreement and the recent understanding to implement it in an accelerated mode; the unilateral decisions to dismantle portions of awesome nuclear arsenals; the conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention; and the commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Welcome as those developments are, the fact remains that the nuclear-weapon States still hold enough nuclear weapons to destroy all life on our planet several times over. The threat of instant incineration in a nuclear holocaust will continue to haunt us until we achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons through a universal, multilaterally negotiated and effectively verifiable treaty.

Pending the emergence of a nuclear-weapon-free world through such a treaty — which will, we recognize, be some time in coming — we can greatly minimize the possibility of a nuclear war and reduce the incentive for horizontal proliferation by concluding a convention on the prohibition of the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons.

We are not persuaded by the argument, which some might endeavour to make, that our proposals have become unnecessary on account of the improved political climate. The existence of mankind is much too serious a matter to be left hostage to the vicissitudes of the international political climate. Prudence demands that, pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, we act with urgency, taking advantage of the prevailing favourable situation to develop a norm against the use of such weapons. A convention on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as called for by us in draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.31, would establish such a norm and would also provide the security assurances demanded for so long by the non-nuclear-weapon States.

It is in this spirit and against this background that my delegation introduces draft resolution L.31, entitled "Convention on the prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons". It is sponsored by 18 countries: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Honduras, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Myanmar, Sudan, Viet Nam and India.

The draft resolution underlines that the use of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat to the survival of mankind; welcomes the nuclear disarmament measures recently initiated by the United States of America and the Russian Federation; notes that a multilateral agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would strengthen international security and help promote a climate for negotiations leading to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons; and reiterates its request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a priority basis to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a possible basis the annexed draft convention.

We would like to take this opportunity to thank all our co-sponsors for the cooperation extended to us and to urge all Member States to help further ameliorate the international security climate by supporting this draft resolution.

Our draft resolution — A/C.1/49/L.32 — on scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security is sponsored by the delegations of Bhutan, Bolivia, Colombia, Honduras, Indonesia, Nepal, Nigeria and Sri Lanka, in addition to India. It focuses on the qualitative aspect of disarmament, which was ignored until a few years ago. At the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1988, India voiced its concerns in this regard. Resolution 43/77 A, adopted with wide support, requested the Secretary-General's report, contained in document A/45/568, bore out our concerns by indicating that in some respects modern technological advances might be hindering rather than helping the pursuit of international security. The report identified five broad areas in which to follow scientific and technological developments: nuclear technology, space technology, materials technology, information technology and biotechnology. Taking into account the illustrative set of criteria it elaborated, this report suggested that the international community needed to be better equipped to follow the nature and direction of technological change, and that the United Nations could serve as a catalyst and a clearinghouse in this regard.

Our draft resolution builds upon the Secretary-General's report. While welcoming his most recent report (A/49/502) and agreeing with his assessment that the application of new technologies for a qualitative improvement of weapons systems is harmful to the cause of disarmament, it requests him to follow scientific and technological developments, make an assessment in keeping with the criteria he has developed and submit a report thereon to the fiftieth session of the General Assembly. It further requests him to develop a database of concerned research institutions and experts with a view to promoting transparency and international cooperation in the applications of scientific and technological developments for pursuing disarmament objectives such as disposal of weapons, conversion and verification.

We regret that it has not been possible for us to have a single draft resolution on this subject; we feel regret because, while the draft resolution fielded by us in the form of L.32 clearly brings out the Jekyll-and-Hyde nature of science and technology and outlines a methodology to curb its adverse impact, draft resolution L.29 tends to blur the negative impact of science and technology on international security and disarmament. This was also a factor which made it difficult to evolve a consensus in the Disarmament Commission on this matter.

We are confident that a shared awareness of technological advances and their channelization to peaceful purposes will create a happier world and a safer security environment. It is obvious that in an interdependent world we have a common future and must therefore demonstrate a common determination to give science and technology a human face. The challenges of eradicating poverty and its attendant social problems, the problems of global warming, ozone depletion and environment management, verification, conversion and safe weapons disposal, all of which have acquired a global dimension, require our inventiveness and cooperation on a global basis. Scientific and technological advance must of course be pursued, but it should be oriented towards peaceful uses for the sustainable benefit of mankind.

My delegation and the others on whose behalf we have introduced this draft resolution sincerely hope that it will receive the Committee's fullest support.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on Mr. Sirous Nasseri of the Islamic Republic of Iran to introduce, in his capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament, the report of the Conference, contained in document A/49/27.

Mr. Nasseri (Islamic Republic of Iran), President of the Conference on Disarmament: Before presenting the annual report of the Conference for 1994, I wish, Sir, to congratulate you on your election as the Chairman of the First Committee, and to congratulate the other officers of the Committee.

For the last four decades the international community has aspired to a world free of weapons of mass destruction and to the reduction of armaments to a minimum level for defensive purposes. Those aspirations are expected to become reality now that the frustrating era of the cold war is behind us. Disarmament is indeed a fundamental pillar of the new international relations and cooperation.

As the sole multilateral negotiating body for disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament shoulders a major responsibility for meeting the challenges and expectations of the present day. Its rich experience in such negotiations is a valuable asset in producing international agreements on various aspects of disarmament and seizing opportunities that have emerged. The result of its work, though not prolific, can still be considered significant given the sophisticated nature of disarmament negotiations.

The Conference on Disarmament adopted an agenda for the 1994 session which included eight items related to several facets of disarmament, omitting the issue of chemical weapons, since the Convention has now entered its preparatory phase at The Hague following its successful conclusion in 1992. It also had before it 13 resolutions adopted at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, which had addressed specific requests to the Conference on Disarmament.

However, without prejudice to its future decision on the organizational framework of other items, the Conference concentrated its work on negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and transparency in armaments through the establishment of ad hoc committees. For other items, the Conference did not establish ad hoc committees, although they were addressed by the delegations in various forms and their positions have been reflected in official documents and working papers as well as the plenary records of the Conference.

The Conference at its 1994 session gave special priority to the comprehensive test-ban treaty, and every effort was made to make this first year of negotiations a productive one and to present a promising report to the General Assembly. I am pleased to say that the result is to a large extent encouraging. This is particularly true in the light of the expressed willingness and enthusiasm of delegations to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion as soon as possible. The Conference has decided to continue its work on the treaty through an inter-sessional period, which will commence immediately following this session of the First Committee. Unswerving support by the General Assembly this year will again buttress the negotiations; just as last year the consensus resolution here served as the underpinning for the work in the Conference.

During 1994, nearly 150 working papers were submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban regarding different aspects of the treaty. The Ad Hoc Committee decided to include the results of its ongoing negotiations in a rolling text. Its first part represents the present stage of the elaboration of the provisions of the draft treaty which command a certain degree of consensus, whereas the second part contains provisions which need more extensive negotiations. The rolling text provides a good basis for further negotiations, which of course will also include some political decisions on certain issues.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space carried out substantive work on legal and terminological issues and on confidence-building measures. The question of terminological issues was considered important even though it was generally held that the completion of work on terminology was not a *conditio sine qua non* for negotiating new instruments or measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

As regards confidence-building measures, the scope of the exchange of information and notifications, as well as their time-frame, was discussed. The establishment of an international outer-space monitoring system and a communication network was also addressed. In addition, notifications for space objects with nuclear-power sources and assessment of compliance as part of the confidence-building measures regime were examined.

On negative security assurances, the Ad Hoc Committee reaffirmed that, pending the effective elimination of nuclear weapons, non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. There was a general feeling that there was a need to concentrate on the question of security assurances related to nuclear weapons, while an eventual solution on the issue of negative security assurances might also involve addressing the problem of positive assurances, building on the principles contained in Security Council resolution 255 (1968).

The Conference held substantive discussions this year on transparency in armaments. It addressed the overall aspects of the issue: military holdings and procurement through national production; the transfer of high technology with military applications; and weapons of mass destruction. It also examined other interrelated aspects of transparency in armaments and elaborated upon universal and non-discriminatory practical means to increase openness and transparency. This included massive production of sophisticated advanced armaments; excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms; a code of conduct; and regional approaches. It was recognized that the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms constituted a step forward in the promotion of transparency in military matters, and that it needed to be further improved and developed in such a manner as to encourage universal participation.

Consultations were held on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a treaty on fissile materials. There was consensus among members that the Conference was the appropriate forum to negotiate a treaty on the issue. While there was no agreement on a mandate for an ad hoc committee, there was agreement in principle that an ad hoc committee should be established as soon as a mandate had been agreed. The Conference decided to continue consultations on this matter.

There were also consultations on the issue of the review of the Conference's agenda, which will be continued during the next annual session. At the same time, some decisions were made on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. In relation to the expansion of its membership, however, despite intensive efforts to arrive at an agreed solution, it was, regrettably, not possible to move beyond the situation in 1993. The Conference will continue to address the question of its expansion and will make every effort to reach a solution by the beginning of its 1995 session.

Looking ahead to its next annual session, the Conference recognizes a number of urgent and important issues for negotiation which would draw heavily on its time and resources. The balance of its future work will be considered more fully, therefore, in deciding which ad hoc committee, besides the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, should be established in 1995.

As the President of the Conference on Disarmament, I take this opportunity to thank warmly the Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, and the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, as well as their able secretariat, for the valuable, solid and continuous assistance they have provided to the Conference during the 1994 session.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Kheradi (Secretary of the Committee): I would like to inform the Committee that the following countries have become sponsors of the following draft resolutions: A/C.1/49/L.9/Rev.1, Bahamas, Senegal and the Philippines; A/C.1/49/L.13, the Republic of Moldova, Argentina and Spain; A/C.1/49/L.18, Cameroon; A/C.1/49/L.19, Mongolia and India; A/C.1/49/L.21, Cameroon, the Republic of Moldova and Argentina; A/C.1/49/L.22, Brunei Darussalam, Guatemala, Nepal, the Republic of Moldova and the Philippines; A/C.1/49/L.23, Guatemala and the Republic of Moldova; A/C.1/49/L.26, Guatemala and Suriname; A/C.1/49/L.29, Nepal and the Republic of Moldova; A/C.1/49/L.30, Senegal; A/C.1/49/L.39, Congo, Guinea and Venezuela; A/C.1/49/L.42, Bolivia and the Republic of Moldova; and A/C.1/49/L.44, Greece and Norway.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.

United Nations

A/C.1/49/PV.15

General Assembly

Forty-ninth Session

First Committee

15th Meeting
Wednesday, 9 November 1994, 10 a.m.
New York

Official Records

Chairman: Mr. Valencia Rodriguez . . . . (Ecuador)

The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

Agenda items 53 to 66, 68 to 72 and 153 *(continued)*

Consideration of draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

The President (*interpretation from Spanish*): The first speaker this morning is the representative of Nigeria, who will introduce two draft resolutions.

Mr. Fasehun (Nigeria): I should like to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.4, entitled "Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade". The main objective of this draft resolution is to call for an assessment of the implementation of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade and a review of the same Declaration in the light of the changed international situation.

This action follows the pattern in the 1980s, when an appraisal of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade was carried out in 1985 by the Disarmament Commission in accordance with General Assembly resolution 39/148 Q of 1984.

The Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade was adopted by consensus at the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly in 1990, in its resolution 45/62 A. The Declaration dealt essentially with the hopes and aspirations of the peoples of the world for lasting peace and security. The Declaration recognized the determination of the international community to make progress in the 1990s by resolutely pursuing disarmament along with other efforts necessary to attain genuine peace and security. We therefore urge the United Nations to continue to foster multilateral cooperation for disarmament wherein bilateral, original efforts can be complementary and mutually supportive in attaining the purposes and principles enunciated in its Charter.

We are now in the middle of the Decade, and there have been great changes, both positive and negative, since that Declaration was issued. More than ever the international community needs to carry out an assessment of our achievements in the field of disarmament in the light of the proposed objectives in the Declaration, and, if need be, adapt its elements to the priority issues of the post-cold-war era.

It is in view of this concern that Nigeria wishes to propose for inclusion in the agenda of the 1995 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission an item entitled "Review of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade".

The Disarmament Commission will make a preliminary assessment of the implementation of the Declaration, as well as of the suggestions that may be put forward to ensure appropriate progress, and report to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session.

In the first preambular paragraph of the resolution the General Assembly would recall its resolution 45/62 A of 4 December 1990, by which it adopted the text of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade and declared the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade, as recommended by the Disarmament Commission at its 1990 substantive session.

This record contains the original texts of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of publication* to the Chief, Verbatim Reporting Section, Room C-178, and incorporated in a copy of the record. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.

In the second, third and fourth preambular paragraphs, the General Assembly would note the changes that have occurred in the international arena since 1990, and in particular the end of the cold war and bipolar rivalries, which heralded a new era of cooperation in international relations. It would note also that the outbursts of ethnic and nationalist conflicts as well as disturbing issues in arms control and disarmament in different parts of the world can have negative implications for international peace and security.

In its operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, the General Assembly would undertake, at its fiftieth session, in the middle of the decade, a review and appraisal of the implementation of the Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade, and would therefore request the Disarmament Commission, at its 1995 session, to make a preliminary assessment of the implementation of the Declaration as well as suggestions that might be put forward to ensure appropriate progress, and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session.

In its operative paragraphs 4 and 5, Member States would be called upon to make known their views as to areas requiring review and to submit their suggestions on such a review by 30 April 1995. We hope that Member States will seize the opportunity to make the exercise a fruitful one.

I wish also to introduce another draft resolution, entitled "United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme", contained in document A/C.1/49/L.12, which has been sponsored by more than 30 other countries. The draft has the same characteristics as those of past years, except for some minor and necessary updating. In particular, in the resolution the General Assembly would express its appreciation to the Governments of Finland, France, Germany, Japan and Sweden for inviting the 1994 fellows to study selected activities in the field of disarmament, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the overall objectives of the programme.

I should like to take this opportunity to express Nigeria's appreciation to the Secretary-General and to the Centre for Disarmament Affairs for the effective and consistent manner in which the fellowship programme has been conducted year in, year out.

In conclusion, the Nigerian delegation wishes to commend the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/49/L.4 and A/C.1/49/L.12 to the Committee for adoption without a vote.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of Togo to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.26, on the United Nations Regional Centres.

Mr. Pennaneach (Togo) (*interpretation from French*): It is a great privilege for me to introduce, on behalf of the Chairman of the Group of African States and the sponsors belonging to other regional groups, the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/49/L.26, entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean".

This draft, prepared under agenda item 63 (e), entitled "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly", is sponsored by Gambia, on behalf of all the African States, and by 29 other States of Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific.

Established, respectively, in 1986, 1987 and 1989, the three Regional Centres are basically charged with providing States, at their request, with operational support for any initiatives they might undertake in order to pursue peace, disarmament, arms limitation and development. From that standpoint, the Centres have had to disseminate, *inter alia*, information on peace, disarmament and security for Governments, students, researchers and other interested individuals and legal entities. They have also organized many seminars, held conferences and carried out studies.

Full information on the functioning and programmes of activities of the three regional centres is contained in the report of the Secretary-General on this item (A/49/389), dated 15 September 1994, which shows that the Centres' programmes are quite ambitious and that their implementation requires considerable resources.

But, as members are aware, the problems encountered by the Centres over the past few years have compelled them to slow down their work, and thus many projects have not been implemented for lack of resources, both human and financial. The Centres were set up on the basis of existing resources and voluntary contributions. However, so-called existing resources are now hardly available at all, and voluntary contributions are scarce. The Regional

Centres are external services of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, of which they are an integral part, and their role today is vital, particularly in preventive diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

On 16 December 1993, the General Assembly adopted without a vote resolution 48/76 E, in which, while appealing to Member States, international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations to make voluntary contributions, it requested the Secretary-General to continue to provide all necessary support to the regional centres in carrying out their programmes of activities. The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/49/L.26, which it is my honour to introduce today, was prepared on the same lines. The result of a series of consultations and an exchange of views between interested delegations, it is virtually identical to resolution 48/76 E, which was adopted last year by consensus.

The only new element — which is really not a new idea but is part of past practice and derives from logic — is the request in operative paragraph 6 to the Secretary-General that the Directors of the Regional Centres should be locally based in order to revitalize the activities of the Centres and avoid long-distance management from New York, which studies show does not promote either their influence or their efficiency. The request in paragraph 6 is intended to promote the revitalization of the activities of the Regional Centres. Moreover, it is in accordance with the rules of decentralization and good management, based on the principle of bringing the administration nearer to the administered.

Implementing this request should, in principle, create no special problem, to the extent that the host Governments have already made available or could make available to the United Nations, free of charge, premises to house the offices of the centres and to serve as residences for the Directors and members of their families.

In view of this, the sponsors would like, through me, to call on all delegations to be more concerned about the problem of the Regional Centres, which, in the final analysis, are our own instruments for promoting peace, security, disarmament and development at the national, subregional and regional levels.

The sponsors hope that their appeal will be heard by everyone so that the draft resolution may again be adopted by consensus.

Mr. Acharya (Nepal): I wish to comment on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/49/L.26 on the United Nations Regional Centres for peace and disarmament, which was introduced by the representative of the Republic of Togo.

During the general debate in the Committee many delegations expressed their views on the importance of regional arms control and disarmament efforts in achieving the objective of general and complete disarmament.

In this context, mydelegation is also of the view that the role of the Regional Centres for peace and disarmament is very crucial inasmuch as they provide the necessary forums for informal but in-depth exchanges of views by experts, diplomats and academics on various aspects of regional strategic and security issues.

The activities of the Regional Centres are also helpful in creating a favourable atmosphere for preventive diplomacy by facilitating and broadening understanding among the States of the region. Initiatives and activities which are mutually agreed upon by countries of the subregions and regions contribute to the development of effective confidence-building measures.

My delegation welcomes the report of the Secretary-General contained in document A/49/389. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific has already organized in various cities in Asia several meetings of experts on disarmament issues. The Secretary-General recognized the activities of the Asia-Pacific Centre as the "Kathmandu process" in his report.

As the host country of the Asia-Pacific Centre, Nepal is fully aware of the excellent work being done by the Centre and believes that its potential could be enhanced to better serve the purpose of regional disarmament. I therefore take this opportunity to appeal for more financial support, which alone will enable the Centre to undertake the activities expected of it in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Government of Nepal expresses its willingness to further extend support to the Centre in every possible way within its limited resources. My delegation is likewise of the view that enough personnel support needs to be provided to the Centres in order to revitalize their programme of activities.

These issues are addressed in draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.26. My delegation, together with the other sponsors, hopes that it will be adopted without a vote.

Mr. Guillen Salas (Peru) *(interpretation from Spanish)*: The delegation of Peru supports the statements made by the representatives of Togo and Nepal on draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.26, entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean".

My delegation is of the view that the regional centres give valuable support to the disarmament process and facilitate the formulation of effective confidence-building measures for strengthening peace and security.

We also believe that United Nations support and voluntary contributions by Member States and non-governmental organizations are vital for carrying out the tasks performed by the Regional Centres. In this regard, the Secretary-General's report (A/49/389) on the activities of the disarmament Centres notes the severe financial limitations affecting the Centres. We believe that the future work of the Centres requires adequate financial resources and permanent leadership.

We feel that clear, stable leadership will make it possible to revitalize the Centres' functioning and programmes of activities. Despite their limitations, the Centres have succeeded in becoming the conduit for an interesting flow of ideas and thoughts about the need for, and advantages of, regional disarmament, peace and security.

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean is to be seen in this context. It has promoted the publication of studies on disarmament and cooperated with the Organization of American States in holding the meeting of experts on "Confidence-building measures and security mechanisms in the region" in Buenos Aires in March this year. It also contributed to organizing a second regional seminar for Latin America and the Caribbean on national implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which took place in September this year in Lima, Peru.

We feel that this interesting effort by the Regional Centre can be expanded, not only as an effective means of disseminating information about the work and progress made by the United Nations in the field of disarmament, but also to make possible the inclusion of other crucial issues that reflect each region's particular characteristics in the areas of peace, security and development. In the final analysis, it is a question of a basic contribution to the Agenda for Peace and the Agenda for Development.

Our delegation hopes that the draft resolution, like last year's, will be adopted by consensus.

The Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish)*: I call on the representative of Afghanistan to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.40, entitled "Measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms".

Mr. Ghafoorzai (Afghanistan): I have the honour to introduce, on behalf of the delegations of Colombia, Sudan, Zimbabwe and my own country, Afghanistan, draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.40, submitted under agenda item 62 (h), entitled "Measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms".

This draft resolution is self-explanatory and does not require a long introduction. For some time the international community has been concerned about the illicit availability and transfer of massive quantities of arms. At its last session the General Assembly adopted resolution 48/75, which was based on several resolutions that the Assembly had adopted by consensus at its forty-sixth and forty-seventh sessions.

Some groups have managed to obtain arms, often by indirect means, and sometimes with the help of certain States. This phenomenon has greatly contributed to violations of human rights and destabilization activities and has had a marked effect on internal conditions in the States concerned.

Recognizing these realities and the fact that curbing illicit arms transfers would make an important contribution to the relaxation of tension and to peaceful reconciliation processes, and on the basis of the conviction that peace and security are essential to economic development and reconstruction, the countries listed as sponsors in document A/C.1/49/L.40 decided to present this draft resolution.

With regard to reconciliation processes, I should like to add that dialogue, negotiation, mediation and arbitration have long proved their worth when it comes to re-establishing or securing justice. However, the availability of massive quantities of illicit arms encourages certain groups to resort to arms and bloodshed, instead of relying on peaceful measures.

By adopting this draft resolution, the General Assembly would invite the Disarmament Commission to expedite its consideration of the agenda item on international arms transfers, with special emphasis on the adverse consequences of the illicit transfer of arms and ammunition, and to study measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms.

Through operative paragraph 2 the General Assembly would invite Member States to provide the Secretary-General with relevant information on national measures on arms transfers, with a view to preventing illicit transfers. It would also request the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on effective ways and means of collecting illegal weapons — a matter of serious concern to a number of countries, especially those that are experiencing national crises and wars — as well as on concrete proposals with regard to measures, at the national, regional and international levels, to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional arms.

We also request the Secretary-General to study, within the existing resources and, of course, at the request of the Member States concerned, the possibility of collecting illicit arms, in the light of the experience gained by the United Nations.

I should like to state, in conclusion, that this draft resolution has been the subject of a number of informal consultations. It is the expectation of the sponsors that it will be adopted by consensus.

The Chairman *(interpretation from Spanish):* I call on the representative of Sweden to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.23, entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects".

Mr. Ekwall (Sweden): I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.23, on the "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects", often referred to as the 1980 United Nations conventional-weapons Convention.

The sponsors of the draft resolution are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The purpose of the 1980 Convention is to place constraints upon the conduct of war. The Convention and its three annexed Protocols constitute an important part of international humanitarian law on armed conflict through restricting the use of certain conventional weapons. Developments since the adoption of the Convention in 1980 have, however, demonstrated the need to strengthen it.

On 22 December 1993 States parties to the Convention requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene, in conformity with article 8 of the Convention, a review conference of the Convention and to establish a group of governmental experts to prepare this conference. As a matter of priority, the Group was given the task of preparing concrete proposals for amendments to Protocol II of the Convention, for the purpose of:

> strengthening restrictions on the use of anti-personnel mines and, in particular, those without neutralizing or self-destruction mechanisms;
>
> considering the establishment of a verification system for the provisions of this Protocol;
>
> studying opportunities for broadening the scope of this Protocol to cover armed conflicts that are not of an international character.

Three meetings have been held by the group of governmental experts, and a fourth session is scheduled for January next year. At the last meeting of the group, it was decided to hold the review conference in Geneva from 25 September to 13 October 1995.

Significant progress has been made at the meetings of the governmental experts. The issue of anti-personnel land-mines has been given priority. In his statement in this Committee at its 12th meeting, on 3 November, the Chairman of the group, Mr. Johan Molander, reported on the state of negotiations.

In the report of the Secretary-General on assistance in mine clearance (A/49/357 and Add.1) it is estimated that there are more than 110 million land-mines spread in 64 countries around the world, and that between 2 million and 5 million more are being laid each year. Through their indiscriminate effects, anti-personnel land-mines predominantly affect the civilian population, causing death, injuries and the devastation of large areas of land. As the

Secretary-General pointed out in a recent article in *Foreign Affairs*, there is today a global land-mine crisis. And while it began as a military problem, it is now an ongoing humanitarian disaster. In this context, it is vital that mine clearance activities be substantially increased to relieve the suffering. Another important element is the declaration by States of moratoriums on the export of anti-personnel land-mines. On 3 November, Senator Patrick Leahy, of the United States of America, introduced in this Committee the draft resolution on this issue.

It is as important, or even more important, to address the question how States at the Review Conference of the 1980 Convention on conventional weapons can — and I quote the Secretary-General:

> "rise to the humanitarian challenge, developing and endorsing a set of provisions which would effectively eliminate the threat of land-mines".

Categories of weapons, other than land-mines, have also been discussed at the meetings of the governmental experts under the 1980 Convention. Proposals for additional protocols to the Convention have been submitted by Switzerland, on small-calibre weapons, and by Sweden, on anti-personnel use of laser beams and naval mines.

The 1980 Convention on conventional weapons entered into force more than 10 years ago, yet only 42 States have so far ratified it. Consequently, the General Assembly would urgently call upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties to the Convention as soon as possible so that ultimately access to this instrument will be universal.

The General Assembly would also welcome the request made by States Parties to the Secretary-General to convene a conference to review the Convention, and to establish a group of governmental experts to prepare the conference. It would take note with satisfaction of the progress made by the group of governmental experts on reviewing Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices and in discussing weapon categories at present not covered by the Convention.

Furthermore, the Assembly would take note of the decision by the group of governmental experts to request the Secretary-General to convene the review conference in Geneva within the time-frame 25 September to 13 October 1995. It would call upon the maximum number of States to attend the conference, to which the States parties may invite interested non-governmental organizations, in particular the International Committee of the Red Cross.

On behalf of the sponsors, I express the hope that draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.23 will be adopted without a vote.

Mr. Ramaker (Netherlands): Over the years, the Netherlands has supported the Swedish position on the issue before us. Today I wish to underline the increasing importance of the Convention for what can be called the humanitarian law of warfare. Now, more than ever, it deserves the full attention of this Committee.

The Convention, which came into force in 1983, has received fairly standardized treatment in the First Committee for years. Since last year, however, it has attracted considerable attention, inasmuch as it is one of the very few international arrangements which deal with the issue of the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel land-mines, a problem whose urgency has become manifest, inasmuch as the world has discovered to what extent these mines harm civilian populations and undermine the economic viability of certain areas, if not the development of some countries as a whole.

Over recent weeks many speakers have addressed the problems posed by anti-personnel land-mines, a clear sign of the growing awareness within the international community that urgent action is called for. In this respect, thus far three draft resolutions have been submitted at this session related to the issue of anti-personnel land-mines. One is draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.19, sponsored by the United States, on export moratoriums. The second is the draft resolution on assistance in mine clearance, sponsored by the European Union, which is being discussed in plenary meetings of the General Assembly. The present Swedish draft resolution focuses on the strengthening of the inhumane weapons Convention, and in particular, its provisions in Protocol II concerning anti-personnel land-mines.

While other draft resolutions relate to export moratoriums and mine clearance, draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.23 deals with the strengthening of an international regime tackling the problem of anti-personnel land-mines from the viewpoint of international law. Apart from the need to find practical solutions to the grave problems posed by the presence of millions of land-mines all over the world, this legal angle is also important, since in many cases it is the indiscriminate use of these mines that poses the greatest dangers to countries and civilian populations.

This means that national moratoriums on exports are not enough. The use of anti-personnel land-mines has to be bound by international rules of behaviour. Therefore, as Mr. Molander, Chairman of the group of governmental experts preparing the first review conference of the Convention, to be held in 1995, eloquently stated earlier this week, there is a need, first of all, for a much larger adherence to the Convention, and, secondly, for a further strengthening of the scope of, and compliance with, the Convention. In preparing for the review conference, the group of governmental experts has set out to do exactly that. The Netherlands delegation urges all participants in the group of experts to contribute to the successful conclusion of its preparatory work for the review conference.

It is reassuring to know that quite a number of States have recently indicated that they intend to become parties to the Convention and its Protocols, having become convinced of the contribution that the Convention can make to the strengthening of international humanitarian law. It is my hope that by the time of the first review conference in September 1995 a greatly enhanced body of States parties will get to work in order to hammer out a stronger, better Convention. This endeavour should, of course, not be confined to Protocol II on land-mines and booby traps, but should extend to other weapon categories not covered at present by the Convention: more specifically, the anti-personnel use of blinding laser weapons and naval mines.

Mr. Fox (Australia): I wish to speak briefly to lend our support to draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.23, on the inhumane weapons Convention, which Australia is very pleased to be sponsoring. Under the draft resolution the Secretary-General would be requested to convene a review conference on the Convention in September 1995. Australia is a strong supporter of both the Convention and the review process.

I would like to take this opportunity to compliment the Chairman of the group of governmental experts, Johan Molander, on his skilful guidance of the group as it proceeds with its work to develop proposals for consideration by the review conference on ways to strengthen and improve the Convention.

Australia is participating actively in the work of the group of experts. In our view, there is a pressing need to tighten the rules on the use of anti-personnel mines in particular and on their production and trade. There is also a need to strengthen the provisions of de-mining cooperation, so that civilians are not killed or injured long after conflicts are over and so that combatants are not unnecessarily killed or injured. We are pleased that there was a significant increase in the number of countries participating in the experts group at the August meeting this year, especially countries such as Cambodia, which have suffered terribly as a consequence of anti-personnel mines. We hope this trend will continue at the next meeting of the group of experts in January next year. We urge all States parties to participate in the work of the experts and in the Review Conference next year.

During the general debate we heard many expressions of concern about the indiscriminate effect of land-mines, especially on civilians. Australia shares these concerns. We are glad that the review process has prompted a number of States to ratify or accede to the Convention, but many countries that should already be parties, consistent with their concern about the land-mines problem, remain outside. The aim is universal adherence to the inhumane weapons Convention, which we regard as the authoritative international instrument covering land-mines. Efforts to regulate the use, production and export of land-mines are necessarily of a long-term nature and should in our view focus on this instrument. We urge all those Member States not yet parties to the Convention to seriously consider adhering to it, in keeping with their humanitarian concerns about the use of land-mines, before the review conference takes place, so that they can participate fully in its deliberations.

I commend draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.23 to the Committee.

The Chairman (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of Indonesia to introduce draft resolutions A/C.1/49/L.34, "Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament"; A/C.1/49/L.35, "Relationship between disarmament and development"; A/C.1/49/L.36, "Request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons"; and A/C.1/49/L.38, "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament".

Mr. Soegarda (Indonesia): I am honoured and privileged to introduce four draft resolutions under the rubric of "General and complete disarmament".

The first draft resolution, A/C.1/49/L.38, entitled "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament", is being introduced on behalf of the non-aligned countries. The draft before us undoubtedly reflects the profound changes that have taken place in world affairs and the resulting shifts in perceptions and policies towards nuclear disarmament. Such a transition is particularly manifest in agreements to limit and reduce nuclear armaments, including the signing of START II last January by the United States of America and the Russian Federation, which provides for significant reductions in the world's two biggest nuclear arsenals.

The Assembly would also commend the decisions to eliminate certain categories of nuclear weapons and to seek cooperative efforts to ensure the safety, security and environmentally sound destruction of nuclear weapons. In this context, we hope that continued dialogue will lead to even farther-reaching results.

The draft emphasizes that nuclear disarmament remains one of the principal tasks of our times, and in this context calls for the intensification of efforts to bring into force, at the earliest possible date, agreements already entered into. At the same time, it points out the responsibility of all States for contributing to arms reductions and disarmament.

The draft is the outcome of determined efforts by the non-aligned countries and in our view warrants the broad and continued support of member States in this Committee. We also believe that on an issue of such importance as nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament the international community, through the General Assembly, should speak with a unified voice. Such a stance would provide further impetus to the efforts of the two major Powers to reduce their levels of nuclear armaments and thus contribute to the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons. It is in this spirit that we commend the draft for unanimous adoption.

The second draft resolution, A/C.1/49/L.35, entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development", is also introduced on behalf of the non-aligned countries.

Mr. Tanaka (Japan), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

As in the past, the draft resolution is essentially procedural in nature. In it the Assembly welcomes the report of the Secretary-General and actions taken in accordance with the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, held in 1987. It requests him to continue his endeavours to implement the action programme adopted by the Conference and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session.

It is our belief that the relationship between disarmament and development has gained new momentum because of the expectations of a peace dividend; hence its importance to the non-aligned countries. We hope that the draft resolution will be adopted without a vote.

The third draft resolution, concerning a request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, contained in document A/C.1/49/L.36, is introduced on behalf of the non-aligned countries.

It is undeniable that throughout history mankind has used every weapon invented, including nuclear weapons. The devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in terms of both immediate and long-term horror, provided a most poignant and practical demonstration of what is, by today's standards, not even considered a minimum destructive capability. It is perhaps one of the more ominous paradoxes of history that the horror and tragedy of these two events should have given rise to the compulsion to obtain these weapons in ever-increasing number and sophistication. It can therefore rightly be said that humanity continues to be confronted by the real danger of self-extinction.

In the face of the enormity of the destruction that would ensue from the use of nuclear weapons, the General Assembly has unequivocally pronounced that such unconscionable use constitutes not only a violation of the Charter, but also a crime against humanity. Yet strategic doctrines have yet to be renounced, even in the post-cold-war era. Further aggravating the situation is the steadfast refusal to provide assurances of the non-use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States. Hence their use as a deliberate political choice remains a frightening possibility for a great majority of nations. Furthermore, a nuclear disaster triggered by technical malfunction, misinformation or human error cannot be ruled out.

Thus, as the draft resolution rightly notes, it is only through the complete elimination of nuclear weapons that the security of all nations can be ensured. But, despite the significant nuclear-arms limitation measures already achieved in recent times, the prospect of nuclear disarmament is not yet sure. Until then, the safety, security and survivability of all nations must be assured by banning the use of nuclear weapons.

The political, military and ethical questions concerning nuclear weapons have been dealt with on numerous occasions by the Member States. It is the legal implications of the use of nuclear weapons that have yet to be addressed and clarified. And it is in this context that a request is made in the draft resolution for an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice.

The fourth draft resolution, contained in document A/C.1/49/L.34, deals with the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Members may recall that six years have elapsed since the convening of the third special session in 1988. Since then the world has undergone profound changes and transformation in both the political landscape and the security environment. It has also been a time of intense activity in the areas of arms regulation and limitation, culminating in the conclusion of unprecedented disarmament agreements. We are encouraged by the progress being made in limiting nuclear, chemical and conventional armaments.

But the disarmament agenda is still unfinished; much more remains to be done. We are also aware of the need to broaden and deepen the dimensions of disarmament. Formidable obstacles to a nuclear-free world and to nuclear peace continue to exist, as large strategic forces are still maintained along with the untenable doctrines concerning their use. Accelerated efforts on the other priority issues are also needed, particularly for the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. Further compounding the situation is the proliferation of sophisticated armaments, the qualitative improvement of weapons through testing, the accelerated momentum in arms sales and the relentless accumulation of conventional armaments that are the main instruments of local wars and armed conflicts. Meanwhile, world military expenditures continue to be disproportionate to the unmet and urgent needs of developmental assistance. Hence, we should seek new and more substantive disarmament measures by focusing attention on those issues that have already been identified by the international community as priority concerns. It is therefore opportune to undertake a comprehensive assessment of progress made towards global disarmament endeavours.

For that purpose, the United Nations is the most appropriate forum. To a greater extent than ever before, it should be utilized as a forum for action-oriented dialogue and negotiations so that the Organization will be able to make an ever-greater contribution to resolving the myriad of disarmament issues that still confront us. The fourth special session will offer a unique opportunity to do so. Hence, its convening is both timely and appropriate. Against this backdrop, it is the hope of non-aligned countries that the draft resolution will elicit the support of all Member States.

Mr. Stoian (Romania): I wish to address draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.12, introduced at the beginning of this meeting by the representative of Nigeria.

The United Nations plays an important and valuable role in global and regional disarmament information and studies. The many activities of the Organization in this field help to promote disarmament, non-proliferation, transparency and confidence-building. In this context, the United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme has a specific and prominent place, not only in education, but also in preparing specialists able to disseminate information and even to take part in decision-making processes. In this sense, the programme has already provided training for a considerable number of officials selected from various geographical regions, most of whom are now in positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament affairs in their respective countries. By the end of 1994 the programme will have provided training for a total of 378 government officials from 133 Member States. The progress achieved to date in many areas of multilateral disarmament has underlined the need for more specialists with diplomatic skills, such as those carefully trained through the United Nations disarmament fellowship programme.

The radical changes in Eastern Europe entail not only a political reorientation of all these countries but also a profound restructuring of their institutions specialized in international relations, including those specialized in the field of disarmament. In this context, a new generation of young diplomats come within the framework of these institutions. They need to be kept informed about disarmament; the United Nations fellowship, training and advisory services programme could play a decisive role in disseminating such information.

Romania is one of the countries which, a few years ago, benefited from the facilities provided by the programme, and the students concerned are now reliable experts in the Department for Disarmament of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. May I take this opportunity to thank those countries which contributed to the programme which made possible the specialization of these diplomats. My thanks go also to the Centre for Disarmament Affairs and personally to the Senior Coordinator of the Programme, Mr. Ogunsola Ogunbanwo, for the capable way in which the classes were organized.

Mr. Issa (Egypt): This year the delegation of Egypt is privileged to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.15, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" on behalf of a group of co-sponsors consisting of Algeria, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Venezuela and my own delegation, Egypt.

Recent developments, which have heralded prospects for a new era of international cooperation, peace and security, have been accompanied by continued expenditure on research and development on weapons systems which could be placed in outer space and pose a serious threat to international security. The prevention of an arms race in outer space is of fundamental importance to the security of all States, whether or not they are space Powers.

This draft resolution, while reaffirming the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space, recognizes that the present legal regime applicable to outer space does not by itself guarantee the prevention of such a race. The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies plays a significant role in governing activities pertaining to outer space. However, there is a need for the adoption of additional legal instruments to make up for the inadequacies of the current legislation, to strengthen the regime and to enhance its effectiveness.

At the request of the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session, the Conference on Disarmament considered the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space during its 1994 session, and for this purpose re-established the Ad Hoc Committee which was first established in 1985. The view widely held within the Ad Hoc Committee, and endorsed by the co-sponsors of this draft resolution, is that the conclusion of a relevant international agreement or agreements should remain the task of the Ad Hoc Committee, and that the specific proposals on confidence-building measures should form an integral part of such agreements. To this end the co-sponsors hoped that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee would be extended so that it could complete its work in 1995. In addition, emphasis must be placed on the need for measures to ensure greater transparency, confidence and security regarding the peaceful use of outer space.

In conclusion, I express the hope that the overwhelming support traditionally received by similar draft resolutions will ultimately lead to the successful establishment of a comprehensive regime to ensure and encourage the peaceful use of outer space and prevent an arms race there.

Mr. Marín Bosch (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): We are pleased to see you, Ambassador Tanaka, chairing our work here in New York.

This morning we have heard a series of statements highlighting the fact that the First Committee has a wide range of very important disarmament issues to discuss. We are searching for a way to channel the work of the international community on disarmament, and we are, in one way or another, establishing a new agenda on disarmament and arms control questions — hence, for instance, the importance of the proposal in draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.34, introduced by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the non-aligned group, on convening the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We feel certain that this could be an occasion to review what we are doing here and in other multilateral forums, particularly the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

I wish also to refer briefly to draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.18 and the amendments to it contained in document A/C.1/49/L.45. No one denies the importance of the subject of transparency in armament matters. Mexico has supported such transparency since we debated what became General Assembly resolution 46/36 L of 9 December 1991. What happened then — and we think should happen now — is that there was agreement when the draft resolution was adopted without a vote on establishing a Register of Conventional Arms but including weapons of mass destruction later. The co-sponsors are asking us now to continue for another year to speak of conventional weapons, which indeed are very important, but we are thereby omitting the other aspect of the agreement, concerning weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, we are involved in an annual exercise, both here in New York in groups of governmental experts, and in Geneva in an ad hoc committee on the matter, of speaking of the subject without making progress on something that we think should be included — transparency in the field of weapons of mass destruction. That is why the Mexican delegation and the delegations of Algeria, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Myanmar, Nigeria and Sri Lanka have presented the amendments in document A/C.1/49/L.45. The basic purpose of the amendments is very simple: to have expert groups in both Geneva and New York for a couple of years, to see how the Register of Conventional Arms is developing from time to time and also to afford an opportunity, particularly to those countries that possess weapons of mass destruction, to think a little more about the appropriateness of including more transparency on these subjects. Hence our amendment would call for the addition, at the end of operative paragraph 4(a), of the following:

> "including its expansion to cover weapons of mass destruction".

The second amendment would make the present paragraph 4(b) much less ambitious and omit the expert group now proposed in draft resolution A/C.1/49/L.18.

The final amendment would delete the present operative paragraph 6, which reads

> "*Encourages* the Conference on Disarmament to continue its work undertaken in the field of transparency in armaments".

The subject is "transparency in armaments" not transparency in conventional armaments.

My delegation would now like to introduce the draft decision in document A/C.1/49/L.24. Last year the Mexican delegation presented a draft resolution on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery in all its aspects. We noted then that in the General Assembly everyone — Heads of State, Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers — had been referring to the question of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of vehicles for their delivery in all its aspects but that, unfortunately, no one was willing to do anything about it. We felt, therefore, that perhaps we might provide the First Committee with an opportunity to explore further options in this connection.

The result was the adoption of resolution 48/75 C, in which the Secretary-General was requested to prepare a short report containing a brief description of the question for transmission to a representative intergovernmental group of experts. We also suggested that those experts be persons represented in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. We are grateful to the Secretary-General for having prepared such a report; unfortunately, it was never transmitted to any group of experts. We shall not dwell on the subject this year, but we feel that here, as with transparency in armaments, we should provide countries possessing weapons of mass destruction with an opportunity to give some thought to the direction our work is taking. We would therefore urge that this subject be included in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly at its fiftieth session.

We are confident that the draft decision will be adopted by the Committee without a vote. We often hear the word "consensus" about all kinds of matters, but the General Assembly rules do not contain the word with regard to taking decisions; draft resolutions may be adopted without a vote, with a vote, by acclamation or unanimously, but not by consensus.

The Chairman: I now call upon the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Kheradi (Secretary of the Committee): I should like to inform the Committee that the following draft resolutions now have the following additional sponsors:

A/C.1/49/L.1/Rev.1: Belgium and the Republic of Moldova

A/C.1/49/L.8: Nepal

A/C.1/49/L.9/Rev.1: Thailand

A/C.1/49/L.12: South Africa, Thailand, Guinea and Hungary

A/C.1/49/L.13: Ireland, Belgium, Croatia and Swaziland

A/C.1/49/L.15: Myanmar

A/C.1/49/L.18: South Africa and Guinea

A/C.1/49/L.19: Belgium, Chad and Guinea

A/C.1/49/L.21: Belarus, Czech Republic and Belgium

A/C.1/49/L.22: Guinea and Croatia

A/C.1/49/L.25: Ecuador

A/C.1/49/L.26: South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Belize and Brunei Darussalam and Uruguay

A/C.1/49/L.29: Nepal, Republic of Moldova, Czech Republic and Uruguay

A/C.1/49/L.30/Rev.1: Chad, Togo and Benin

A/C.1/49/L.31: Costa Rica

A/C.1/49/L.32: Costa Rica

A/C.1/49/L.44: Belgium and Hungary

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.